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Summary
This thesis provides empirical evidence on the impact of the global financial crisis (2007-
2009), the European sovereign debt crisis (2009-2012) and central banks’s actions on
different economic agents in the euro area and in the United States. It is composed
by three independent chapters. The first chapter studies the impact of the above-
mentioned two periods of crisis on the relation between euro area and US interest rates
and the US dollar/euro exchange rate. The last two chapters focus on monetary policy
and its impact on households’ financial investment choices.
The first chapter is joint work with Malte Rieth. We use daily data from 2000 to
2016 to evaluate whether the structural relation between euro area and US interest rates
and the US dollar/euro exchange rate changes across normal and crisis times. Using
a structural VAR and exploiting the heteroskedasticity in the data for identification,
we find that, on the one hand, positive US interest rate shocks appreciate the dollar in
normal times, have no effect during the global financial crisis, and lead to a depreciation
of the dollar during the European sovereign debt crisis; on the other hand, the impact of
positive euro area interest rate shocks on the exchange rate surges during the European
crisis, but we find no evidence of time-varying effect (in terms of sign) across crisis and
non-crisis times. These patterns are consistent with the presence of a flight to safety
channel towards the US during the two crisis samples that alters the traditional interest
rate channel effect on exchange rates. Specifically, the results suggest that in times of
crisis the US dollar is considered a safe haven currency.
In the second chapter I use 2006-2016 survey data on Italian households’ financial
portfolios to examine how the unconventional monetary policies implemented by the
European Central Bank after 2007 affect households’ asset allocation choices. I focus
on two asset categories, Italian government bonds and Italian risky assets (equity,
corporate bonds and mutual funds). First, I disentangle any change in households’
investment in both categories into its active saving component (rebalancing) and its
passive saving component (capital gains) using financial indexes. Then, I estimate the
impact of unconventional measures on the active saving component. The empirical
analysis finds that accomodative unconventional monetary policy exerts a substantial
XXI
Summary
effect on the size and composition of households’ financial investment. In particular,
it induces a positive rebalancing into both Italian government bonds and risky assets,
although this is true only for households at the top of the income distribution. Thus, the
results show that, consistent with the confidence channel of unconventional monetary
policy, European Central Bank’s unconventional tools have contributed to reviving
Italian households’ appetite for some of the financial segments mostly hit by the crisis.
The third chapter is joint work with Chi Hyun Kim. We use US household survey
data from 2001-2017 to investigate whether monetary policy has heterogeneous effects
on the financial portfolio decisions of different household groups identified with a com-
bination or their head’s gender and marital status. On the one hand, we show that
monetary policy affects stock market entry decisions of single female-headed house-
holds, while we find no impact for single and married male-headed households. On the
other hand, we do not find any monetary policy’s heterogeneous effect on household
groups’ exit decision nor in their stock market investment rebalancing choices. These
results suggest that single female-headed households are more sensitive to monetary
policy cycles than male headed-households, but only if they are not already participat-
ing in the stock market.
Keywords: International Transmission, Safe Haven, Crisis, United States, Euro Area,
Monetary Policy, Unconventional Monetary Policy, Federal Reserve, European Central
Bank, Households’ Portfolio Choices, Gender.
JEL Classification: D14, E58, F31; G11, G51,J16.
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Zusammenfassung
Im Rahmen der vorliegenden Dissertation habe ich empirisch untersucht, wie sich die
globale Finanzkrise (2007-2009), die Europäische Schuldenkrise (2009-2012) und die
von den Zentralbanken ergriffenen Maßnahmen auf verschiedene Wirtschaftsteilnehmer
im Euroraum und in den Vereinigten Staaten ausgewirkt haben. Die Arbeit gliedert
sich in drei voneinander unabhängige Kapitel. Im ersten Kapitel wird analysiert, welche
Effekte die beiden aufeinanderfolgenden Krisen auf die Beziehung zwischen den Zins-
sätzen (in den USA und im Euroraum) und dem US-Dollar/Euro-Wechselkurs gehabt
haben. In den beiden letzten Kapiteln liegt der Fokus auf der und Geldpolitik und
darauf, wie sich diese auf die Investitionsentscheidungen privater Haushalte ausgewirkt
hat.
Der Schwerpunkt des ersten Kapitels, welches in Zusammenarbeit mit Malte Rieth
entstanden ist, liegt auf dem strukturellen Zusammenhang zwischen den Zinssätzen in
den USA und im Euroraum sowie dem US-Dollar/Euro-Wechselkurs in “normalen” Zei-
ten und Krisenzeiten. Wir verwenden tägliche Daten von 2000 bis 2016. Durch Anwen-
dung eines strukturellen vektorautoregressiven Modells (VAR-Modell) unter Ausnut-
zung der vorhandenen Heteroskedastizität in den Daten stellen wir fest, dass positive
Zinsschocks in den USA in “normalen” Zeiten zu einer Aufwertung des Dollars füh-
ren, ein derartiger Effekt während der globalen Finanzkrise jedoch nicht zu beobachten
war und es während der Europäischen Schuldenkrise zu einer Abwertung des Dollars
kam. Zinsschocks im Euroraum haben während der Schuldenkrise einen vergleichswei-
se größeren Einfluss auf den Wechselkurs gehabt. Das Verhalten der Wechselkurse in
Krisenzeiten steht im Einklang damit, dass während der Krisen ein “flight to safety
channel” für Investoren Richtung USA vorhanden war, wodurch die standardmäßige
Effekte des Zinskanals als Transmissionsmechanismus auf die Wechselkurse modifiziert
wurde.
Im zweiten Kapitel wird basierend auf Umfragedaten über die Finanzportfolios ita-
lienischer Haushalte, die sich auf den Zeitraum von 2006 bis 2016 beziehen, untersucht,
inwiefern sich die unkonventionellen geldpolitischen Maßnahmen der Europäischen Zen-
tralbank (EZB) auf die Entscheidungen der Haushalte hinsichtlich der Aufteilung ihres
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Vermögens auf verschiedene Anlagen ausgewirkt haben. Aus dabei auftretenden Vermö-
gensänderungen wurden mithilfe von Finanzindizes die Effekte isoliert, die auf aktives
Sparen (Portfolioumschichtungen) zurückgeführt werden können.
Anschließend wurden anhand von zwei ausgewählten Anlageoptionen - italienische
Staatsanleihen und riskante Aktiva (Aktien, Unternehmensanleihen und offene Invest-
mentfonds) - ermittelt, welchen Einfluss die unkonventionellen Maßnahmen auf Port-
folioumschichtungen hatten. Im Rahmen der empirischen Untersuchung hat sich her-
ausgestellt, dass die Maßnahmen der EZB einen erheblichen Einfluss auf den Umfang
und die Zusammensetzung der Finanzportfolios von privaten Haushalten hatten, ein-
schließlich eines prozyklischen Anstiegs der Investitionen in sowohl Staatsanleihen als
auch in risikobehaftete Aktiva - jedoch nur bei den Haushalten am oberen Ende der
Einkommensverteilung. Die Ergebnisse veranschaulichen die Wirkung der unkonven-
tionellen geldpolitischen Maßnahmen der EZB. Die Maßnahmen haben seit 2007 zur
Wiederbelebung Nachfrage in einigen Segmenten des Finanzmarktes, die am stärksten
von der Krise betroffen waren, beigetragen.
Das dritte Kapitel ist in Zusammenarbeit mit Chi Hyun Kim entstanden. Wir haben
Umfragedaten aus den USA für die Jahre 2001-2017 ausgewertet, um zu untersuchen,
ob die Geldpolitik eine unterschiedliche Wirkung auf die Investitionsentscheidungen
der verschiedenen Haushaltsgruppen gehabt hat. Zu diesem Zweck wurden die ein-
zelnen Haushalte anhand des Geschlechts sowie des Familienstands des Haushaltsvor-
stands zu Gruppen zusammengefasst. Auf der einen Seite konnten wir so zeigen, dass
die Geldpolitik die Entscheidung für den Einstieg in den Aktienmarkt im Falle von
Single-Haushalten mit einem weiblichen Haushaltsvorstand beeinflusst, während geld-
politische Schocks die Entscheidungen von Single-Haushalten mit einem männlichen
Haushaltsvorstand und die von Haushalten mit einem verheirateten männlichen Haus-
haltsvorstand diesbezüglich nicht beeinflussen. Auf der anderen Seite konnten wir für
die geldpolitischen Schocks keine heterogenen Effekte in Bezug auf die Entscheidung
der Haushaltsgruppen für den Ausstieg aus dem Aktienmarkt oder deren Entscheidun-
gen zur Umschichtung ihrer Portfolios nachweisen. Diese Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin,
dass Single-Haushalte mit einem weiblichen Haushaltsvorstand sensibler auf geldpoli-
tische Zyklen reagieren als Haushalte mit einem männlichen Haushaltsvorstand, aber
nur, wenn sie nicht schon an der Börse aktiv sind.
Schlagworte: Internationale Transmision, Safe Haven, Krisen, USA, Eurozone, Geldpo-
litik, Unkonventionelle Geldpolitik, Federal Reserve, Europäische Zentralbank, Portfo-
lioentscheidungen von Haushalte, Geschlecht.
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In the first two decades of the 21st Century, the euro area and the United States have
witnessed periods of strong financial and economic instability that forced policy makers
and researchers to rethink macroeconomic policies, financial supervision and as well as
central banks’ role and objectives. First, the global financial crisis (2007-2009) showed
how little was known about the dangers posed by the financial system and about the
consequences of periods of crisis on financial markets. Then, the European sovereign
debt crisis (2009-2012) revealed the weaknesses of the Euro area currency union and
of its fiscal policy. To some extent, the real and financial consequences of these events
are still unfolding as I write.
Exceptional times called for exceptional measures. The European Central Bank
(ECB) and the Federal Reserve (as well as many other central banks around the world)
have reacted to these challenges aggressively, cutting monetary policy rates and imple-
menting the so called “unconventional monetary policies” (UMPs). In particular, the
main objectives of these unconventional tools were to address problems in the mone-
tary policy transmission mechanism and to provide additional monetary stimulus once
standard policy rates could not be lowered further (Potter and Smets, 2019).
Motivated by these events, the three independent chapters of this thesis provide em-
pirical evidence on the impact of periods of crisis and central banks’ actions on different
economic agents, with a focus on the euro area and the United States. The first chap-
ter evaluates the impact of periods of crisis on financial markets and studies how the
structural relation between interest rates and the US dollar/euro exchange rate changes
across tranquil times, the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis.
The last two chapters take a different perspective and focus on monetary policy and
its impact on households’ financial investment choices. Chapter 2 evaluates how the
unconventional monetary policy implemented by the European Central Bank affects
the financial portfolio choices of Italian households. Chapter 3 analyzes whether gender




From the methodological point of view, this thesis applies different econometric
techniques, depending on the research focus and the type of data used for the analysis.
Chapter 1 employs a structural VAR identified through the heteroskedasticity present in
the data to reach identification (Rigobon, 2003; Lanne and Lütkepohl, 2008). Chapters
2 and 3 use cross-sectional data and panel data econometric techniques applied to
microdata obtained from household-level surveys.
The first chapter, titled Interest Rates and Exchange Rates in Normal and Crisis
Time, is a joint work with Malte Rieth. The global financial crisis and the subsequent
European sovereign debt crisis (or European crisis) had substantial effects on global
exchange rate configurations (Fratzscher, 2009; Ehrmann et al., 2014). In particular,
the US-dollar/euro exchange rate decreased sharply after the fall of Lehman Brothers,
with hitherto unseen increases in volatility that persisted also through the European
crisis. Nonetheless, the literature that explains the determinants of the USD/EUR ex-
change rate behavior during these two crisis episodes is limited. Fratzscher (2009) and
Kohler (2010) explain the 2008-2009 dollar appreciation with switch in the relationship
between the currency and US macroeconomic announcements and with the safe haven
status of the dollar, respectively. The studies that focus on the European crisis find
contrasting results (Ehrmann et al., 2014; Stracca, 2015). Moreover, no study considers
nor compares the behavior of the USD/EUR exchange rate in both crisis episodes.
Chapter 1 attemps to shed new light on exchange rate behaviour in times of crisis by
focussing on how the structural relationship between the USD/EUR exchange rate, the
euro area and the US interest rates changes across tranquil times, the global financial
crisis and the European crisis. We employ a structural VAR model and we include the
US dollar/euro exchange rate, the 2-year German Bund rate (as a proxy for the euro
area interest rate), and the 2-year US Treasury rate. We collect data from January
2000 through October 2016 and we split the sample into four sub-periods: pre-crisis,
global financial crisis, European crisis, and post-crisis. A main difficulty in identify-
ing the causal effects between interest rates and exchange rates is the endogeneity of
these asset prices even at the daily frequency. We circumvent this issue by using the
heteroskedasticity in the data to identify the contemporaneous impacts of asset price
changes (Rigobon, 2003; Lanne and Lütkepohl, 2008).
Our findings contribute to the literature by showing that the relation between interest
rates and exchange rates changes during crisis episodes. In the two non-crisis samples
we find that the US dollar/euro exchange rate responds in a manner consistent with
the traditional interest rate channel, which is decreasing (increasing) in response to a
positive shock to the US (euro area) interest rate. On the contrary, in the two crisis
samples we find a striking asymmetry between the effects of the US and euro area
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interest rates. While during the global financial crisis both interest rate shocks cease
to have an impact on the USD/EUR FX, during the European crisis both areas’ shocks
become significant, with the impact of the US interest rate shock having opposite sign
with respect to the non-crisis samples. The documented patterns are consistent with a
flight to safety channel towards the dollar in time of distress that alters the traditional
interest rate channel of exchange rate. Specifically, the results suggest that during
crises the US dollar is considered a safe haven currency.
The second chapter, titled Unconventional Monetary Policy and Households’ Fi-
nancial Portfolio Choices deals with the impact of monetary policy and households’
financial choices. Unconventional monetary policy is expected to affect investors’ port-
folio choices, for example through the portfolio rebalancing channel or the confidence
channel (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011; Krishnamurthy et al., 2017;
Fratzscher et al., 2018). Yet, in the current academic debate on the impact of unconven-
tional tools on households’ wealth redistribution it is always assumed that households
do not adjust their portfolios in response to monetary policy (Adam and Tzamourani,
2016; Casiraghi et al., 2018; Ampudia et al., 2018; Lenza and Slacalek, 2018). This
chapter analyzes the impact of unconventional monetary policy on how much house-
holds decide to rebalance their portfolio in the context of a specific case: the impact
of the European Central Bank’s unconventional tools on the portfolio rebalancing of
Italian households.
I combine the 2006-2016 waves of the Bank of Italy Survey on Household income and
Wealth with financial indexes. This allows me to isolate the active saving component
of households’ investment in Italian government bonds and Italian risky assets (equity,
corporate bonds and mutual funds). Then, I estimate the impact of unconventional
monetary policy on these two active saving components. Analysing households’ portfo-
lio choices is important not only because it gives new insights into the effectiveness and
the transmission channels of unconventional measures, but especially because it sheds
new light on an under-explored channel through which unconventional tools can affect
wealth redistribution: the one that stems from households’ heterogeneous response to
monetary easing.
Results show that in a period of financial turbulence in which households have dras-
tically reduced their financial investment, accommodative unconventional tools boost
the investment in both Italian government bonds and Italian risky assets. These find-
ings are consistent with the so-called confidence channel of monetary policy and point
toward the effectiveness of central banks in restoring Italian households’ trust in the
financial system. The study also finds that these results only hold for households in the
top quartile of the income distribution. Moreover, I conduct a simulation exercise that
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evaluates the impact of unconventional tools on households’ financial wealth consider-
ing both UMP-induced valuation and rebalancing effects. The simulation shows that
the differences in household portfolio performance across the income distribution has
to be attributed almost solely to the rebalancing component. This suggests that rebal-
ancing decisions play a prominent role in the effects of monetary policy on households’
wealth redistribution.
The third chapter, titled The Effect of Monetary Policy on Stock Market Invest-
ment Decisions: The Role of Gender and Marital Status, is a joint work with Chi Huyn
Kim. One key aspect of the current debate on possible redistributional effects of cen-
tral banks’ actions (Yellen, 2016; Draghi, 2016) is to understand what are households’
financial and demographic characteristics that interact with monetary policy. Several
papers document monetary policy’s heterogeneous effects along income, wealth, house
ownership, employment status and age (see, among the others, Bivens, 2015; Ampu-
dia et al., 2018; Wong, 2019). In this chapter we take a different perspective and we
evaluate the impact of gender and marital status on monetary policy-driven financial
portfolio decisions, focusing in particular on single female-headed households.
In the financial literature the link among gender, marital status, risk preferences
and investment decisions is well established. The empirical findings show that men
invest significantly more in financial assets than women. Moreover, women are more
risk averse (Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998; Sunden and Surette, 1998; Fisher and
Yao, 2017) and less confident in their investment decisions(Barber and Odean, 2001;
Croson and Gneezy, 2009). In a prolonged period of low interest rates - and, thus, high
asset prices - the single female-headed households’ low propensity to bear financial risks
and invest in financial assets may lead to a distributional divergence between different
household groups.
Thus, we investigate whether monetary policy has a different impact on the stock
market investment decisions of single-female headed households and both single and
married male-headed households. We use survey data from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) between 2001 and 2017. Employing different econometric techniques,
we show that on the one hand, contractionary monetary policy negatively affects single
female-headed households’ stock market status, decreasing their probability of stock
market entry (while this is not the case for male headed-households). On the other
hand, we do not find any monetary policy’s heterogeneous effect on household groups’
exit decision or in their stock market investment rebalancing choices. Finally, we
conduct a simulation study to quantify the missed out capital gains stemming from
monetary policy-driven stock market non-participation.
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We conclude that the single female-headed households are more sensitive to monetary
policy cycles than male headed-households in their investment decisions, but only if
they are not already participating in the stock market.
This thesis is an attempt to shed light over some recent economic events, which
left behind many open questions in the fields of both macroeconomics and finance. I
see these chapters as the beginning of a personal research agenda, as well as a modest
attempt to better understand the consequences of the most prominent events unfolding




Interest Rates and Exchange Rates in Normal and Cri-
sis Times1
1.1 Introduction
A long-standing puzzle in international macroeconomics and finance is the difficulty to
explain and predict exchange rate fluctuations (Rossi, 2006). In their seminal work,
Meese and Rogoff (1983) show that a simple random walk beats various exchange
rate models in terms of forecasting performance. A large number of subsequent pa-
pers introduced nonlinearities to improve the explanatory power of these models and
to understand the determination of exchange rates. One strand focuses on reduced
form forecasting models (Rossi, 2006, 2013). Several other studies center on changes
in the structural relations between macroeconomic fundamentals and exchange rates
(Fratzscher, 2009; Bacchetta et al., 2009; Mumtaz and Sunder-Plassmann, 2013). Fi-
nally, a different strand focuses on the relationship between interest rates (and espe-
cially their differential) and exchange rate (for example, Flood and Rose, 2002; Cheung
et al., 2005; Engel, 2016), as the former are considered foundamental predictors of the
latter (Rossi, 2013; Engel, 2014). In this Chapter, we empirically revisit the relation-
ship between interest rates and exchange rate, focusing our attention on whether it
changes across normal and crisis times.
The choice to take a closer look to the possible changes in the interest rates/exchange
rate relationship across different periods is motivated by the crisis episodes originating
in the US (the 2007-2009 global financial crisis) and the in euro area (the 2009-2012 Eu-
ropean sovereign debt crisis, or European crisis), as well as by the integration of global
1This chapter is joint work with Malte Rieth. We thank Menzie Chinn, Michael Ehrmann, Marcel
Fratzscher, Peter Karadi, Angela Maddaloni, Lukas Menkhoff, Andreas Schrimpf. We are partic-
ularly grateful to Kenza Benhima and all participants to the WinE retreat, Lisbon, to the EEA
annual conference, Lisbon, to the Jahreestagung of the Verein für Sozialpolitik, Vienna, as well as to
participants of the DIW PhD internal seminar for helpful comments and suggestions.
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financial markets. The latter has increased substantially since the turn of the century,
with US markets, investors, and monetary policy playing a main role in the determi-
nation of international asset prices (Rey, 2015), including the exchange rates. During
the global financial crisis, investors repatriated funds to the US (Fratzscher, 2009; Mc-
Cauley and McGuire, 2009) and they fled the euro during the European debt crisis
(Ehrmann et al., 2014). Reflecting these developments, the US-dollar/euro exchange
rate decreased sharply after the fall of Lehman Brothers, with hitherto unseen increases
in volatility in the following two periods of crisis (see Figure 1.1). Nonetheless, the lit-
erature explaining the determinants of the USD/EUR exchange rate behavior during
these two crisis episodes is limited. Few works explain the 2008-2009 dollar appre-
ciation with switch in the relationship between the currency and US macroeconomic
announcements (Fratzscher, 2009), or with the safe haven status of the dollar (Kohler,
2010). Few other papers stress the role of US dollar shortages generated by the funding
of net long US dollar exposure by European banks (McCauley and McGuire, 2009; Hui
et al., 2011). The few studies that focus on the European crisis find contrasting results.
On the one hand, Ehrmann et al. (2014) show that neither macroeconomic fundamen-
tals, nor policy actions or the public debate by policy makers are able to explain euro
exchange rate volatility between 2009 and 2012. On the other hand, Stracca (2015)
finds that European crisis did have a consistent and depreciationary effect on the euro
exchange rate. Moreover, no study encompasses nor compares these crisis episodes
when analysing exchange rate developments.
Against this background, this Chapter attemps to shed new light on exchange rate
behaviour in times of crisis by focussing on how the structural relationship between the
USD/EUR exchange rate, the euro area and the US interest rates changes across tran-
quil times, the global financial crisis and the European crisis. In fact, understanding
the determinants of the nominal exchange rate, especially in time of economic distress,
is crucial from both the financial and the real point of view. On the one hand, the US
dollar/euro exchange rate is the biggest and most important of all foreign exchange
(FX) markets, with daily turnover of almost $1.3 trillion and with a market share of
24% of all FX markets (2013). On the other hand, it is important for policymakers
and practitioners alike since this price determines foreign demand for home goods if
prices are sticky.
The empirical model includes three asset prices at the two-day frequency - the 2-year
interest rate on the German Bunds (as a proxy for the euro area interest rate), the
2-year interest rate on the US Treasury and the US dollar/euro exchange rate - over the
2
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years 2000 to 2016.2 We split the sample into four subperiods, the pre-crisis, global fi-
nancial crisis, European crisis and post-Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT). Within
each subsample, we model each asset with a multifactor model and then we use the
heteroscedasticity in the data to identify the contemporaneous impacts of asset price
changes (Sentana and Fiorentini, 2001; Rigobon, 2003; Lanne and Lütkepohl, 2008). In
a nutshell, this identification strategy exploits the fact that periods of higher interest
rate volatility contain additional information on the response of the exchange rate to
interest rates changes. These shifts in the volatility of interest rates can then be used
as a “probabilistic instrument" (Rigobon, 2003) to trace out the impact of interest rate
shocks on the exchange rate. Similarly, the framework allows quantifying the strength
of contemporaneous interest rate spillovers across the Atlantic.
The empirical analysis finds significant changes across subsamples in the structural
relations among the endogenous variables. In the pre-crisis sample exchange rate move-
ments are dominated by the US interest rate shocks, while in the post-crisis sample
both euro area and US interest rates are of similar importance for the determination
of the exchange rate. Moreover, in both non-crisis periods (pre-crisis and post-OMT)
we find that the US dollar/euro exchange rate responds in a manner consistent with
the traditional interest rate channel, which is decreasing (increasing) in response to a
positive shock to the US (euro area) interest rate. On the contrary, in the two crisis
samples we find a striking asymmetry between the effects of US and euro area interest
rate shocks on the exchange rate. While during the global financial crisis both US and
euro area shocks cease to have an impact on the USD/EUR FX, during the European
crisis both areas’ shocks become significant. What is interesting, though, is that in
the second crisis subsample, the impact of the US interest rate flips sign with respect
to the non-crisis samples, and a positive US interest rate shock has a negative impact
the exchange rate. On the contrary, the euro area shock effects are in line with the
non-crisis periods (although significantly bigger in magnitude). For the bidirectional
spillovers between interest rates, we find that they are stronger from the US to the euro
area than vice versa across all subsamples but that they do not change in magnitude
or sign over time. These results are qualitatively and quantitatively robust to various
alterations of the model and the data. Specifically, we assess the sensitivity of the
estimates to changing the definition of the volatility regimes used for the identification,
including a market sentiment variable, considering additional interest rate maturities
and merging the two crisis periods in one.
2This Chapter was produced at an earlier stage of the dissertation. For this reason the analysed data
sample ends at the end of 2016.
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The findings are supported by the forecast error variance decomposition. US interest
rate shocks explain a larger fraction of exchange rate and interest rates variability in
the pre-crisis, lose their role during the global financial crisis and they gain it back
during the European crisis. Euro area interest rate shock contribution to explaining
exchange rate variation peaks during the European crisis. Finally, the regression of
the US/EUR exchange rate on the euro area and US macroeconomic news confirms
this pattern. In particular, in the post-OMT subsample, a positive news shock - i.e. a
better than expected performance of the US economy - leads to an appreciation of the
dollar and, in turn, to a decrease of the exchange rate. On the contrary, during the
two crises there is evidence of a switch in sign, implying that some positive news about
the US economy is perceived even better for the euro area, leading to an appreciation
of the euro and pushing up the exchange rate.
Our findings show that the relation between interest rates and exchange rates changes
during crisis episodes and provide a potential explanation for why uncovered interest
parity may not hold on average (Engel, 2014). The documented patterns are consistent
with a flight to safety channel towards the dollar in time of distress that alters the
traditional interest rate channel of exchange rate. Specifically, the results suggest that
during the crises the US dollar is considered a safe haven currency. While exogenous
decrease in US interest rates typically lead to a depreciation of the dollar, during
crisis times, i.e. when financial distress is high, investors might perceive them as a
positive signal about the state of the US economy and increase their demand for what
they perceive being a safer currencies. According to our results, the safe haven effect
seems to offset the traditional interest rate channel for US interest rate shocks in the
global financial crisis and dominate (and revert) it during the European debt crisis.
The Chapter also shows that the ECB’s announcement of the OMT program seems
to have re-established normality in the foreign exchange market. After Summer 2012
the impact of both US and euro area interest rates shocks are consistent with the
traditional interest rate channel and of similar importantance.
Our paper contributes to several strands of literature. Generally, it connects to em-
pirical studies of the relationship between exchange rates and interest rates. Ehrmann
et al. (2011), using a vector autoregressive model estimated on pre-crisis data, find
that both US and euro area interest rate shocks are important for USD/EUR ex-
change rate developments. A long-standing literature analyses this relationship within
the framework of the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP), which states that interest
rates are fundamental in determining the exchange rate. UIP is a cornerstone of in-
ternational finance, constituting an important building block of many exchange rate
determination theories. However, the empirical evidence supporting UIP is mixed.
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While several papers find evidence favoring this relation (Baillie and Bollerslev, 2000;
Chinn and Meredith, 2004), others document its failure (Bekaert et al., 1997; Engel,
1996; Bekaert et al., 2007).
Another, more closely, related literature analyses whether the behavior of exchange
rates changes during particular time periods. Focusing on the global financial crisis,
Fratzscher (2009) shows that this episode triggered sharp and unexpected currency
movements, with domestic macroeconomic fundamentals and the financial exposure of
individual countries playing a key role in the transmission of US shocks; Kohler (2010)
finds that safe haven flows and the role played by interest rate differentials contribute
to explain why a large number of countries that were not at the centre of the crisis
depreciated against the US dollar, the Japanese yen and the Swiss franc. Concentrating
on the European crisis, Ehrmann et al. (2014) present evidence that the euro mainly
danced to its own tune, with fundamentals and policy decisions possessing only a little
explanatory power with respect to exchange rate fluctuations. Swanson and Williams
(2014) investigate the effect of the zero lower bound on asset price formation using
an event study design. They show that interest rates are partially constrained during
this period, while exchange rates are not. Similarly, Stavrakeva and Tang (2016) show
that the contemporaneous relation between yields at different maturities and exchange
rates changed after the zero lower bound was hit in the US, based on a model with
VAR-based expectations of short-run yields and inflation. Several other papers analyze
whether there are differences between the effects of conventional and unconventional
monetary policy shocks on exchange rates (Glick and Leduc, 2013; Kiley, 2013; Glick
and Leduc, 2015; Ferrari et al., 2016). The main difference between these papers and
our work is that we do not analyze the relationship between exchange rate and interest
rates conditional on a particular shock, but more generally we study the reaction of
the exchange rate to interest rate shocks.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, we derive the main hypothesis
for the analysis. In Section 1.3, we outline the empirical model and describe the data.
Section 1.4 outlines the empirical findings. Section 1.5 contains the robustness checks,
before the last section concludes.
1.2 Conceptual framework
This Chapter analyses the unconditional relationship between exchange rate and inter-
est rates. In this section, we derive our main hypothesis for the empirical analysis. We
first discuss the contemporaneous links between interest rates and exchange rates in
normal times. Then, we outline potential effects of periods of crisis on this relationship.
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Among financial market operators, folk wisdom establishes that a country’s currency
appreciates as its interest rates increase relative to those of another country (Stavrakeva
and Tang, 2016). This basic and contemporaneous relationship derives from the un-
covered interest rate parity (UIP) condition. The UIP provides a simple relationship
between the interest rate on an asset denominated in a domestic country’s currency
unit, the interest rate on similar asset denominated in a foreign country’s currency,
and the expected rate of change in the spot exchange rate between the two curren-
cies, conditional to the risk-neutrality and the market efficiency hypotheses. The UIP
predicts that an increase in the domestic to foreign interest rate differential is, ceteris
paribus, associated with an appreciation of the domestic currency. In the context of





t = α + β(r
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where eUS,EAt is the natural logarithm of the spot exchange rate of US-dollar per unit
of euro, rUSt is the US nominal interest rate, rEAt is the euro area nominal interest rate
proxied by the German interest rate, and h is the horizon. The UIP predicts that high
interest rate currencies will depreciate relative to low interest rate currencies.
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t −∆rEAt . (1.2)
For sufficiently large horizons, Et(∆eUS,EAt+h ) should be very small because, conditional
on t, when h increases the difference between Et(et+h) and Et(et+h−1) decreases (the
value of the two forecasts should be very close); hence, we assume it is close to zero
(Kiley, 2013).
Equation (1.2) can be written as
∆eUS,EAt = −∆rUSt + ∆rEAt . (1.3)
Equation (1.3) gives a (consistent with theory) contemporaneous relationship between
changes in interest rates and exchange rate. It implies that an increase in ∆rUSt (∆rEAt )
yields to an appreciation of the dollar (euro), that in turn leads to a decrease (increase)
in the US dollar/euro exchange rate.
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The following equation is the relationship we build our empirical framework on
∆eUS,EAt = α− β1∆rUSt + β2∆rEAt + εt. (1.4)
It is important to note that, although derived from the UIP condition, our model
relaxes the assumption of common coefficients between the two interest rates. In fact,
separating the coefficients allows us to understand how the relative contribution to
the exchange rate formation of the two interest rates evolves over time. Thus, from
Equation (1.4), in normal times we expect a positive shock to the US (euro area)
interest rate to appreciate the dollar (the euro) and, in turn, to decrease (increase) the
exchange rate.
Results may change in times of financial distress. A relatively well-established liter-
ature finds that returns on low-interest rate currencies tend to be negatively correlated
with global risk aversion, while high- yield currencies often crash exactly when global
risk aversion is high (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2008). This implies that, in times of
crisis, large deviations from the UIP condition may occur, with low yield currencies
appreciating during times of global financial stress (see, among others, Flood and Rose,
2002; Habib and Stracca, 2012). This may be due to an increase in market participants’
risk aversion or to the failure of the rational expectation hypothesis. In particular, if
market operators become risk averse, the UIP may not hold because agents require
rates of return that are higher than the interest differential for holding a country asset
(Fama, 1984; Taylor, 1995).
The failure of the UIP can lead to the safe haven phenomenon: a currency is con-
sidered a safe haven if, in periods of high uncertainty and risk aversion, it appears to
be more attractive than others. In particular, the definition of safe haven implies that
the relative price of such an asset should increase during crises. Moreover, in contrast
to a hedge currency, which is expected to appreciate on average, a safe haven currency
is expected to appreciate against others only in times of uncertainty (Beckmann and
Czudaj, 2017). This definition of safe haven currency is in line with the dollar’s behav-
ior between at least 2008 and 2009. In fact, as noted by several observers (Fratzscher
2009; McCauley and McGuire 2009; Beckmann and Czudaj 2017; Reinhart and Rein-
hart 2008; Kohler 2010), one paradoxical aspect of the global financial crisis was the
appreciation of the US currency and its behavior as safe haven, despite the fact that
the financial crisis had been generated by, and was propagating from, the US to the
rest of the world. What is less clear is if the dollar’s role as safe haven can be extended
also vis-à-vis the euro and if it holds not only during the global financial crisis but also
throughout the subsequent European crisis.
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The safe haven phenomenon operates in the direction opposite to the UIP one. If we
consider the US dollar as a safe haven, this would imply that a positive shock to the
US interest rate would lead to an depreciation of the dollar, leading to an increase in
the exchange rate. Considering again Equation (1.4), this would imply a sign reversion
of the β1 coefficient, leading to the following equation




t + εt. (1.5)
From Equation (1.4) and (1.5), it follows that in turbulent times both the standard
(UIP-consistent) effect and the safe haven effect can be in place and that it is ex-ante
unclear which one will prevail, as they could offset each other. Thus, in times of crisis,
we expect an increase of the euro area interest rate to lead to an appreciation of the
euro (and, thus, to an increase of exchange rate), while it is unclear what is the effect
of a positive shock to the US interest rate on the dollar and, in turn, its final effect on
the exchange rate.
1.3 Empirical analysis
This section presents the empirical model, the data and the estimation methodology.
1.3.1 Empirical model and data
The structural VAR model is
Ayt = c̃+ Ã1yt−1 + ...+ Ãpyt−p + Γ̃xt + εt, (1.6)
where yt is the vector of endogenous variables, which includes: eUS,EAt , the natural
logarithm of the nominal exchange rate measured as the amount of US dollars per one
euro (such that an increase in the variable reflects a depreciation of the US dollar vis-à-
vis the euro); rEAt , the risk-free rate in the euro area, approximated through the 2-year
rate on German government bond; rUSt , the 2-year rate on the US Treasury bonds. All








xt is a vector of exogenous variables; Ãt and Γ̃ with i = 0, ..., p are coefficient matrices
that capture the lagged and contemporaneous effects of the endogenous and exogenous
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variables, respectively; c̃ is a vector of constants; finally, εt is a vector of structural
shocks with diagonal variance matrix Σε = E(εtε′t). Table 1.7 in the Appendix contains
the summary statistics of the endogenous variables.
The vector of exogenous variables xt includes the news or surprise component of
macroeconomic announcements for both the US and the euro area about real, financial,
and confidence variables. These surprises are computed as the actual realization of the
economic indicators minus the financial market’s expectations from few days before.
The data are obtained from Bloomberg. Several papers show that macroeconomic
surprises are important for the development of exchange rates and interest rates (among
the others, Andersen et al. 2003 and Swanson and Williams 2014). For this reason, it is
crucial to take them into account to rule out the possibility that asset price shocks are
driven by common shocks, as this would imply the non-orthogonality of the structural
shocks. Table 1.8 in the Appendix provides the complete list of included macroeconomic
news, together with their summary statistics. We also include dummies for the day of
the week.
Data is collected at daily frequency from Datastream and Bloomberg for the January
1, 2000, to October 31, 2016, period. We split the data into four subsamples: a pre-
crisis period, the global financial crisis, the European sovereign debt crisis, and the
period post-OMT (see Figure 1.1). The first subsample runs from the beginning of the
sample until August 9, 2007, when the largest French bank BNP Paribas temporarily
halted redemptions from three of its funds that were holding assets backed by US
subprime mortgage debt. This event is seen by many commentators as the trigger
of the global financial crisis (Trichet, 2010; Cecchetti, 2008). The second subsample
follows the dating of Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2017) and it covers the period from
August 10, 2007, until September 1, 2009, when the newly elected Greek government
announced for the first time that there could be issues with the Greek government debt
and deficit data. Then the European sovereign crisis subsample starts, continuing until
September 30, 2012, which is after ECB President Draghi’s “Whatever it takes" speech
on July 26, 2012, and after the ECB’s official announcement and implementation of the
OMT program (August and September 2012). Finally, the post-OMT period runs from
October 1, 2012, until the end of the sample. As we formally show in the main analysis,
the data support this sample split, as the structural relations among the endogenous
variables change significantly across subsamples. Throughout the Chapter, the analysis
and the results are conducted and reported separately for the four subperiods.
We construct 2-day windows following Ehrmann et al. (2011). In fact, US shocks
may occur after the closing of European markets, thus affecting the latter only on
the next business day. To avoid losing information on macroeconomic surprises, all
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news that would happen on an excluded day are moved forward and reported as if
they would occur on the next business day. Both endogenous and exogenous variables
are standardized prior to estimation, as this enable us to compare the relative effects
of variables having different units of measurement. The standardization is subsample
specific.
1.3.2 Identification through heteroscedasticity
For estimation we pre-multiply the structural VAR model (1.6) by A−1
yt = A




and re-write it as
yt = c+ A1yt−1 + ...+ Apyt−1 + Γxt + ut, (1.7)
where the vector of reduced form shocks Aut = εt is related to the structural shocks
through matrix A. The matrix A is the focus of the Chapter because it contains the
contemporaneous effects of structural shocks on the endogenous variables (i.e., without
taking into account all instantaneous feedbacks among variables). In particular, the
off-diagonal elements of matrix A are of main interest for us, as they indicate the effect
on impact of the interest rates on the exchange rate. After estimation, we are able
to assess the effect of a positive shock to the euro area and US interest rates on the
USD/EUR exchange rate in crisis and non-crisis times by testing whether, within each
subsample, α1,2 and α1,3 ≶ 0, where αj,k is the respective element in the estimated A.
Moreover, we are also able to test and compare estimates across subsamples.
The parameters of equation (1.7) and the covariance matrix of the reduced form,
Σu, can be consistently estimated by ordinary least squares. In particular, based on
the Bayesian information criterion, in the analysis of each subsample we include one
lag of the endogenous variables, but in the post-OMT one, where we include two, so to
obtain residuals free from autocorrelation. However, in order to recover the structural
parameters, we need to identify the impact matrix A. From Equation (1.6) and (1.7), it
follows that Σu = A−1Σε(A−1)′. In this system, the number of unknowns is larger than
the number of independent equations and it is necessary to add additional information
to achieve the identification of the impact matrix A. A common practice in the struc-
tural VAR literature is to impose zero restrictions. However, as exchange rates and
government interest rates react simultaneously to each other, it is difficult to defend
the imposition of zero restrictions. One alternative option would be employing sign
restrictions, which allows for contemporaneous effects among the variables. The side
effect of this approach is that it constrains the response of the endogenous variables to
10
Chapter 1 Interest Rates and Exchange Rates in Normal and Crisis Times
be of an ex-ante determined sign. However, as there is no consensus in the literature
on the bi-directional causality between asset price relationships, it is difficult to de-
velop a robust sign scheme that would allow the identification of shocks. For example,
Fratzscher (2009) finds that, in period of crisis, negative news about the US economy
would make the dollar appreciate while Rogers et al. (2018) document that during the
European crisis, the ECB’s monetary policy easing would lead to a euro appreciation.
Both findings are in contrast to what standard theory would predict. Moreover, the
main hypothesis of this Chapter is that during crisis episodes, the relationship between
exchange rates and interest rates may flip sign due to, as explained in Section 1.2, the
safe haven phenomena. Thus, it is precisely the aim of this analysis to determine the
signs of the relationships between endogenous variables and we thus do not, of course,
impose them a priori.
To identify the shocks, we use the identification through heteroscedasticity (IH),
as developed by Sentana and Fiorentini (2001) and Rigobon (2003). This methodol-
ogy exploits the fact that financial variables are generally found to be heteroscedastic
(Ehrmann et al., 2011) to obtain information on the response of variables to each
other.3 The idea behind it is that changes in the relative variance of the structural
shock over time allows for determining the entries of A. A short illustration explains
how different volatility regimes contain additional information that can be exploited.
Defining k as the number of volatility regimes and considering our 3-variable system,
when k = 1 we have only six moments on the LHS that can be estimated but nine
parameters on the RHS that need to be determined (three structural shock variances
and six off-diagonal elements in A, with the main diagonal normalized to unity). When
k ≥ 2, the system has as many moments to be estimated as unknowns and it can be
solved. Thus, we assume that, within each subsample, the structural shocks have the










and that Σu,k = A−1Σε,k(A−1)′.
The identification strategy relies on three assumptions: first, the structural shocks
have to be uncorrelated; second, the ratio of the shock variances changes significantly
across regimes; and, third, the contemporaneous impact matrix Amust be stable across
regimes, in order to ensure that each additional regime adds more equations than un-
3The specific form of heteroscedasticity is not of interest, as Rigobon (2003) shows that the estimates
of the contemporaneous relationships are consistent regardless of the form of heteroscedasticity.
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knowns. The first assumption is standard in the structural VAR literature. Moreover,
to increase the likelihood that this assumption holds, we control for common effects
through macroeconomic news and other exogenous variable (see Section 2.4). The
second assumption can be formally tested after estimation. The third assumption is
standard in both classical linear applications (no volatility regimes) and (G)ARCH
models. Moreover, the choice of conducting the analysis separately on the four sub-
samples substantially increases the likelihood of this assumption to hold. Finally, the
system is identified only up to a rotation of the matrix A and, therefore, we need to
impose some additional restrictions to ensure that we pick the rotation that represents
the true underlying economic relationships among variables.4 Following Ehrmann et al.
(2011), we impose a sign restriction on the structural coefficients and we assume that
an increase in the 2-year US Treasury interest rate leads to an increase in the 2-year
euro interest rate. This restriction is fairly uncontroversial and it helps us to correctly
identify the structural parameters without restricting the coefficients of main interest.
Moreover, the constraint is never binding in the estimation.
1.3.3 Identification of volatility regimes and estimation
Before the estimation, we need to define the volatility regimes. We apply a statistical
approach, where the determination of the regimes is data-driven. The following proce-
dure is applied separately to each of the four subsamples. We start by estimating the
reduced form model (Equation 1.7). Then, we compute the rolling standard deviation
for each reduced form residual ut. We proceed by calibrating the threshold for the
rolling standard deviation that defines whether the residual are classified into a high or
low volatility. The threshold, as well as the window used to compute the rolling stan-
dard deviation, are subsample-specific and they are reported in the Appendix, Table
1.9. In particular, for each subsample we identify five volatility regimes and we define
them as follows: 1) All residuals are classified in low volatility; 2) Only one residual is
in high volatility, the others are in low; 3) All residuals display high volatility. Finally,
observations that cannot be classified into any of the five regimes are excluded from
the analysis (for an overview of the number of observations included in all volatility
regimes and subsamples, see Table 1.10 in the Appendix). Windows and thresholds are
chosen so to minimize the number of observations not included in the analysis while
4A short example using demand and supply problem can easily explain this issue. Consider the
following two equations: D = aP + e1 (supply) and P = bD + e2 (demand). In this context there is
another system (symmetric to the truthful one) that produce the same variance-covariance matrix.
However, this implies that, empirically, it is not possible to disentangle the two systems from the
variance-covariance matrix unless we impose a sign restriction that allows for identifying the correct
rotation. Thus, this sign restriction is not used to identify the matrix, but only to make sure that a
solution that is economically meaningful and consistent with theory is picked.
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ensuring the minimum number of observations per regime (which, following Ehrmann
et al. (2011), is set to 16 observations).
To see whether our regimes are supported by the data, we formally test for the
constancy of the reduced form covariance matrix within each subsample. Following
Lanne and Lütkepohl (2008), we perform a test on the joint null hypothesis that all five
regimes have the same covariance matrix (Table 1.1). Moreover, we conduct pairwise
likelihood ratio tests on the null hypothesis so that any two regimes have the same
variance-covariance matrix (Table 1.11 in the Appendix). All null hypotheses are
strongly rejected, implying that we can reject the equality of the variance-covariance
matrices. In all subsamples, the data prefer a model with changes in volatility over the
assumption of homoscedasticity.




LR statistic 909.62 375.20 357.72 739.66
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: The table shows results for all subsamples of a likelihood ratio
test on the null hypothesis that, within a subsample, all regimes have
the same reduced form covariance matrix. Bootstrap p-values are in
parentheses.
After having determined the volatility regimes, within each subsample we estimate
the model as in Ehrmann et al. (2011) by minimizing the following matrix norm:





s.t. Σu,k diagonal and A sign restriction
(1.8)
where Σu,k is the variance of the reduced form shocks in regime k, Σε,k is the variance
of the structural shocks in regime k, and A is the matrix of contemporaneous im-
pact subject to the sign restriction defined in Subsection 1.3.2. Statistical inference is
based on 200 bootstrapping replications. In each replication we use the regime-specific
covariance matrix to generate new data from which we obtain estimates using the
minimization procedure. We compute the p-values as the share of estimates beyond
zero.
As mentioned above, one identification assumption is that all possible estimated
variance-ratios of the uncorrelated structural shocks are sufficiently distinct across
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regimes (Lütkepohl and Netšunajev, 2014). To check if this condition is met, after






k , for each pair of shock
(S, S ′), each regime k and each subsample. Then, for each shock pair, we use a Wald











5 , which would invalidate the identification
of A. Inference on these tests is based on 200 bootstrap replications. Table 1.2 shows
that, for each pair of shocks and each subsample, the null hypothesis of no changes in
volatility is rejected. The model is statistically identified.



























Wald stat 27.13 21.12 16.10
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Global financial crisis
Wald stat 22.01 17.75 18.67
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
European crisis
Wald stat 7.85 9.36 24.42
p-value (0.10) (0.05) (0.00)
Post-OMT
Wald stat 31.87 21.38 42.42
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: The table shows the Wald statistics and the associated p-values of linear Wald tests







k , are the same across volatility regimes, for each pair of
structural shocks. σsk is the estimated variance of shocks s = USD/EUR exchange rate,
2-year German interest rate, 2-year US Treasury rate in regime k = 1, ..., 5. The tests are
based on 200 boostrap replications. P-values are in parentheses.
1.4 Results
We now present the empirical results. We first discuss the estimates of the direct
effects, focusing specifically on the impact of the interest rates on the exchange rate;
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then, we move to the variance decomposition. Finally, we analyze the sensitivity of the
exchange rate to macroeconomic news.
1.4.1 Direct effects
Table 1.3 presents the estimated A-matrix for all four subsamples. These coefficients
are the direct effects of a one standard deviation shock (in columns) on the endogenous
variables (in rows). All other variables are kept constant within period and there is no
contemporaneous feedback among endogenous variables. For ease of interpretation, we
reverse the signs of the off-diagonal elements. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level is denoted by a, b, and c, respectively.
The following set of equations presents the estimates of contemporaneous response
of the exchange rate to interest rate shocks for each subsample. These correspond to
the first row of each of the four panels in Table 1.3. We highlight parameters that are
at least significant at the 10% level using bold font:
Pre-crisis : eUS,EAt = −0.02rEAt − 0.22rUSt + ... (1.9)
Glob fin crisis : eUS,EAt = +0.21r
EA
t − 0.01rUSt + ... (1.10)




t + ... (1.11)
Post-OMT : eUS,EAt = +0.21r
EA
t − 0.20rUSt + ... (1.12)
Equation (1.9) shows that, in the pre-crisis period, a one standard deviation increase
of the 2-year Treasury directly decreases the exchange rate by 0.22 standard deviation
on impact. In contrast, the effect for the euro area is not significant. Thus, the
evidence for the pre-crisis and the US supports the traditional interest rate channel on
exchange rate, with a positive shock to the 2-year Treasury rate leading to a decrease
of the USD/EUR exchange rate. With the unfolding of the global financial crisis the
situation changes (Equation 1.10). Not only does the euro area interest rate remains
insignificant, but now also the US interest rate ceases to affect the exchange rate. One
possible explanation is that the two channels described in Section 1.2, the traditional
interest rate channel and the safe haven channel offset each other so that the final
outcome is insignificant. During the European crisis (Equation 1.11), the situation
is reversed. The euro area gains importance and the exchange rate now responds
to developments of the German rates, probably as a consequence of the fear of a
possible euro break-up. Regarding the US interest rate, the results suggest that the
safe haven channel prevails over the traditional one. In fact, the US coefficient turns
positive, implying that a positive one standard deviation shock to the Treasury leads
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to a depreciation of the dollar and, in turn, to an increase of 0.32 standard deviation
of the exchange rate. Finally, after the announcement of the ECB’s OMT program
(Equation 1.12) the situation reverts back to normality in terms of signs, with the euro
area estimate being positive and significant and the US coefficient being negative. In
terms of magnitude, the two areas are now of similarly importance for the exchange
rate determination.
To formally compare results across subsamples, we conduct a pairwise t-test on the
null hypothesis that two estimates are equal. The tests for the euro area and US
coefficients are run separately. From Table 1.4, it emerges that all tested differences
are significantly different from zero and that they support our hypothesis of a change in
the relationship between interest rates and exchange rate change during crisis episodes.
Moreover, the table also shows that the US interest rate impact on the exchange rate
in the pre-crisis and post-OMT subsamples is similar both for sign and magnitude, but
that their difference is statistically different from zero.
Summing up, the results show that the relationship between the USD/EUR exchange
rates and the US/euro area interest rates changes over time and that, in tranquil times,
it is consistent with the folk wisdom that a country’s currency appreciates when its
interest rates increase relative to that of another country. In particular, the analysis
finds that while US economic conditions dominate exchange rate movements before the
global financial crisis, the euro area variable gains importance in the post-crisis sam-
ple. The two crisis samples behave very differently and we find a striking asymmetry
between the effects of the two interest rate shocks on the exchange rate. While, during
the global financial crisis, the US shocks cease to have an impact on the currency,
interest rate shocks from the euro area increase their impact during the European cri-
sis. The results of the two crisis subsamples are in line with Stavrakeva and Tang
(2016)’s finding that after the first quarter of 2009 (i.e., during the zero lower bound
period, which, for us, starts at the end of the global financial crisis period, continues
throughout the European crisis, and partially overlaps the post-OMT subsample), the
increase in longer bonds (one year or above) leads to a depreciation of the dollar. On
the contrary, our crisis-period findings are in contrast with Glick and Leduc (2015),
which find that both accommodative conventional and unconventional monetary policy
shocks (measured as the change in long term Treasury rate futures in a tight window
around a monetary policy announcement) in the ZLB period lead to a depreciation of
the dollar. Nonetheless, two points are worth noting. First, this Chapter considers
the USD/EUR exchange rate (in contrast to only the dollar). Second, we study the
unconditional relationship between exchange rate and interest rates, which we do not
condition with respect to any particular shock (as the monetary policy one). Finally,
16
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USD/EUR ex rate 1.00 -0.02 -0.22
p-value . . .b
2-year euro rate -0.13 1.00 0.37
p-value . . .a
2-year US rate -0.09 0.27 1.00
p-value . .a .
Global financial crisis
USD/EUR ex rate 1.00 0.21 - 0.01
p-value . . .
2-year euro rate 0.16 1.00 0.45
p-value . . .a
2-year US rate -0.15 0.33 1.00
p-value . .b .
European crisis
USD/EUR ex rate 1.00 0.29 0.32
p-value . .b .b
2-year euro rate 0.22 1.00 0.34
p-value .b . .a
2-year US rate -0.41 0.24 1.00
p-value .a .b .
Post-OMT
USD/EUR ex rate 1.00 0.21 -0.20
p-value . .a .b
2-year euro rate 0.19 1.00 0.33
p-value . . .a
2-year US rate 0.08 0.23 1.00
p-value . .a .
Note: The table shows, for each of the four subsamples, the estimated di-
rect effects of a one standard deviation structural shocks on the endogenous
variables, based on a three-variable SVAR identified through heteroscedastic-
ity. The impulse variables are in columns, response variables are in rows. For
ease of interpretation, the signs of the off-diagonal elements are reversed. The
subsample periods are as follows. Pre-crisis: 3 Jan 2000 - 8 Aug 2007; global
financial crisis: 9 Aug 2007 - 30 Sep 2009; European crisis: 1 Oct 2009 - 30 Sep
2012; post-OMT: 1 Oct 2012 - 31 Oct 2016. .a, .b, .c below point estimates
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively.
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Table 1.4: Test for the equality of A-matrix coefficients
Ha βGFC − βpre > 0 βEC − βGFC > 0 βpost − βEC > 0 βpost − βpre 6= 0
Euro area
Difference
between βs 0.24 0.10 -0.09 0.25
T stat 12.67 5.68 - 8.20 17.06
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
United States
Difference
between βs 0.22 0.29 -0.54 -0.02
T stat 12.86 14.20 -34.67 -2.21
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03)
Note: The table shows results for the t tests on the null hypothesis that two coefficients






where β1 and β2 are the two means, s1 and s2 are unbiased estimators of the variances of
the two samples and n1 and n2 are the number of observations. In our case, n1 = n2. In
the first row we report the alternative hypothesis we test for. Then, we report the actual
difference between the two coefficients. Moreover, we report the value of the t statistic.
For ease of interpretation, the signs of the differences and of the t statistics are reversed.
P-values are in parentheses.
the announcement of the OMT program seems to have re-established normality in the
foreign exchange market, because, in the last subsample, signs revert back to what
the traditional UIP-consistent interest rate channel would predict. This supports once
more the safe haven behavior of the dollar vis-à-vis the euro (in contrast, for example,
to its possible use as a hedge currency), because it implies that the dollar appreci-
ates with respect to the euro only in times of crisis and not also in tranquil periods
(Beckmann and Czudaj, 2017).
The following sets of equations present the results of contemporaneous responses of
the 2-year euro area rates and of the 2-year US Treasury rates. They correspond to
the second rows (Equation 1.13 to 1.16) and the third row (Equation 1.17 to 1.20) of
the four panels in Table 1.3. The euro area rate responds to the exchange rate and to
its US counterpart in the following way:




t + ... (1.13)
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t + ... (1.14)




t + .. (1.15)




t + ..., (1.16)
while the US Treasury rate responds to euro rate and exchange rate as follows:




t + ... (1.17)




t + ... (1.18)




t + ... (1.19)




t + ... (1.20)
The spillovers from the United States to the euro area are generally larger than in the
other direction. This result is in line with the US as the leading market and consistent
with , among others, findings in Chinn and Frankel (2003), Ehrmann and Fratzscher
(2005), and Ehrmann et al. (2011), while holding across both tranquil and turbulent
times. Moreover, although we constrain the parameter of the effect of US interest rate
shocks on the euro interest rate to be positive, the restriction is not binding in any
of the subperiods. Moreover, the relationship between the two interest rates does not
change sign during period of turmoil. The reason is most likely found in the peculiar
role of safe haven held by the German interest rate within the eurozone during crisis
periods (see, among others, Von Hagen et al. 2011 and De Santis 2012). In fact, as both
countries are perceived safe havens for the euro area, this implies that the relationship
between them is invariant. Furthermore, the magnitude of the coefficient is fairly
constant, slightly peaking only during the global financial crisis period. Finally, as to
the effect of a shock to the exchange rate, the estimates are only significant during the
European crisis subsample, with the effects on the euro area and the US interest rates
of opposite sign.
1.4.2 Variance decomposition
To quantify the average economic significance of the different types of structural shocks
and to understand which shock contributes the most in explaining the volatility of the
endogenous variables, we compute the 1-step ahead forecast error variance decompo-
sition (FEVD). The FEVD shows how much of the forecast error variance of each
variable can be explained by exogenous shocks to the other variables. As we have five
different regimes, we obtain five forecast decompositions for each subsample. Thus, we
compute a weighted average of the regime specific decomposition using the number of
19
Chapter 1 Interest Rates and Exchange Rates in Normal and Crisis Times
observations per regime as weights. Only this last set of results are reported in Table
1.5.








USD/EUR ex rate 0.95 0.00 0.05
2-year euro rate 0.04 0.81 0.15
2-year US rate 0.02 0.06 0.92
Global financial crisis
USD/EUR ex rate 0.94 0.05 0.01
2-year euro rate 0.01 0.82 0.16
2-year US rate 0.02 0.12 0.87
European crisis
USD/EUR ex rate 0.77 0.09 0.14
2-year euro rate 0.01 0.84 0.15
2-year US rate 0.16 0.01 0.82
Post-OMT
USD/EUR ex rate 0.93 0.05 0.02
2-year euro rate 0.04 0.87 0.09
2-year US rate 0.02 0.11 0.88
Note: The table shows the weighted forecast error variance decompositions over an
horizon of 2 days for each subsample. For each subsample, the weighted FVED is com-
puted averaging over the forecast error variance decompositions calculated for each
regime, using the number of observations per regime as weights, based on a structural
VAR identified through heteroscedasticity. For each subsample, we identify five volatil-
ity regimes and we define them as follows: 1) all residuals are classified in low volatility;
2) only one residual is in high volatility, the others are in low; 3) all residuals display
high volatility. Observations that cannot be classified into any of the five regimes are
excluded from the estimation. The windows and thresholds used to define the volatility
regimes are subsample-specific (see Table 1.9 in the Appendix).
The weighted FEVD results are in line with previous findings, corroborating and
mirroring the evidence for a time varying impact of interest rates on exchange rate
across normal and crisis times. Table 1.5 shows that, as it is usually found, each variable
variance is mainly explained by its own idiosyncratic shock (see, among the others,
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Ehrmann et al., 2011). The importance of the two interest rates in explaining the
variation of the exchange rate evolves over time. The US accounts for a larger fraction
before the crisis but it loses its dominance with the unfolding of the global financial
crisis. During the European crisis, the importance of the US shocks spikes again,
returning to very low levels in the aftermath of the OMT announcement. Further, the
contribution of the euro area shocks follows closely the findings discussed in previous
section: it is equal to zero in the pre-crisis subsample, it increases until its maximum
(9%) in the European crisis, and then it reverts to a lower level in the last subsample. In
general, the overall contributions of the two areas to the exchange variation is increasing
over time, moving from 5% in the pre-crisis sample to 23% during the European crisis.
In the post-OMT period, the explanatory power of both interest rates goes back to
pre-crisis levels.
Turning to the interest rates, on average the share of their variance not explained by
idiosyncratic shocks is larger than in the exchange rate case. The spillovers from the
US to the euro interest rate are the strongest. Results also show that, over time, the
two areas show a diverging trend: while a larger share of the behavior of the US interest
rate is explained by the other two shocks, the opposite is true for the euro area rate.
Moreover, while the contribution of the US interest rate is fairly constant over time
(with the exception of the last subsample), the spillovers from the euro area increase up
to 12% during the global financial crisis, then drop to almost zero during the European
crisis, implying that the US rates are almost only determined domestically.
1.4.3 The sensitivity of exchange rate to macroeconomic news
So far, the analysis shows that the impact of interest rate shocks on the exchange rate
is time varying, pointing toward the role of the US-dollar as a safe haven vis-à-vis
the euro in times of crisis. In this section, we check whether the same result emerges
when considering the impact of the macroeconomic surprises. As explained in Section
2.4, the SVAR includes US and euro area macroeconomic news shocks as exogenous
variables. Here we present the effects of these macro surprises on the USD/EUR
exchange rate. The estimates are obtained estimating the first row of the reduced
form model (Equation 1.7) with robust standard errors, in order to account for the
heteroscedasticity present in the data,




t−1 + δXt + ue,t. (1.21)
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The vectorXt contains all included macroeconomic news (see Table 1.8 in the Appendix
for the complete list).5 The results are reported in Table 1.6. Each of the four columns
reports the results of a separate regression of the USD/EUR exchange rate on the
macroeconomic data surprises (listed in the first column) in the subsample specified in
the first row of the table. All variables are standardized prior to estimation and the
standardization is subsample-specific. We do not interpret all single coefficients, as we
are mostly interested in the general trend. Moreover, we only show the estimates of
the surprises being significant at least in one subsample. The significant coefficients
are reported in bold font to facilitate reading. In line with the interpretation of the
results in Section 1.4.1, a positive (negative) coefficient, i.e. a stronger than expected
performance of European (American) economy, implies an appreciation of the euro (US
dollar) and, in turn, an increase (decrease) of the exchange rate.6 We also experiment
with excluding the lag values of the exchange rate, the German bund and the Treasury,
and excluding those days on which no major macroeconomic data was released (i.e.,
days on which Xt is identically zero). Results are very similar to those presented in
Table 1.6.
The results show that, over time, the exchange rate sensitivity to macroeconomic
surprises coming from the euro area is U-shaped and it reaches its minimum during
the European crisis, while the responsiveness to US surprises increases over time. This
implies that, on the on hand, our results are in line with Swanson and Williams (2014)’s
findings and that the exchange rate response to the macroeconomic surprises was con-
strained neither by the US zero lower bound nor by the global financial crisis; on the
other hand, we also find that, consistent with Ehrmann et al. (2014), the USD/EUR is
not responsive to the news coming from the euro area during the European crisis. In
general, the effects of the news coming to the euro area is mixed, as there are several
cases where positive news tend to depreciate the euro. Regarding the effect of the
surprises coming from the other side of the Atlantic, while positive news about the
US economy tend to appreciate the dollar in the post-OMT, during the two crisis sub-
samples, there is evidence of a partial switch in signs. This implies that a better than
expected performance of several US variables (though not all) leads to a depreciation
of the US dollar. This suggests that, in line with previous results, positive news for
the US economy may be perceived as even better for the euro area, inducing a euro
strengthening. These results are consistent with the dollar being a safe haven currency
vis-à-vis the euro.
5Contrary to the main analysis, here we use daily changes instead of 2-day changes data, in order to
capture the effect of the news on the day of their release.
6This reasoning does not hold for the Eurostat Unemployment Rate news, as a positive surprise is
generally perceived as negative for the euro area, depreciating the euro.
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Table 1.6: Effects of selected surprises on the USD/EUR exchange rate - estimation of





EC Business Climate Ind 0.0026 0.0611 0.0204 0.0602∗
(0.0199) (0.0611) (0.0300) (0.0330)
Euro Consumer Price Index YoY -0.0039 0.0026 0.0704∗ -0.0639∗∗
(0.0246) (0.0463) (0.0402) (0.0274)
Gross Fixed Capital Formation QoQ -0.0142∗ -0.0503 0.0201 0.0061
(0.0073) (0.0370) (0.0259) (0.0277)
Retail Sales Volume MoM SA -0.0008 -0.119∗∗∗ -0.0479 0.0107
(0.0390) (0.0442) (0.0523) (0.0415)
Trade Balance with non Eurozone 0.0315∗∗ -0.0636∗ -0.0174 -0.0221
(0.0132) (0.0360) (0.0311) (0.0475)
PPI Eurozone Industry Ex Construction MoM 0.0384 -0.214∗ -0.0020 -0.0456
(0.0252) (0.126) (0.0714) (0.0450)
Eurostat Unemployment Rate -0.0086 -0.0195 -0.0278 -0.0893∗∗
(0.0284) (0.0408) (0.0318) (0.0369)
US surprises
CPI Urban Consumers YoY -0.0201 0.0348 -0.141∗∗∗ -0.0089
(0.0329) (0.1480) (0.0489) (0.0536)
CPI Urban Consumers no Food&Energy YoY 0.0240 0.0195 0.0494 -0.0634∗
(0.0201) (0.0464) (0.0428) (0.0366)
Personal Consumption Expenditure CPI YoY 0.0070 -0.0036 -0.0440 -0.0764∗∗∗
(0.0201) (0.0336) (0.0366) (0.0280)
CPI Urban Consumers MoM SA 0.0153 -0.104 0.0941∗∗ 0.0286
(0.0322) (0.1740) (0.0440) (0.0673)
S Government Budget Balance -0.0051 0.0510 -0.0321 -0.0441∗
(0.0116) (0.0347) (0.0284) (0.0249)
US Consumer Spending Growth Rates MoM -0.0293∗ 0.0131 0.0243 0.0536∗∗
(0.0165) (0.0288) (0.0357) (0.0247)
Industrial Production MoM -0.0133 0.0433 -0.0136 -0.0010
(0.0288) (0.0780) (0.0463) (0.0340)
Core Producer Price Index 0.0020 0.0010 0.0546∗ -0.0253
(0.0208) (0.0465) (0.0320) (0.0177)
Producer Price Index - Finished Goods -0.0138 0.2050∗ 0.0472 -0.0065
(0.0288) (0.1240) (0.0664) (0.0965)
GDP Chained 2009 Dollars QoQ 0.0426∗∗∗ 0.0097 -0.0366 -0.0446∗
(0.0149) (0.0305) (0.0249) (0.0256)
Capacity Util % of Total Capacity -0.0208 -0.0285 -0.0817∗∗ -0.0166
(0.0281) (0.0643) (0.0347) (0.0301)
Business Inventories MoM 0.0098 0.0728∗∗ -0.0303 -0.0307
(0.0192) (0.0306) (0.0230) (0.0194)
Prod Output Per Hour Nonfarm Bus QoQ 0.0366∗∗ -0.0095 0.0529∗ -0.0233
(0.0182) (0.0360) (0.0291) (0.0472)
Nonfarm Payrolls Total MoM -0.0447 0.0054 0.0495 -0.144∗∗∗
(0.0294) (0.0473) (0.0338) (0.0253)
Observations 1979 560 782 1065
R2 0.026 0.084 0.037 0.064
F 1.758 2.026 1.922 2.707
p-value 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: The table shows the effects of statistically significant variables in each subsample on the USD/EUR exchange
rate from the baseline VAR, obtained from estimating the first row of the reduced form model (Equation 1.7) with
robust standard error, in order to account for heteroscedasticity: Only estimates of the exogenous regressors have
been reported here. All surprises have been standardized. .***, .**, and .* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively. 23
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The R2 of the regressions is low, ranging from the 0.026 of the pre-crisis subsample to
the 0.084 of the global financial crisis subsample, consistent with the standard finding
that it is difficult to explain exchange rate movements with fundamentals (Andersen
et al., 2003; Swanson and Williams, 2014). Nonetheless, the regressions have a very
high degree of statistical significance overall, which peaks in the two crisis subsamples
and in the post-OMT. This indicates that the USD/EUR does responds systematically
to many macroeconomic announcements. The results support the findings described
in Subsection 1.4.1.
1.5 Robustness checks
In what follows we perform a number of robustness analyses, which can be classified into
four different groups. First, we introduce in our analysis the Vix, in order to control
for investor sentiment and market volatility. Second, we test whether our findings
are robust to using different maturities of US and German interest rates. Third, we
analyze the robustness of the main results to a different calibration and definition of
the volatility regimes. Finally, we specify a different crisis sample. Given the large
number of estimates, in the discussion we mainly focus only on the contemporaneous
impact of the two interest rates on the exchange rate.7
1.5.1 Including market sentiment variable and considering additional in-
terest rate maturities
One possible concern about our main model specification is the lack of inclusion of any
market sentiment variable. For this reason, we include the Vix as an endogenous vari-
able. The results show that estimates are comparable to the baseline model, although
the point estimates are slightly different and the effect of both US and euro area rates
are amplified (Table 1.13 in the Appendix).
We repeat the analysis using different US and German interest rate maturities. In
particular, instead of the 2-year, we use the 5- and the 10-year German and US Treasury
rates (the estimates are reported in Table 1.14 in the Appendix). Once again, the
results found in the baseline analysis are here confirmed, implying that changes in the
structural relations between exchange rate and interest rate was not peculiar to the
2-year maturity, but that they can be extended to longer maturities. The euro area
shocks are not significant in the pre-crisis and in the global financial crisis, but they gain
importance during the European crisis. The pattern for the 5- and 10-year US shocks
7All the calibrated thresholds and window lengths needed for these new sets of estimations are reported
in Table 1.12 in the Appendix.
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are in line with the 2-year interest rates, the only difference being that the coefficients
during the European crisis are insignificant. Finally, the estimates in Table 1.14 are
in magnitude bigger than in the baseline analysis, pointing to a positive correlation
between the rates’ maturity and the absolute value of the estimated coefficients.
1.5.2 Alternative definition of volatility regimes
As a second robustness check, we test whether our choice of windows used to calculate
the rolling standard deviations and the thresholds used to classify the residuals in high
or low volatility affects the findings. Thus, we investigate how the results change when
we modify the two parameters, one at the time. The main results are robust to the
alternative specifications of the windows. In fact, the pattern that emerges from the
table is very similar to that described in Section 1.4: the US economic conditions
dominate exchange rate movements in the pre-crisis sample, while the euro area fails
to be significant in the first two periods. Moreover, there is again evidence of safe
haven phenomena in crisis times: during the global financial crisis the estimate of
the impact of a Treasury shock on the exchange increases, getting close to zero. In
the post-OMT period estimates revert back to pre-crisis behavior, with the euro area
being now significant. The same pattern is confirmed when different thresholds, the
only difference being that now the US impact on the exchange rate fails to be significant
in the post-OMT subsample. Both sets of results are in the Appendix, Table 1.15.
1.5.3 Alternative definition of the crisis period
As a final sensitivity check, we repeat the analysis merging the two crisis period into
one. Table 1.17 in the Appendix presents only the results for the new merged crisis
subsample, as the pre-crisis and post-OMT results are equal to that which is reported in
Table 1.3. Moreover, the table also reports how this last set of estimates varies when
changing the threshold or window (one at the time) used for the estimation. From
the results, it emerges that in this new crisis sample the behavior of the coefficient
attached to the US interest rates is dominated by the global financial crisis sample,
meaning negative, close to zero, and insignificant, while the response of the exchange
rate to a euro interest rate shock is clearly mainly influenced by the European crisis
period. The table also shows that these results are robust to different windows and
thresholds. To conclude, none of our key results, regarding both magnitude and the
direction of the coefficients, are affected in any of the robustness checks, thus implying
that the main findings are robust.
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1.6 Conclusion
The paper studies the structural relationship between the US-dollar/euro exchange
rate and the US and euro area interest rates over time. We collected daily data from
January 1, 2000, to October 31, 2016, splitting it into four subsamples: pre-crisis, global
financial crisis, European debt crisis, and post-crisis. For each subsample, we specify
each asset price within a multifactor model and estimate the causal contemporaneous
coefficients by exploiting the heteroscedasticity that is present in the data.
The key finding of the Chapter is that the relationship between the exchange rates
and the interest rates changes significantly across crisis and non-crisis times. In both
non-crisis periods the US dollar/euro exchange rate responds to interest rate shocks
in a manner consistent with the traditional interest rate channel, that is decreasing
(increasing) in response to a positive shock to the US (euro area) interest rate. In par-
ticular, US economic conditions dominate exchange rate movements before the global
financial crisis (and the euro are interest rate shocks have no significant effect), while
in the post-crisis sample both areas are similarly important. In the two crisis periods,
results look very different. On the one hand, during the global financial crisis both
US and euro area shocks have no impact; on the other, during the European crisis not
only both areas have a significant effect on the exchange rate, but the impact of the
US interest rate flips sign with respect to the non-crisis samples. This implies that a
positive US interest rate shock has now a negative impact the exchange rate. These
results are confirmed by the variance decomposition and by the analysis of the impact
of macroeconomic news on the exchange rate.
The results are consistent with a flight to safety channel towards the dollar that
alters the traditional interest rate channel of exchange rate, suggesting that in times of
crisis the US dollar is considered a safe haven currency. These findings contribute to a
better understanding of exchange rate behavior. In fact, they indicate the existence of
time-variation in the international transmission of unconditional interest rates shocks
which can play a prominent role in explaining why the UIP condition is generally found
not to hold on average.
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1.A Figures



















































01jul2000 01jan2006 01jul2011 01jan2017
Date
USD−EUR exchange rate 200 day roll s.d. USD−EUR exchange rate
Note: The figure shows the behavior of the daily USD/EUR exchange rate (blue line, left
axis) together with its 200 days rolling standard deviations (red dashed line, right axis).
The subsample periods are as follows. Pre-crisis: 3 Jan 2000 - 8 Aug 2007; global financial
crisis: 9 Aug 2007 - 30 Sep 2009; European crisis: 1 Oct 2009 - 30 Sep 2012; post-OMT:
1 Oct 2012 - 31 Oct 2016.
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1.B Tables
Table 1.7: Summary statistics of the endogenous variables used in the analysis
Pre-crisis Global financial European Post-OMT
crisis crisis
Variable Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Baseline analysis
∆ lnUSD/EUR ex rate 0.002 0.893 0.021 1.109 -0.033 0.973 -0.030 0.780
∆2-year euro rate -0.002 0.062 -0.011 0.102 -0.003 0.064 -0.001 0.023
∆2-year US rate -0.003 0.074 -0.013 0.121 -0.002 0.042 0.001 0.035
Robustness checks
∆vix -0.001 2.282 0.015 3.875 -0.025 2.531 0.011 1.976
∆5-year euro rate -0.002 0.066 -0.007 0.095 -0.005 0.082 -0.002 0.042
∆5-year US rate -0.002 0.086 -0.008 0.132 -0.004 0.076 0.001 0.058
∆10-year euro rate -0.002 0.061 -0.004 0.075 -0.005 0.077 -0.002 0.053
∆10-year US rate -0.002 0.083 -0.005 0.121 -0.004 0.085 0.001 0.060
Note: The table provides summary statistics for the endogenous variables used in the analysis. The
reported statistics are subsample specific. The subsample periods are as follows. Pre-crisis: 3 Jan 2000 -
8 Aug 2007; global financial crisis: 9 Aug 2007 - 30 Sep 2009; European crisis: 1 Oct 2009 - 30 Sep 2012;
post-OMT: 1 Oct 2012 - 31 Oct 2016.
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Table 1.8: Summary statistics of euro area and US news included in the analysis
Pre-crisis Global financial European Post-OMT
crisis crisis
Macroeconomic news Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Euro area
EC Business Climate Ind -0.002 0.199 -0.033 0.296 0.010 0.301 0.011 0.292
EC Consumer Confidence Ind -0.003 0.139 -0.034 0.304 0.006 0.296 0.034 0.294
Euro Consumer Price Index YoY -0.004 0.157 0.007 0.109 -0.008 0.137 0.002 0.124
Euro Consumer Price Index MoM -0.001 0.166 0.007 0.137 0.000 0.168 0.000 0.115
Gross Fixed Capital Formation QoQ 0.001 0.094 0.006 0.116 -0.040 0.286 0.007 0.157
EC Services Confidence Ind 0.000 0.124 -0.032 0.259 -0.002 0.291 0.021 0.296
Retail Sales Volume YoY WDA -0.011 0.247 -0.048 0.332 -0.024 0.296 0.001 0.293
Retail Sales Volume MoM SA -0.009 0.256 -0.046 0.323 -0.039 0.305 0.009 0.269
Trade Balance with non Eurozone -0.008 0.207 0.023 0.246 0.006 0.226 0.006 0.194
ECB M3 Money Supply 3 Month Moving Avg 0.015 0.235 -0.020 0.280 0.001 0.238 -0.004 0.210
PPI Eurozone Industry Ex Construction YoY 0.005 0.192 -0.023 0.280 0.027 0.271 -0.016 0.249
PPI Eurozone Industry Ex Construction MoM -0.001 0.176 -0.022 0.248 0.010 0.266 -0.010 0.246
Eurostat Unemployment Rate -0.017 0.204 0.034 0.222 0.011 0.166 -0.022 0.239
United States
GDP SA QoQ 0.003 0.108 0.007 0.141 0.011 0.159 0.011 0.160
CPI Urban Consumers YoY 0.001 0.168 0.003 0.248 -0.002 0.217 -0.002 0.229
CPI Urban Consumers no Food&Energy YoY -0.003 0.155 0.006 0.205 0.000 0.235 -0.007 0.197
Personal Consumption Expenditure CPI YoY 0.000 0.125 0.000 0.153 -0.005 0.198 -0.005 0.194
CPI Urban Consumers MoM SA -0.006 0.232 0.007 0.235 -0.008 0.220 -0.012 0.221
Uni of Michigan Consumer Conf Ind 0.006 0.213 0.029 0.275 0.040 0.287 0.012 0.272
S Government Budget Balance 0.014 0.298 -0.009 0.253 -0.006 0.272 0.012 0.292
US Consumer Spending Growth Rates MoM 0.000 0.228 0.009 0.195 -0.015 0.273 0.006 0.214
Industrial Production MoM -0.003 0.243 -0.016 0.277 -0.014 0.287 0.001 0.237
Trade Balance of Goods& Services -0.008 0.275 0.016 0.301 0.001 0.291 -0.003 0.267
Core Producer Price Index -0.004 0.150 0.027 0.272 0.008 0.245 -0.007 0.135
Producer Price Index - Finished Goods 0.004 0.185 0.005 0.284 0.003 0.261 -0.012 0.140
Initial Jobless Claims SA 0.009 0.622 0.043 0.619 0.046 0.631 -0.024 0.617
Housing Starts/Permits 0.017 0.292 -0.013 0.291 -0.005 0.296 -0.011 0.283
GDP Chained 2009 Dollars QoQ 0.002 0.133 0.008 0.084 -0.016 0.172 0.001 0.156
PPI Finished Goods MoM % 0.003 0.268 0.008 0.288 0.009 0.282 -0.011 0.134
Capacity Util % of Total Capacity -0.003 0.235 -0.023 0.276 -0.008 0.266 -0.005 0.263
Business Inventories MoM 0.011 0.231 -0.028 0.231 0.007 0.241 0.010 0.246
Construction Spending Tot MoM -0.004 0.201 0.021 0.295 0.009 0.290 -0.038 0.320
Durab Goods New Ord Indust MoM -0.006 0.288 0.009 0.286 -0.029 0.301 0.012 0.274
Conf Board Leading Ind MoM -0.002 0.238 0.006 0.253 0.014 0.246 0.020 0.262
Prod Output Per Hour Nonfarm Bus QoQ 0.003 0.157 0.007 0.174 0.001 0.160 0.005 0.154
Unit Labor Costs Nonfarm BusiQoQ % 0.007 0.170 0.002 0.170 0.004 0.170 -0.004 0.164
Personal Income MoM 0.009 0.250 0.035 0.293 -0.010 0.269 0.002 0.247
Nonfarm Payrolls Total MoM -0.011 0.211 -0.010 0.181 -0.011 0.198 0.008 0.173
Note: The table provides summary statistics for the euro area and the US exogenous variables used in the analysis. The reported
statistics are subsample specific. The subsample periods are as follows. Pre-crisis: 3 Jan 2000 - 8 Aug 2007; global financial
crisis: 9 Aug 2007 - 30 Sep 2009; European crisis: 1 Oct 2009 - 30 Sep 2012; post-OMT: 1 Oct 2012 - 31 Oct 2016.
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(days) 20 8 24 16
Threshold
(st. dev.) 0.8 0.9 1.1 0.9
Note: The table reports the subsample-specific windows and thresh-
olds used to determine the volatility regimes. First, we estimate the
reduced form model. Then, we compute the rolling standard devi-
ation for each reduced form residual ut, using the window reported
above. Finally, we calibrate the threshold for the rolling standard
deviation that defines whether the residual should be classified into
a high or low regime. For each subsample we identify five volatility
regimes and we define them as follows: 1) all residuals are classified
in low volatility; 2) only one residual is in high volatility, the others
are in low; 3) all residuals display high volatility. Observations that
cannot be classified into any of the five regimes are dropped from the
estimation.
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Table 1.10: Summary statistics of statistically defined regimes
Pre-crisis Global financial crisis
Volatility Regime Observation % Observation %
1 131 13.21 77 27.50
2 123 12.40 37 13.21
3 16 1.61 37 13.21
4 51 5.14 31 11.07
5 430 43.35 30 10.71
Dropped 241 24.29 68 24.29
Total 992 100 280 100
European crisis Post-OMT
Volatility Regime Observation % Observation %
1 163 41.69 124 23.26
2 32 8.18 33 6.19
3 45 11.51 74 13.88
4 52 13.30 77 14.45
5 37 9.46 43 8.07
Dropped 62 15.86 182 34.15
Total 391 100 533 100
Note: The table shows the number and the share of observations per
volatility regime and subsample. The definition of the volatility regimes
is based on a statistical procedure that uses the rolling standard devi-
ations (in days) and a thresholds defined in Table 1.9 to classify the
reduced-form residuals. For each subsample we identify five volatility
regimes and we define them as follows: 1) all residuals are classified in
low volatility; 2) only one residual is in high volatility, the others are in
low; 3) all residuals display high volatility. Observations that cannot be
classified into any of the five regimes are dropped from the estimation.
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regime 1 2 3 4
Pre-crisis
2 LR statistic 29.69
p-value (0.00)
3 LR statistic 27.03 25.43
p-value (0.04) (0.00)
4 LR statistic 25.44 32.74 31.24
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
5 LR statistic 171.12 114.49 35.91 52.45
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Global financial crisis
2 LR statistic 36.91
p-value (0.00)
3 LR statistic 26.90 35.14
p-value (0.00) (0.00)
4 LR statistic 13.53 44.52 33.40
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
5 LR statistic 78.75 67.70 46.95 36.17
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
European crisis
2 LR statistic 20.03
p-value (0.02)
3 LR statistic 50.32 16.72
p-value (0.00) (0.01)
4 LR statistic 23.21 13.98 24.36
p-value (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
5 LR statistic 106.80 27.32 39.35 29.97
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Post-OMT
2 LR statistic 42.46
p-value (0.00)
3 LR statistic 40.60 44.61
p-value (0.00) (0.00)
4 LR statistic 57.49 48.03 106.02
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
5 LR statistic 123.71 30.50 76.25 78.92
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: The table shows results of likelihood ratio tests on the
null hypothesis that, within a subsample, pairwise regimes
have the same reduced form covariance matrix. The first row
from the top and the fist column from the left indicate the
volatility regime. For instance, the cell at the intersection
between regime 1 and regime 2 in the pre-crisis subsample
(the value shown in that cell is 29.69) contains the likelihood
ratio test statistic of the test on the null hypothesis that
regime 1 and regime 2 have the same variance-covariance
matrix. Bootstrap p-values are in parentheses.
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Table 1.12: Windows and thresholds used for the computation and the classification of





Window (days) 14 6 12 4
Threshold (st. dev.) 0.7 0.9 1.1 0.7
Different windows
Window (days) 16 12 26 8
Threshold (st. dev.) 0.8 0.9 1.1 0.9
Different threshold
Window (days) 20 8 24 16
Threshold (st. dev.) 0.7 0.9 1 1.2
Merged crisis
Window (days) . . 14 .
Threshold (st. dev.) . . 1 .
Merged crisis - different window
Window (days) . . 16 .
Threshold (st. dev.) . . 1 .
Merged crisis - different threshold
Window (days) . . 14 .
Threshold (st. dev.) . . 1.1 .
5-year interest rates
Window (days) 8 14 10 4
Threshold (st. dev.) 0.9 0.9 1 0.9
10-year interest rates
Window (days) 18 4 10 16
Threshold (st. dev.) 0.8 0.9 0.9 1
Note: The table reports the windows and the thresholds used to determine the volatility
regimes in the sensitivity analysis, Section 1.5. First, we estimate the reduced form
model. Then we compute the rolling standard deviation for each reduced form residual
ut, using the window reported above. Then we calibrate the threshold for the rolling
standard deviation that defines whether the residual should be classified into a high or
low volatility regime. For each subsample, we identify five volatility regimes and we define
them as follows: 1) all residuals are classified in low volatility; 2) only one residual is in
high volatility, the others are in low; 3) all residuals display high volatility. Observations
that cannot be classified into any of the five regimes are excluded from the estimation.
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USD/EUR ex rate 1.00 0.06 -0.32 -0.13
p-value . . .a .c
2-year euro rate -0.11 1.00 0.31 -0.7
p-value . . .a .
2-year US rate -0.04 0.31 1.00 -0.28
p-value . .a .
Vix 0.11 -0.13 0.13 1.00
p-value . . . .
Global financial crisis
USD/EUR ex rate 1.00 0.12 -0.06 -0.24
p-value . . . .
2-year euro rate 0.05 1.00 0.22 -0.16
p-value . . .b .
2-year US rate -0.12 0.33 1.00 -0.9
p-value . .a . .
Vix -0.07 -0.05 -0.12 1.00
p-value . . . .
European crisis
USD/EUR ex rate 1.00 0.45 0.34 0.12
p-value . .b .c .
2-year euro rate -0.01 1.00 0.39 -0.53
p-value . . .b .
2-year US rate -0.58 0.08 1.00 -0.19
p-value .b . . .
Vix -0.27 0.40 -0.35 1.00
p-value . . . .
Post-OMT
USD/EUR ex rate 1.00 0.17 -0.24 -0.04
p-value . .b .a .
2-year euro rate 0.19 1.00 0.22 0.17
p-value .c . .b .c
2-year US rate -0.15 0.22 1.00 -0.11
p-value .c .a . .
Vix 0.03 -0.19 0.02 1.00
p-value . .b . .
Note: The table shows, for each of the four subsamples, the estimated direct effects of a one
standard deviation structural shocks on the endogenous variables, based on a four-variable
SVAR identified through heteroscedasticity. The impulse variables are in columns, response
variables are in rows. For ease of interpretation, the signs of the off-diagonal elements are
reversed. The subsample periods are as follows. Pre-crisis: 3 Jan 2000 - 8 Aug 2007; global
financial crisis: 9 Aug 2007 - 30 Sep 2009; European crisis: 1 Oct 2009 - 30 Sep 2012; post-
OMT: 1 Oct 2012 - 31 Oct 2016. .a, .b, .c below point estimates denote significance at the 1%,
5%, 10% level, respectively. 34
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Table 1.14: Contemporaneous effects among endogenous variables - different interest
rate maturities
Impulse













USD/EUR ex rate 1.00 0.03 -0.30 1.00 -0.02 -0.38
p-value . . .b . . .a
Euro area int rate -0.1 1.00 0.43 -0.09 1.00 0.45
p-value . . .b . . .a
US int rate 0.04 0.23 1.00 0.07 0.39 1.00
p-value . . .b . .a .
Global financial crisis
USD/EUR ex rate 1.00 0.24 -0.02 1.00 0.12 -0.08
p-value . . . . . .
Euro area int rate -0.01 1.00 0.23 0.03 1.00 0.30
p-value . . .c . . b
US int rate -0.08 0.35 1.00 -0.10 0.40 1.00
p-value . .b . . .a .
European crisis
USD/EUR ex rate 1.00 0.47 0.06 1.00 0.51 -0.42
p-value . .a . . .a .
Euro area int rate 0.22 1.00 0.42 0.13 1.00 0.41
p-value . . .a . . .a
US int rate -0.11 0.35 1.00 0.27 0.35 1.00
p-value . .a . b .a .
Post-OMT
USD/EUR ex rate 1.00 0.19 -0.36 1.00 0.35 -0.36
p-value . .a .a . .b .b
Euro area int rate 0.24 1.00 0.47 0.05 1.00 0.34
p-value .a . .a . . .a
US int rate 0.09 0.27 1.00 -0.08 0.61 -1.00
p-value . .b . . .a .
Note: The table shows, for each of the four subsamples, the estimated direct effects of a
one standard deviation structural shocks on the endogenous variables, based on two distinct
structural VARs, both identified through heteroscedasticity. The interest rates in the response
column are of the same maturity of the shocked interest rates. For instance, the value 0.23
at the intersection between the third row and the second column corresponds to the response
of the 5-year US interest rate to a shock to the 5-year euro area interest rate. For ease of
interpretation, the signs of the off-diagonal elements are reversed. For each subsample, the
threshold and the windows used to classify residual in low or high volatility regime are reported
in Table 1.12. The subsample periods are as follows. Pre-crisis: 3 Jan 2000 - 8 Aug 2007;
global financial crisis: 9 Aug 2007 - 30 Sep 2009; European crisis: 1 Oct 2009 - 30 Sep 2012;
post-OMT: 1 Oct 2012 - 31 Oct 2016. .a, .b, .c below point estimates denote significance at
the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 35
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USD/EUR ex rate 1.00 -0.12 -0.24
p-value . . .b
2-year euro rate -0.09 1.00 0.42
p-value . . .a
2-year US rate -0.05 0.25 1.00
p-value . .a .
Global financial crisis
USD/EUR ex rate 1.00 0.14 -0.07
p-value . . .
2-year euro rate 0.07 1.00 0.42
p-value 0.39 . .a
2-year US rate -0.04 0.32 1.00
p-value 0.52 .a .
European crisis
USD/EUR ex rate 1.00 0.30 0.31
p-value . .a .c
2-year euro rate 0.21 1.00 0.29
p-value .c . .b
2-year US rate -0.43 0.32 1.00
p-value .b .a .
Post-OMT
USD/EUR ex rate 1.00 0.17 -0.29
p-value . .a .b
2-year euro rate 0.29 1.00 0.39
p-value .b . .a
2-year US rate 0.16 0.21 1.00
p-value . .b .
Note: The table shows, for each of the four subsamples, the estimated direct effects of a
one standard deviation structural shocks on the endogenous variables, based on a three-
variable SVAR identified through heteroscedasticity. For each subsample, the thresholds
and the windows used to classify residual in low or high volatility regime are reported
in Table 1.12. The impulse variables are in columns, response variables are in rows. For
ease of interpretation, the signs of the off-diagonal elements are reversed. The subsample
periods are as follows. Pre-crisis: 3 Jan 2000 - 8 Aug 2007; global financial crisis: 9 Aug
2007 - 30 Sep 2009; European crisis: 1 Oct 2009 - 30 Sep 2012; post-OMT: 1 Oct 2012
- 31 Oct 2016. .a, .b, .c below point estimates denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%
level, respectively.
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USD/EUR ex rate 1.00 0.10 -0.23
p-value . . .c
2-year euro rate -0.19 1.00 0.37
p-value . . .a
2-year US rate -0.14 0.23 1.00
p-value .b .b .
Global financial crisis
USD/EUR ex rate 1.00 0.21 -0.01
p-value . . .
2-year euro rate 0.16 1.00 0.45
p-value . . .a
2-year US rate -0.15 0.33 1.00
p-value . .b .
European crisis
USD/EUR ex rate 1.00 0.29 0.23
p-value . .b .c
2-year euro rate 0.15 1.00 0.37
p-value . . .a
2-year US rate -0.34 0.24 1.00
p-value .a .b .
Post-OMT
USD/EUR ex rate 1.00 0.32 -0.22
p-value . .a .
2-year euro rate 0.29 1.00 0.38
p-value .a . .a
2-year US rate -0.22 0.29 1.00
p-value . .a .
Note: The table shows, for each of the four subsamples, the estimated direct effects
of a one standard deviation structural shocks on the endogenous variables, based on
a three-variable SVAR identified through heteroscedasticity. For each subsample,
the thresholds and the windows used to classify residual in low or high volatility
regime are reported in Table 1.12. The impulse variables are in columns, response
variables are in rows. For ease of interpretation, the signs of the off-diagonal elements
are reversed. The subsample periods are as follows. Pre-crisis: 3 Jan 2000 - 8 Aug
2007; global financial crisis: 9 Aug 2007 - 30 Sep 2009; European crisis: 1 Oct 2009
- 30 Sep 2012; post-OMT: 1 Oct 2012 - 31 Oct 2016. .a, .b, .c below point estimates
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively.
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Crisis subsample, main result
USD/EUR ex rate 1.00 0.35 -0.06
p-value . .a .
2-year euro rate -.01 1.00 0.29
p-value . . .a
2-year US rate -0.11 0.24 1.00
p-value . . .
Crisis subsample, different window
USD/EUR ex rate 1.00 0.30 -0.07
p-value . .b .
2-year euro rate 0.08 1.00 0.37
p-value . . .a
2-year US rate -0.04 0.19 1.00
p-value . .b .
Crisis subsample, different threshold
USD/EUR ex rate 1.00 0.30 -0.05
p-value . .b .
2-year euro rate 0.02 1.00 0.21
p-value . . .b
2-year US rate -0.07 0.23 1.00
p-value . .a .
Note: The table shows, for each of the four subsamples, the estimated direct effects
of a one standard deviation structural shocks on the endogenous variables, based on a
three-variable SVAR identified through heteroscedasticity. In this case, the two crisis
subsamples, the GFC subsample and the EC subsample have been merged into a more
general crisis subsample. Only results for the crisis subsample are shown, as the results
for the pre-crisis subsample and the post-OMT are identical to results shown in Table 1.3.
For each subsample, the thresholds and the windows used to classify residual in low or
high volatility regime are reported in Table 1.12. The impulse variables are in columns,
response variables are in rows. For ease of interpretation, the signs of the off-diagonal
elements are reversed. The subsample periods are as follows. Pre-crisis: 3 Jan 2000 - 8
Aug 2007; global financial crisis: 9 Aug 2007 - 30 Sep 2009; European crisis: 1 Oct 2009 -
30 Sep 2012; post-OMT: 1 Oct 2012 - 31 Oct 2016. .a, .b, .c below point estimates denote
significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively.
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CHAPTER 2
Unconventional monetary policy and households’ fi-
nancial portfolio choices1
2.1 Introduction
The unconventional monetary policies (UMPs) introduced by the European Central
Bank (ECB) with the aim of restoring confidence in the European financial system
have spurred an intense public and academic debate about their financial and real
implications on different economic agents. In particular, the discussion on whether
ultra-loose monetary policy impacts income and wealth inequality has caught the at-
tention of the public and policy-makers in the Eurozone (Draghi, 2015; Panetta, 2015;
Draghi, 2016; Constâncio, 2017). Among other concerns, commentators point out that
expansionary measures that positively affect the price of financial assets would only
benefit the owners of financial wealth, thus increasing the gap between households that
invest in financial markets and those who do not. In order to analyze the issue in
depth, Adam and Tzamourani (2016), Casiraghi et al. (2018), Ampudia et al. (2018),
and Lenza and Slacalek (2018) perform simulation exercises where they focus on the
UMP’s effects on financial wealth through capital gains. These papers, though, assume
that households are only passively affected by monetary policy through its impact on
asset prices but that this effect does not translate into an active choice of portfolio
rebalancing. However, this view is hard to reconcile with the fact that unconventional
tools are also expected to work by affecting investors’ portfolio allocation choices (e.g.,
1I thank Stefania Albanesi, Kit Baum, Michael Berlemann, Kerstin Bernoth, Franziska Bremus, An-
drea Delitala, Marcel Fratzscher, Mathias Klein, Angela Maddaloni, Maria Luisa Magli, Dieter Nautz,
Hedwig Plamper, Valentina Raponi, Barbara Rossi, Dorothea Schäfer, Ulrich Schneider, Paolo Sodini,
as well as participants in the DIW PhD internal seminar, Berlin; DIWMacro internal seminar, Berlin;
FU Seminar Empirical Macroeconomics 2018, Berlin; RES Symposium 2018, Brighton; Workshop in
Econometrics 2018, Tornow; SSES 2018, St Gallen; IAAE 2018, Montreal; EEA 2018, Cologne; SAEe
2018, Madrid; AEA 2019, Atlanta; Bank of Spain, Madrid; Bank of England, London; Università
Milano-Bicocca, Milan and Università Statale, Milan for helpful comments and suggestions.
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through the portfolio rebalancing channel or the signalling channel of monetary policy)
and investors’ risk appetite (e.g., through the confidence channel), both domestically
(Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 2011; Krishnamurthy et al. 2017) and interna-
tionally (Fratzscher et al., 2018).
This Chapter analyzes how unconventional tools affect households’ portfolio choices,
addressing a specific case: the impact of ECB’s unconventional policies on Italian
households’ financial choices between 2006 and 2016. The contribution of this work
is threefold. First, this is the first paper to focus on, and emphasize, the role that
unconventional monetary policy plays in households’ portfolio rebalancing decisions.
Second, I use survey data on Italian households’ portfolio composition and augment
it with extra financial data to construct a novel dataset that, for each household and
financial asset class, disentangles any change in financial wealth into its capital gain and
active rebalancing components. Third, this work brings new evidence to the limited
literature that evaluates UMPs effect on Italy, one of the so-called peripheral countries
heavily affected by the crisis and, thus, most suitable for evaluating the effectiveness
of ECB’s actions.
Understanding how unconventional tools shape households’ financial choices is im-
portant from several points of view. First, households hold an important stock of
financial wealth and their investment decisions may have a significant impact on as-
set prices (Kogan et al., 2006; Kumar and Lee, 2006) and even on the macroeconomy
(Korniotis and Kumar, 2010). To give an example, between 2007 and 2014, Italian
households invested on average EUR 3,7 trillion in financial assets, of which EUR 205
billion in Italian government securities, financing roughly 10% of the government debt.2
Thus, their rebalancing decisions can have important consequences at both the finan-
cial and real economy levels. Second, it provides new insights into the effectiveness
and the transmission channels of unconventional measures in a country that was at the
core of the sovereign crisis. Third, this Chapter contributes to the debate on inequality
by pointing toward an under-explored additional channel through which UMPs might
affect wealth inequality: the one stemming from investors’ heterogeneous reaction to
monetary stimulus. An extended literature documents that richer and better educated
households (the so-called sophisticated investors) rebalance their portfolio more fre-
quently (Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002; Campbell, 2006; Calvet et al., 2009b; Bilias et al.,
2010) and make smaller investment mistakes (Calvet et al., 2007, 2009b). Thus, only
a small group of households might decide to shape their investment decisions so to
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take better advantage of the new unconventional environment. This could have serious
consequences on the wealth distribution, as it might exacerbate inequality.
I use the micro data contained in the Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and
Wealth (SHIW) for the 2006-2016 period. This dataset gathers data every other year on
wealth and other aspects of households’ economic and financial behavior. Each wave in-
cludes roughly 8,000 households. This data allows constructing financial portfolios, but
it does not include any additional information that can be used to distinguish whether a
change in financial wealth is due to valuation effects (passive saving component/capital
gains) or to an active reallocation (active saving component/active rebalancing). This
distinction is crucial for this Chapter, as the aim of this study is to capture how UMPs
shape households’ financial decisions, i.e. how much households actively and voluntar-
ily decide to rebalance their portfolio. Following Guiso et al. (2002b), Berben et al.
(2006), and Juster et al. (2006), I approximate the return on several asset classes in-
cluded in the survey with financial indexes. This allows me to isolate the active saving
component of the ten most important Italian asset classes (four types of government
bonds, equity, corporate bonds, liquidity funds, flexible funds, bond funds, and eq-
uity funds). Furthermore, the richness of the financial wealth information included in
the SHIW and the possibility to isolate the pure rebalancing component supports the
choice of focusing on the Italian case.
One of the challenges of this Chapter is the identification of the causal relationship
between UMPs and households’ portfolio rebalancing due to the low frequency of the
household data and concerns over simultaneity and omitted variable bias. Therefore, I
employ a two step approach. First, I follow Altavilla et al. (2014), and Fratzscher et al.
(2018) by using an event-study approach to estimate the impact of monetary policy
shocks. UMP shocks are proxied by announcements and measured through their valu-
ation impact on the return of the financial indexes used to construct the dataset. This
gives a clear picture of the effects that UMPs have on the asset classes I include in
the analysis. The choice of a high-frequency, financial market-driven procedure ensures
that any change in the indexes around the time of any unconventional monetary policy
announcement can be only attributed to the unexpected component of monetary pol-
icy revealed by the announcement itself, while the magnitude of the shock is extracted
directly from the financial indexes’ response. Then, I exploit households’ cross sec-
tional heterogeneity in their exposure to unconventional monetary policy due to their
heterogeneous stock of financial investment to sharpen the identification. The intuition
is that the more financial wealth households hold, the more they are affected by mone-
tary policy changes due to the valuation effect. Comparing the behavior of households
expected to be more affected with those less affected should shed light on the effects
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of UMPs. This two step procedure allows for a straightforward interpretation of the
identification: it isolates the portion of capital gains due to exogenous UMP-valuation
effects. Thus, the empirical analysis estimates how much of this exogenous change in
financial wealth is passed through to portfolio rebalancing.
My main result is that unconventional tools directly affect households’ portfolio
composition. In line with the literature finding that portfolio rebalancing is positively
correlated with income and wealth, this is true only for households in the top 25%
of the income distribution. An accommodative ECB announcement that increases
return of financial indexes by 1% induces, on average, a positive investment of EUR
5000, of which one third in government bonds and two thirds in risky assets. These
findings speak in favor of ECB’s ability to restore household confidence in the financial
system and are consistent with the confidence channel of unconventional monetary
policy. Further evidence supporting this channel comes from limiting the estimation
sample to the end of 2014. Excluding the last rounds of unconventional measures
- initiated to sustain economic growth and inflation rather than to relieve sovereign
stress and fight the redenomination risk - quantitatively increases households’ response
to unconventional shocks. Finally, I use a qualitative measure of the households’ change
in risk aversion to gain more insights on the relationship between household risk taking
and unconventional measures. The analysis finds that UMP has a significant and
negative effect on households’ risk aversion.
The empirical finding that only top income earners rebalance after a UMP shock can
be interpreted as a first evidence that unconventional monetary policy could amplify
the (financial) wealth inequality between sophisticated and non-sophisticated investors.
This idea is corroborated by the results of a simulation exercise (Section 2.6) find-
ing that, when considering both UMP-induced valuation and rebalancing effects, rich
households’ portfolio return cumulated over the 2006-2016 period is ten times higher
than that of low/middle income investors. The simulation also shows that this dif-
ference is only attributable to portfolio rebalancing. This Chapter does not consider
the total financial portfolio but only some of the asset classes households invest in.
Thus, it is not possible to draw direct conclusions about financial wealth inequality.
Nevertheless, my findings point toward the heterogeneity of portfolio rebalancing as
important channel through which unconventional monetary policy can affect wealth
inequality.
This Chapter relates to different strands of literature. Few works evaluate the im-
pact and transmission channels of ECB programs on the Italian financial markets and
macroeconomic variables (see, among others, Altavilla et al., 2014; Fratzscher et al.,
2016; Falagiarda and Reitz, 2015; Casiraghi et al., 2016; Krishnamurthy et al., 2017).
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They all find that ECB policies are positively associated with an increase in financial
prices, real activity, and credit. Most closely related to this Chapter is the study by
Casiraghi et al. (2016), who assess the impact of the main unconventional measures on
the Italian economy. In line with this Chapter, they first use a high-frequency event
study approach to estimate the UMP’s direct effects on financial markets and then
estimate the impact of UMPs on the main Italian macroeconomic variables using a
much lower frequency model. They find that UMPs have, to varying degrees, served
to counteract the increase in government bond yields and had a large positive effect
at the macro level. My findings are in line with theirs and, in addition, I show that
the ECB was not only effective in sustaining Italian financial segments, but also in
restoring confidence to private investors.
There is a flourishing literature showing that households’ risk aversion is time-varying
and that macro/financial events affect portfolio decisions through their impact on
households’ wealth. This literature is nicely connected to this work not only because,
consistent with several papers (Fratzscher et al., 2016; Falagiarda and Reitz, 2015), I
find that unconventional tools negatively affect agents’ risk aversion, but also because
I identify UMP shocks as an exogenous change in wealth induced by monetary policy
on portfolio rebalancing. There are no studies linking unconventional (or conventional)
monetary policy shocks to households’ portfolio rebalancing, but a few papers consider
the relationship between financial fluctuations and portfolio rebalancing in the context
of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Bucher-Koenen and Ziegelmeyer (2013) show that
crisis episodes might have a negative impact on households’ participation in financial
markets both in the short- and long-run. This is especially true for households with
lower levels of financial literacy. Interestingly, the authors point out that for financially
illiterate households, this behavior might have serious consequences regarding wealth
distribution, as they would fail to benefit from market resurgence in the short-run and
from equity premium in the long-run. Guiso et al. (2018) also find that, after the 2008
drop in stock prices, Italian investors rebalanced their portfolio in a way consistent to
a fear model (i.e. selling stocks). On the contrary, using Dutch data, Hoffmann et al.
(2013) find that individual investors continue to trade actively and do not de-risk their
investment portfolios. Consistent with the first three papers, I show that households
respond to an exogenous increase in financial wealth (thus, to a positive shock) driven
by unconventional measures by buying more assets. However, this is only true for
richer households, as for the bottom 75% of income distribution “inertia seems to be
the main driver of portfolio allocation” (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2008).
Finally, this Chapter contributes to the growing literature that uses detailed balance
sheet data to estimate the distributional effects of unconventional monetary policy on
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wealth inequality. Bivens (2015) for the US, Domanski et al. (2016) for a set of ad-
vanced countries, and Ampudia et al. (2018) for the Euro Area, provide data-driven
simulation exercises. On the one hand, they find that, given the initial distribution
of financial wealth, unconventional tools mainly accrue wealthiest investors. On the
other, this negative effect is outweighed by UMP ability to sustain economic activity,
employment, and house prices, which is especially beneficial for low-income households.
They conclude that unconventional tools tend to reduce income and wealth inequal-
ity. Casiraghi et al. (2018) (on Italian data) and Bunn et al. (2018) (on UK data)
use elasticities from a large-scale econometric model of the Italian and UK economy,
respectively, and reach the same conclusions. My work is complementary to this lit-
erature and uncovers an additional channel through which UMP exacerbates wealth
inequality.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 reviews ECB’s main policy actions during
the crisis and UMPs main transmission channels. Section 2.3 describes the data and the
construction of the dataset. Section 2.4 discusses unconventional monetary policy, the
empirical framework, and the results. Section 2.5 presents robustness checks. Section
2.6 quantifies the heterogeneous UMPs impact on financial wealth along the income
distribution. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 The crises, ECB’s unconventional monetary policy, and its
transmission channels
Between 2008 and 2016, the ECB faced three different crisis phases (Praet, 2018). The
first phase coincides with the liquidity crisis triggered by the onset of the global fi-
nancial cycle and the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The principle ECB response was
to lower its main refinancing rate to 1% (May 2009), expand the number of eligible
collateral for refinancing operations, and provide liquidity to the banking sector. The
second phase is the sovereign debt crisis of 2011-12. Italy and the other GIPS coun-
tries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) saw large increases in their government
bond yields. The ECB’s main policy response included the direct purchases of govern-
ment bonds through the Securities Market Program (SMP, May 2010), two three-year
refinancing operations (LTROs, December 2011 and February 2012) and the announce-
ment of the conditional Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT, August 2012). The
explicit aim of these programs was to reduce the perception of redenomination risk
and financial market anomalies, such as fragmentation and illiquidity. Although the
extraordinary injection of liquidity proved useful, acting as powerful circuit breaker
stopping the downward spiral, by mid-2014, a credit crunch was looming and the eco-
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nomic recovery was losing momentum. With the risk of low inflation and de-anchored
inflation expectations on the rise, the ECB decided to ease its monetary stance further
by directly intervening across the whole range of interest rates affecting the financing
conditions of the economy. First, it implemented a negative interest rate policy, lower-
ing the interest rate paid on the deposit facility to -0.1% (2014). Then it promoted two
rounds of longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs, September 2014 and March
2016), in order to support bank lending to the private sector. Finally, it introduced
the asset purchase programme (APP, January 2015) for both private and public sector
securities. These policies helped to compress further premia along the yield curve.
There is a growing literature analyzing possible channels through which UMPs might
impact financial markets (for an extensive literature review, see Haldane et al. 2016),
but less is known about the mechanisms through which they affect households’ portfolio
decisions. In this Chapter, I focus on two transmission channels that are the most
likely to affect the households’ portfolio rebalancing choices: the confidence channel
(and the closely connected sovereign credit risk channel) and the portfolio rebalancing
channel. These two channels have opposite implications for active rebalancing following
an increase in asset prices driven by UMPs valuation effect. Although the empirical
strategy does not allow me to directly test/compare them, in the discussion of the
results (Section 3.4) I still argue whether the empirical findings are consistent with one
channel or the other.
The first channel is the confidence channel. It affects and influences the perception
of risk and uncertainty, restoring agents’ confidence in the financial system. Conse-
quently, risk premia decline and asset prices increase (Bluwstein et al. 2016; Fratzscher
et al. 2018). It was heavily stressed, especially during the first and the second phases of
the crisis. A very connected channel is the so-called sovereign credit risk channel. One
of the key goals for UMPs in the second phase of the crisis was to reduce sovereign risk
premia of peripheral counties, considered excessive and not in line with fundamental
but more reflecting unfounded fears of Eurozone break-up. Given Italy’s peculiar role
during the period of crisis, these two channels predict that investors would respond in
a pro-cyclical manner to price changes. Thus, accommodative unconventional mone-
tary policy should increase households’ investment toward all asset classes, including
government bonds.
The second channel is the portfolio rebalancing channel. Many commentators indi-
cate it is one of the main transmission mechanisms (see, among others, Bernanke et al.
2010; Bernanke 2012; Gagnon et al. 2010; Joyce et al. 2012; Draghi 2014, 2015). The
main idea is that central bank purchases affect risk premia and yields of key financial
segments, inducing investors to rebalance their portfolio away from assets not directly
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affected by unconventional stimulus and toward investments with higher return. Thus,
this channel prescribes that investors would respond in a counter-cyclical manner to
price changes, selling government bonds and buying riskier assets.
2.3 Data description and portfolio composition
The empirical analysis in Section 2.4 requires disaggregated and detailed data of a
representative sample on households’ portfolio composition, wealth, and demographics.
For this reason, I make use of the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Households Income and
Wealth. In this chapter, I provide an overview of the dataset and of the methodology
I apply to distinguish between active and passive saving components.
2.3.1 Data sources
The main dataset is obtained from the Survey of Households Income and Wealth
(SHIW), a large-scale household survey run by Banca d’Italia every second year. It
contains detailed information on demographic, consumption, labor supply, income, real
wealth, and financial wealth characteristics of a stratified random sample of the Italian
population. SHIW is conducted since 1960 and the sample used in most recent years
comprises about 8,000 households; as I focus on the unconventional monetary policy
period, I rely on the waves from 2006 through 2016 (the last available survey wave).
Their contents, methodology, and variable definition are broadly homogeneous. The
survey contains a rotating panel component and in each wave around half of the house-
holds are participating for at least their second time. This panel component proves very
useful for the determination of the change in wealth active saving component needed
for the analysis. Balance-sheet entries are reported as of the end of the previous year
(for example, December 31st, 2006), while flows of income and consumption refer to
the previous year. The unit of observation is the household.3
In the empirical analysis, I focus only on the rebalancing of the financial portfolio.
In fact, although for the majority of Italians the residence is the only held asset, it is
acquired mainly for living necessities rather than as an investment. For this reason,
throughout the Chapter it is assumed that housing is a highly illiquid asset and that it
is not rebalanced in a strategic manner. Nonetheless, it will be used as a control in the
empirical analysis. The same applies to deposits: I assume that increases or decreases in
saving and checking accounts are linked to liquidity reasons, unrelated to investment
policies. For this reason, they are also excluded from the analysis. In the SHIW
3The household is defined to include all persons residing in the same dwelling who are related by
blood, marriage, or adoption. Individuals selected as partners or other common-law relationships are
also treated as households.
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questionnaire, households are presented with a fixed list of forms of financial saving
and investment and they are asked if the household held any of them on December
31st of the previous year. If the answer is positive, they are asked to provide the
approximate value. Table 2.5 in the Appendix contains an overview of all asset classes
among which the households can choose for the years 2006 to 2016.
The asset classes included in the analysis are: Italian government bonds (bot, btp,
cct, ctz), Italian mutual funds (liquidity funds, mixed funds, bond funds, equity funds),
Italian equity and Italian corporate bonds.4 5 The other asset classes are excluded for
the following reasons:
1. It is not possible to calculate the active saving component due to lack of extra
information. As described later in this paragraph, this calculation is done using
data available on Bloomberg. If the data provider does not have any information
about these asset classes they are dropped. This is the case of shares of unlisted
and private companies, shares of partnerships, other government bonds, managed
portfolios, and loans to cooperatives.
2. The percentage of households holding the asset class is very low. This is the case
of bonds, government bonds, shares, other assets and investment funds issued by
non-residents.
3. The asset class does not appear in all waves. This is the case of shares in privatized
listed companies indexed funds and non-harmonized funds.
Table 2.7 (in the Appendix) shows the percentage of households holding each asset
class included in the SHIW. The table is divided in two, the upper part reporting the
holding of the asset classes included in the analysis while the bottom part showing the
excluded ones. Most asset classes are held by only a small fraction of households. This
can be partially due to a problem of underreporting, but it is mostly to be attributed
to the fact that several Italian financial markets are thin. Moreover, the table shows
that, on average, between 2006 and 2016 the share of households holding financial assets
decreased, implying that during the years of crisis households have partially abandoned
financial investments. This trend is visible not only in the asset classes included in the
analysis (with the main exception of mutual funds), but also in the excluded markets.
Table 2.7 (in the Appendix) also shows that the share of households directly investing in
assets issued by non-residents has not increased over time (it has decreased, if possible),
4The asset class mixed funds is given by the sum of balanced funds, balanced bond funds, balanced
equity funds and flexible funds.
5For a detailed description of the asset classes included in the analysis, as well as the final classification
with respect to the analysis, see Table 2.6 in the Appendix.
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suggesting that there has been no rebalancing between domestic and foreign markets,
but, most likely, a general reduction of financial investment. Moreover, Figure 2.6 shows
that, in times of crisis, Italians have not drastically changed the composition of their
financial portfolio, and this pattern is consistent across different groups of households
along the income distribution (Group 1, Group 2, and Group 3, i.e. households in
the bottom two quartiles, third quartile and top quartile, respectively). All groups
exhibit the strongest reduction in government bonds in favor of other assets between
2010 and 2012, the period of higher stress for Italian markets, but the trend starts
reversing already in 2014. Moreover, the percentage invested in foreign assets and in
other assets is constant over time. Interestingly, the figure also shows that, contrary
to expectations, low income earners do not invest higher share of their portfolio in
government bonds compared to other households.
2.3.2 Passive and active rebalancing of portfolio
To understand the impact of UMPs on the portfolio rebalancing of household it is nec-
essary to isolate the change in financial wealth due to an active decision of rebalancing
(either positive or negative). An asset can change in value for two reasons: either
some of it is sold or purchased (active saving or rebalancing) or the price of the asset
changes (passive saving or capital gain). Thus, by definition the change in the financial
wealth composition between two points in time is always given by the sum of the active














where Xji,t is the stock of money held by household i in asset j, x
j
i,t is the flow of asset j,
pji,t denotes the price of asset j at time t paid by household i and r
j
i,t is the annual return
between t − 1 and t of asset j. Unfortunately, the SHIW does not contain questions
about purchases or sales of assets. Moreover, it does not include any information about
asset prices and returns. This implies that Equation (2.1) cannot be used directly to
compute the active saving component. To solve this problem I first rearrange Equation












then, I approximate the missing variables. In fact, for each wave the survey provides
me with the money invested in several asset classes (Xji,t and X
j
i,t−1). Thus, the only
thing that is missing in order to calculate the active saving is the return on assets, rji,t.
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I replace the return on each of the ten asset classed included in the analysis j with the
return of financial indexes that summarize the behavior of the asset segment.6 Then,
I can finally apply Equation (2.2) and obtain ten active rebalancing components. It
is important to notice that to use Equation (2.2) it is necessary to follow the same
household for at least two consecutive waves, and that is where I make use of the
rotating panel component of the SHIW. This procedure is applied to the ten classes
included in the analysis (bot, btp, cct, ctz, liquidity funds, mixed funds, bond funds,
equity funds, equity and corporate bonds). Moreover, it is also important to stress
that my final dataset does not have a panel structure, but that it is constituted by
repeated cross sections. The indexes used to approximate the returns, together with a
short description, is contained in Table 2.8 and they are plotted in Figure 2.7 (both in
the Appendix).
Finally, the active saving components are aggregated further more into two final
categories that are then used for the empirical analysis, the government bonds active
saving component (including btp, bot, ctz, and the cct) and the risky asset active saving
component (including corporate bonds, equities, and mutual funds). This procedure
also allows obtaining the capital gain components of the two asset categories. This
classification between government bonds and risky assets is maintained throughout the
entire paper.
I impose some requirements for households to be considered in the analysis. First,
only households followed for at least two consequent waves are included in the analysis
for the aforementioned reason. Second, both net wealth and income must be positive.
Third, all positive rebalancing of risky or government bonds assets smaller than 500
Euro is considered a mistake of the household reporting of its financial variables and
it is replaced with a rebalancing equal to zero.7 Pooling all waves together, I am left
with a sample of around 20,000 households.
Figure 2.1 shows the cross-section distribution of the newly created stock of active
rebalancing variables.8 Table 2.1 reports the summary statistics when considering the
full sample and different groups of households along the income distribution (Group 1,
Group 2, and Group 3, including households in the bottom two quartiles, third quartile
and top quartile, respectively) over the 2006-2016 period. Both mean and median of
6The return on the asset class mixed funds is given by the average of the balance funds and flexible







7The idea is the following. Assume that household i has not rebalanced its portfolio between t−1 and
t. If i does not take into account the valuation effect of its investment when reporting its investment
value in t, the application of Equation (2.2) will result in an active saving different from zero. For
this reason, rebalancing lower than 500 Euro are considered here as misreporting and not as an
investment or disinvestment of small amounts.
8For a plot of the distribution of households’s active rebalancing across different years and household
groups, please refer to the Appendix 2.8 and 2.9, respectively.
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the active rebalancing are negative for both asset categories and across all groups of
households. The same results emerge when considering the evolution over time of the
same two summary statistics (Figure 2.10, in the Appendix). To conclude, it appears
that in the decade under analysis households have progressively reduced their financial
investement in the two asset categories under analysis.
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(b) Risky Assets
Note: The figure shows the distribution of Italian households’ active
rebalancing for the two asset categories included in the empirical analy-
sis, Italian government bonds (bot, ctz, btp,cct) and Italian risky assets
(liquidity funds, mixed funds, bond funds, equity funds, equity, and cor-
porate bonds) over the 2006-2016 period. The unit is thousands of euro.
For a detailed explanation of the methodology used to construct the two
active rebalancing categories, please refer to Section 2.3.2. Only data
included in the estimation sample is reported here. Thus, rebalancing
equal to zero as well as positive rebalancing in t conditioning on not be-
ing invested in the asset category in t − 1 have been excluded from the
picture.
Source: Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth,
Bloomberg, Datastream and own calculation.
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Table 2.1: Italian households’ active rebalancing - summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Government Bonds
Group 1 966 -9207.9 -6061.9 24268.9 -193365.9 200150.6
Group 2 1163 -14567.4 -7551.9 33100.9 -282372.7 118234.9
Group 3 894 -12376.0 -8410.4 40724.9 -258490.20 279394.1
Full sample 3023 -12048.0 -7282.9 33835.8 -282372.7 279394.10
Risky Assets
Group 1 538 -6326.0 -6765.1 28208.8 -110462.9 188918.4
Group 2 1184 -8580.4 -6078.6 47168.0 -269932.6 445047.4
Group 3 1371 -11630.8 -6356.7 57088.1 -446124.8 354559.9
Full sample 3093 -9821.5 -6259.4 50329.8 -446124.8 445047.4
Note: The table reports the summary statistics for the active rebalancing of the
two categories included in the analysis, Italian government bonds (Bot, Ctz, Btp,
Cct) and Italian risky assets (Liquidity funds, mixed funds, bond funds, equity
funds, equity and corporate bonds) for the year 2006-2016. Summary statistics are
reported for the full sample as well as for different groups of households along the
income distribution: Group 1 (bottom two quartiles of the income distribution),
Group 2 (third quartile) and Group 3 (top quartile). For a detailed explanation of
the construction of the two active rebalancing categories, please refer to Section
2.3.2. Only data included in the estimation sample is used for the calculations.
Thus, rebalancing equal to zero as well as positive rebalancing in t conditioning on
not being invested in the asset category in t− 1 have been excluded from the table.
Source: Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth, Bloomberg,
Datastream and own calculation.
2.4 Empirical analysis
In this section, I first present the identification strategy. Then I proceed describing the
empirical framework. Finally, I discuss the baseline results.
2.4.1 The identification of unconventional monetary policy
The identification of unconventional monetary policy in this context poses several is-
sues. First, unlike in conventional times, in the unconventional period there is not a
clean single indicator of the overall stance of monetary policy. Moreover, using low fre-
quency data could lead to endogeneity issues and omitted variable bias. Not only could
the responses that follow the central bank intervention be attributed to other changes
in the economy around the same time, but monetary policy could also be responding
to important news affecting both monetary policy itself and the other variables under
investigation (Gürkaynak et al., 2005).
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In order to construct a UMPs measure and achieve identification, I build on the liter-
ature that estimates the impact of monetary policy changes using high frequency data.
Here the effect of unconventional tools is extracted directly from the high frequency
response of financial markets to unconventional announcements. Many authors rely
on announcements as a source of UMPs identification, using an event study approach
or structural VAR models (see, among others, Wright 2012; Gertler and Karadi 2015;
Rogers et al. 2018; Hachula et al. 2020). The idea is that any high frequency financial
indicator (indexes, prices, yields, etc...) close before a monetary announcement has
already priced in the endogenous response of monetary policy to the state of the econ-
omy. Thus, any variation that occurs in a (small enough) window around a monetary
policy announcement must reflect only the unexpected component of monetary policy
revealed by the announcement itself and it is interpreted as exogenous with respect
to the economy. Second, I borrow from the literature evaluating the impact of UMPs
on banks. Here the heterogeneity across banks is exploited to assist with the identi-
fication (see, among others, Albertazzi et al. 2018; Chakraborty et al. 2020; Acharya
et al. 2018). The idea is that some banks are expected to be more affected than others
(due to a different composition of their balance sheet) and their different reaction to
monetary shocks can, in turn, help identify the causal effect of monetary policy. The
same reasoning can be applied to households: it is possible to exploit their financial
portfolio composition to assess their exposure to unconventional monetary. Then, com-
paring the behavior of more and less affected HHs, allows shedding light on the effects
of unconventional measures on portfolio rebalancing choices. In particular, I employ
as exposure measure the stock of assets invested in t− 1 in both the categories under
analysis, risky assets and government bonds.
In order to have a clear understanding of the effects of UMPs on the asset classes
included in the analysis, I estimate the effect of unconventional monetary policy an-
nouncements on the ten indexes used to approximate the returns (see Section 2.3.2).
Following, among others, Fratzscher et al. (2018) and Altavilla et al. (2014), I employ
the following univariate model
rj,t = αj +
A∑
a=1
βaDa,t + γ∆Eoniat +
N∑
n=1
δnzn,t + ηj,t (2.3)
where rj,t is the daily return of financial index j at time t; j= bot index, btp index, ctz
index, cct index, equity index, corporate bond index, liquidity funds index, mixed funds
index, bond funds index, and equity funds index; αj is the index specific constant; Da,t
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the unconventional monetary policy announcement
a = 1, .., A takes place, zero otherwise. The event dummies reflect the major uncon-
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ventional monetary policy announcement-related events that occurred between 2007
and 2016. The events are chosen following Hachula et al. (2020) and listed in Table
2.10; the Eonia in first difference, ∆Eoniat accounts for conventional monetary policy;
zn,t is the release of macro news for Italy, Euro Area, and the US. See Table 2.9 (in
the Appendix) for a list of all included macro surprises. The coefficients of interest are
the βa,j, as each of them captures the change in the return rj,t in response to the ECB
announcements a.
After estimating Equation (2.3), the following procedure is applied:
1. The estimated vector (βj,1, .., βj,A)T is transformed into a daily binary variable
mβ,j,t that takes value 0 on non-announcement days and value βa on the day of
announcement a.
2. The vector mβ,j,t is then aggregated into a biennial series, umpj,t, by summing
within two years. Thus, each one of the five data points (2008, 2010, 2012, 2014,
2016) composing the vector umpj,t is the cumulated impact of UMPs announce-
ments on asset j in the previous two year window.
3. Finally, two UMPs impact measures, one for risky assets and one for government
bonds, are constructed by averaging out the single UMPs impact measures









where f={gov, risky} and j= bot index, btp index, ctz index, cct index if f=gov
bonds and j= equity index, corporate bond index, liquidity funds index, mixed
funds index, bond funds index and equity funds index if f=risky. For a plot of
UMPgovt,average and UMP
risky
t,average, see Fig. 2.2.
After having constructed the (common) UMPs impact measures, I interact them
with the household-specific financial investment in government bonds and risky assets
at time t− 1 and construct the UMP variable,
UMP Vari,t = UMPgovt × gov bondsi,t−1 + UMP
risky
t × riskyi,t−1.
The way the UMP Vari,t variable is constructed allows for a straightforward inter-
pretation. It captures the realized capital gains on the two asset categories in t due
to unconventional monetary policy. Referring again to the decomposition in Eq. (2.1)
and assuming Yi,t is household i total portfolio, y is i’ total inflow/outflow of assets, p
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Note: The graph depicts the biennial cumulated impact of UMP an-
nouncements’ unexpected component on Italian government bonds and
risky asset categories. The blue and red lines are obtained by estimat-
ing at the daily frequency the effect of ECB’s UMP announcements on
the returns of several financial indexes (bot, btp, ctz, cct in the case
of UMP govaverage and equity, corporate bond, liquidity funds, mixed funds,
bond funds and equity funds in the case of UMP riskyaverage), estimating Equa-
tion (2.3). The daily impact is then aggregated into a biennial series by
summing within two year window, as explained in Section 2.4.1. For a
complete list of the ECB’s announcements included in the analysis, see
Table 2.10.
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the price of assets and r the total portfolio return, then
Yi,t − Yi,t−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
change in wealth
= yi,tpi,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
active rebalancing
+ Yi,t−1ri,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
capital gains










= yi,tpi,t + Yi,t−1r
non−UMP
i,t +
+ UMPgovt,average × gov bondsi,t−1 + UMP
risky
t,average × riskyi,t−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
capital gainsUMP
.
Thus, this Chapter estimates the UMP-induced financial wealth effect on household
portfolio choices, i.e. how much of the exogenous change in the value of assets (windfall
gains) due to UMPs is passed through to financial inflows or outflows. The two compo-
nent of the UMPs variable, UMPs-exposure through government bonds and risky assets
are included separately in the empirical model (see Section 2.4.2). First, households
might react differently to different realized UMPs-capital gains, implying a different
wealth effect for different asset categories. Second, including only one UMPs- capital
gains, for example, the UMPs-exposure through the government bonds, I would impose
a priori that the UMP transmission happens only through government bond exposure,
and, in turn, that households only invested in risky assets would not be affected by the
ECB monetary action.
2.4.2 Econometric framework and results
2.4.2.1 Unconventional monetary policy and portfolio rebalancing
This section addresses the empirical question of whether UMPs affects household port-





(f) + αHHs Controls(f)i,t−1 + β1UMP
gov











where i denotes the household, t = 2006− 2016, f = {risky, gov} asset categories; j=
bot index, btp index, ctz index, cct index if f=gov and j= equity index, corporate
bond index, liquidity funds index, mixed funds index, bond funds index, and equity
funds index if f=risky; asji,t indicates the (stock of) active saving of category f between
t− 1 and t; the interactions UMPgovt, average× gov bondsi,t−1 and UMP
risky
t, average× riskyi,t−1
capture the effect of unconventional monetary policy on the dependent variable. The
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vector HHs Controls(f)i,t−1 contains one period lagged household financial and demo-
graphic characteristics (so to mitigate the impact of reverse causality) that reflect
factors likely to shape rebalancing decisions. The first category includes disposable
income, net wealth, and a dummy equal to 1 if the household has a mortgage. The
second category includes a dummy for post high-school education, dummies for the
sex and marital status, as well as the age of the household head and the family size.
HHs Controls(f)i,t−1 also contains the lag investment in government bonds and risky as-
sets, the two variables included in the interaction terms and the capital gainsnon−UMP ,
i.e. the total portfolio capital gains minus the portion that is to be attributed to
UMPs. Moreover, I include dummies capturing the household head’s attitude toward
risk.9 The effect of UMP riskyt,average and UMP
gov
t,average are absorbed by the time fixed ef-
fect δt. The coefficients of interest are β1 and β2, the interaction of the UMPs impact
measures with the households (idiosyncratic) exposure. Finally, all financial variables
are trimmed at the bottom and top 1%.
Table 2.2 includes the baseline results for risky assets (Column 1) and government
bonds (Column 2). Only some coefficients are reported. In general, a positive sign indi-
cates an increase in investment (purchases), while a negative sign indicates a disinvest-
ment (sales). Moreover, based on the way the variables UMP govt,average and UMP
risky
t,average
are constructed, the coefficients attached to the interactions are the effect of an ac-
commodative unconventional monetary policy announcement that increases the return
of, respectively, risky assets and government bonds by 1%. Column (1) and (2) show
that unconventional monetary policy has a positive impact on the rebalancing of both
asset classes. In particular, a positive UMP shock induces a positive investment in
risky assets (6.3%) and government bonds (4.6%), for an increase in the total portfolio
of roughly 11%. Considering the average investment in risky assets (41000 EUR), it
implies a positive investment of 2600 EUR in risky assets and 1900 EUR in government
bonds. The results can also be interpreted through the lens of the confidence channel of
monetary policy: by reducing the amount of volatility in markets or uncertainty about
both financial and real variables outlook, UMPs are able to boost financial investment
in those segments that were mostly affected by the crisis. Table 2.2 also shows that
the UMPs wealth effect happens only through risky assets. One possible explanation
is that, given that the average investment in government bonds amounts to roughly
9In SHIW, households are asked, “In managing your financial investments, would you say you have
preferences for investments that offers: 1) A very high returns, but with a high risk of losing part
of the capital; 2) A good return, but also a fair degree of protection for the invested capital; 3) a
fair returns with a good degree of protection for the invested capital; or 4) low returns with no risk
of losing the invested capital." The answers are used to construct dummies capturing the household
head’s attitude toward risk.
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27000 EUR, the gains induced by UMPs are too little to trigger a wealth effect. This
result ia in line with households’ inertia in portfolio rebalancing.
Table 2.2: UMP and active rebalancing - baseline results
Risky assets Government bonds
(1) (2)
Risky, lag × UMPriskyaverage 6.283∗∗∗ 4.599∗∗∗
(2.088) (1.712)
Gov, lag × UMPgovaverage -2.443 -1.782
(2.724) (2.567)
Risky, lag -0.504∗∗∗ 0.0713∗
(0.0415) (0.040)
Gov, lag 0.223∗∗∗ -0.693∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.050)
∆ Income 0.303∗∗∗ 0.0870
(0.077) (0.060)
∆ Net wealth 0.0672∗∗∗ 0.0418∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007)
Net wealth, lag 0.0182∗∗∗ 0.0111∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Income, lag 0.139∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.046)
Constant yes yes
Demographics, lag yes yes
Risk aversion, lag yes yes
Time FE yes yes
Observations 3,093 3,023
R2 0.338 0.370
Note: The table reports the estimates from Equation (2.4) includ-
ing data from 2008 to 2016. The dependent variables are the stock
(in euro) of active rebalancing of risky assets (Column 1) and
of government bonds (Column 2). The variables UMPriskyaverage and
UMPgovaverage are constructed estimating Equation (2.3) with daily
data and then following the procedure explained in Section 2.4.1 to
construct a biennial series. Only the coefficients of interest and the
households’ financial controls are reported here. Standard errors
(in parenthesis) are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance
levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 2.11 in the Appendix (that is the extended version of Table 2.2 where all
estimates are reported) also shows that for both asset categories the rebalancing is
57
Chapter 2 Unconventional Monetary Policy and Households’ Financial Portfolio
Choices
negatively affected by the initial investment in the same category and positively by
the other one, implying that, in line with Calvet et al. (2009b), the initial investment
has a quantitative effect on the active change and that, after a shock, the investment
might gradually revert to a long-term mean and that the ratio between risky assets and
government bonds is (partially) re-adjusted. In line with previous findings (Juster et al.,
2006; Calvet et al., 2009a,b; Bilias et al., 2010), household financial characteristics are
positively correlated with the portfolio rebalancing. In general, all other controls have
the expected sign, but the capital gain variables deserve some deeper considerations.
Following Calvet et al. (2009b) and Juster et al. (2006), the relationship between active
and passive saving components is expected to be negative, but in this context the
magnitude of the coefficient is mechanically inflated by the relationship between the
two. Households’ financial wealth is measured with error, as are passive and active
savings. Measurement error introduces bias due to the method used to construct
capital gains and active rebalancing. In fact, for a given change in wealth, a positive
error in the passive saving necessarily lowers active rebalancing by an equal amount,
artificially inducing a negative correlation between the two (Juster et al., 2006). This
explains the strong effect of capital gains on risky asset rebalancing. Finally, it is
worth noting that financial and demographic characteristics, including risk attitude,
play a more important role in risky asset rebalancing decisions compared to government
bonds, implying that for the latter category other factors might be partially affecting
the active saving choices, like the traditional precautionary saving motive.10
One possible concern is that the outcome might differ for different groups of house-
holds. Thus, the analysis splits the sample into three groups: “poor” households,
defined as those in the bottom 50% of the income distribution, “middle class” house-
holds, defined as the third quartile, and “rich” households, defined as the 25% richest
households according to the income distribution. Results are reported in Table 2.3 for
risky assets and in Table 2.4 for government bonds. For ease of comparability, the
tables also report the baseline results. For both asset categories, the full sample re-
sults is driven by the behavior of the rich households, with the UMPs being significant
only for HHs in the third group. This finding is consistent with the well-established
literature finding that richer, better educated households (the so-called sophisticated
households) better diversify their financial investments (Vissing-Jørgensen and Attana-
sio, 2003; Calvet et al., 2007) and rebalance more frequently (Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002;
Campbell, 2006; Calvet et al., 2009b; Bilias et al., 2010) than other households. Fi-
nally, more sophisticated agents tend to be more aware of financial products (Guiso
10Unfortunately it is not possible to capture the precautionary saving motive due to data limitation.
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and Jappelli, 2005), invest more aggressively, and make smaller mistakes (Calvet et al.,
2007, 2009b). According to Table 2.3 and 2.4, UMPs induce a rebalance of the total
portfolio of roughly 10% (6.6% and 3.16% towards, respectively, risky assets and gov-
ernment bonds). Considering that, for this group, the investment in risky assets ranges
from 1000 EUR to 418000 EUR (with an average investment of 50000 EUR), it im-
plies a rebalancing of total portfolio that ranges between 100 and 41000 EUR. As in
the baseline results, the impact of UMPs happens only through the exposure to risky
assets. Moreover, it appears that the effect of financial covariates on the rebalancing
is similar across household groups.
Another possible concern is that the second and the third phase of unconventional
tools might have different impacts on rebalancing. Unlike the previous phase, which
sought to relieve financial and sovereign stress and fight redenomination risk and finan-
cial markets’ geographical fragmentation triggered by crises, after Summer 2014 ECB
action was designed to support economic growth and inflation. Specifically, in this
third phase, the ECB introduced the Asset Purchase Programme (APP) for private
and public sector securities with the aim of further depressing the term structure of
interest rates, not only in those market segments where there is a direct intervention,
namely covered bonds, asset-backed securities (ABS), sovereign and corporate bonds,
but also into non-targeted markets through the portfolio rebalancing channel (Praet,
2017). Due to data limitations, it is not possible to directly compare the UMPs impact
on rebalancing in the two different phases, but it is possible to re-run the analysis
excluding data after 2014. Results for risky assets and government bond rebalancing
are in Tables 2.12 and 2.13, respectively. The two tables show that excluding the last
rounds of unconventional monetary policy increases rich households rebalancing of risky
and government bonds by roughly 20% and 45% , respectively. This is further evidence
on the effectiveness of ECB’s policy in restoring markets’ confidence and that, while
the positive rebalancing in the period before the end of 2014 is driven by the confidence
channel of monetary policy, after 2014 other channels, such as the portfolio rebalancing
channel, might be attenuating (or even reversing) the sign of the rebalancing.
A final possible concern is that unconventional monetary policy might affect house-
holds’ financial portfolio not only through the change in financial asset prices, but also
through other direct and indirect effects. For example, UMP might impact households’
saving incentives (the intertemporal substitution effect) by affecting interest rates on
newly originated fixed rate mortgages or adjustable rate mortgages. In the former case,
households might decide to invest these extra available resources in their financial in-
vestment, and this could have a positive impact on the portfolio adjustment of both the
exposures to risky asset and goverment bonds. In the latter case, a newly originated
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Table 2.3: UMP and risky assets active rebalancing - different household groups
Full Sample Group 1 Group 2 Group3
1-50% 51-75% 76-100%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Risky, lag × UMPriskyaverage 6.283∗∗∗ 1.739 5.929 6.619∗∗
(2.088) (4.959) (3.650) (2.789)
Gov, lag × UMPgovaverage -2.443 -0.962 -4.462 0.599
(2.724) (11.09) (2.798) (4.016)
Risky, lag -0.504∗∗∗ -0.312∗∗∗ -0.490∗∗∗ -0.516∗∗∗
(0.0415) (0.103) (0.0776) (0.0512)
Gov, lag 0.223∗∗∗ 0.182∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗
(0.0680) (0.107) (0.0659) (0.103)
∆ Income 0.303∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗ 0.254∗ 0.324∗∗∗
(0.0775) (0.171) (0.146) (0.0996)
∆ Net wealth 0.0672∗∗∗ 0.0679∗∗∗ 0.0763∗∗∗ 0.0601∗∗∗
(0.00700) (0.0135) (0.0116) (0.00928)
Net wealth, lag 0.0182∗∗∗ 0.0180∗ 0.0131∗∗ 0.0180∗∗∗
(0.00435) (0.00988) (0.00540) (0.00641)
Income , lag 0.139∗∗ 0.295 0.256 0.169
(0.0686) (0.246) (0.226) (0.130)
Constant yes yes yes yes
Demographics, lag yes yes yes yes
Risk aversion,lag yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 3,093 538 1,184 1,371
R2 0.338 0.211 0.367 0.355
Note: The table reports the estimates from Equation (2.4) including
data from 2008 to 2016. In all four columns the dependent variable
is the stock (in euro) of Italian risky assets active rebalancing. The
first column shows the results when considering the full sample. In the
following three columns households are split according to the value of
their disposable income: Group 1 includes households in the bottom
two quartiles of the income distribution, Group 2 contains households
in the third quartile, and Group 3 comprises households in the top
quartile. The variables UMPriskyaverage and UMP
gov
average are constructed
estimating Equation (2.3) with daily data and then following the
procedure explained in Section 2.4.1 to construct a biennial series.
Only the coefficients of interest and the households’ financial con-
trols are reported here. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to
heteroskedasticity. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.4: UMP and government bonds active rebalancing - different household groups
Full Sample Group 1 Group 2 Group3
1-50% 51-75% 76-100%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Risky, lag × UMPriskyaverage 4.599∗∗∗ 11.36 6.371 3.164∗
(1.712) (7.210) (4.593) (1.911)
Gov, lag × UMPgovaverage -1.782 8.667 -3.431 -2.411
(2.567) (6.069) (4.452) (2.784)
Risky, lag 0.0713∗ 0.00677 0.120 0.0439
(0.0398) (0.0883) (0.0836) (0.0459)
Gov, lag -0.693∗∗∗ -0.662∗∗∗ -0.674∗∗∗ -0.719∗∗∗
(0.0502) (0.0844) (0.0923) (0.0786)
∆ Income 0.0870 0.327∗∗∗ 0.134 -0.00699
(0.0602) (0.116) (0.0875) (0.0934)
∆ Net wealth 0.0418∗∗∗ 0.0309∗∗∗ 0.0385∗∗ 0.0441∗∗∗
(0.00719) (0.00852) (0.0158) (0.00918)
Net wealth, lag 0.0111∗∗ 0.00599 0.0124 0.0101∗∗
(0.00434) (0.00520) (0.0102) (0.00508)
Income, lag 0.145∗∗∗ 0.484∗∗∗ 0.202 0.128
(0.0456) (0.124) (0.188) (0.0971)
Constant yes yes yes yes
Demographics, lag yes yes yes yes
Risk aversion yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 3,023 966 1,163 894
R2 0.370 0.391 0.349 0.418
Note: The table reports the estimates from Equation (2.4) including
data from 2008 to 2016. In all four columns the dependent variable
is the stock (in euro) of Italian government bonds active rebalancing.
The first column shows the results when considering the full sample.
In the following three columns households are split according to the
value of their disposable income: Group 1 includes households in the
bottom two quartiles of the income distribution, Group 2 contains
households in the third quartile, and Group 3 comprises households
in the top quartile. The variables UMPriskyaverage and UMP
gov
average are
constructed estimating Equation (2.3) with daily data and then fol-
lowing the procedure explained in Section 2.4.1 to construct a biennial
series.Only the coefficients of interest and the households’ financial
controls are reported here. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to
heteroskedasticity. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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mortgage (for example for the purchases of a new home) might have a negative effect
on portfolio adjustment, as households might decide to disinvest their financial wealth
to finance the down payment. The indirect effects of UMP operate through the general
equilibrium responses of prices and wages, hence of labour income and employment.
With an accomodative monetary policy, the direct increase in households’ expenditure
and firms’ investment will lead to an increase in output, sustainin employment and
wages, which, in turn, might have a positive impact on financial portfolio adjustment.
In order to control for these second-order effects of monetary policy I re-run the analy-
sis for different subsamples. Results for risky assets and for government bonds can be
found in Tables 2.14 and 2.15 (both in the Appendix), respectively. Both tables present
three sets of results. In the first one (Column 1-4) I consider only households where
the head is employed at time t − 1 and t; in the second one (Column 5-8) I include
households that have no mortgage at time t− 1 and t; in the third one (Column 9-12)
I take into account only household that are home owners both in t− 1 and t. In each
set of results I report results for all households grouped together (full sample) and for
the “poor", “middle" and “rich" household groups. Comparing results in Tables 2.14
with the baseline outcome obtained when using all available observations (Table 2.3),
it is possible to notice that results are very similar. Only the interaction term Risky,
lag × UMPriskyt, average is significant, the coefficients are qualitatively and quantitatively
very close and significant only for the “rich" households. This suggests that none of
the possible second order effect of UMP taken into consideration play a role risky asset
investment adjustment decisions. The same is true when comparing Tables 2.15 and
2.4. As in the baseline results, what drives governement bond investment decisiond
for households in the three analysed subsamples is previous year investment in risky
asset. Moreover, results are significant only for households at the top of the income
distribution and the coefficients are qualitative similar to the baseline case, although
quantitatively a bit higher. This suggests that for households where the head is always
employed, that has no mortgage and that are home owners the positive effect of un-
conventional policies on goverment bonds invesment might be stronger. This last set
of results confirm baseline findings.
2.4.2.2 Unconventional monetary policy and change in household’s risk aversion
Results in previos section show that Italian households respond in a pro-cyclical way
to UMP, increasing their invesment into both government bonds and risky assets. As
discussed in Section 2.2, this behaviour is consistent with the confidence channel of
monetary policy. To further explore the the relationship between UMP and households’
risk aversion I make use of the measure of households’ willingness to take financial risk
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reported in the SHIW. In each wave, respondents are asked, “In managing your financial
investments, would you say you have preferences for investments that offers: 1) A very
high returns, but with a high risk of losing part of the capital; 2) A good return, but
also a fair degree of protection for the invested capital; 3) a fair returns with a good
degree of protection for the invested capital; or 4) low returns with no risk of losing
the invested capital". Responses are coded with integers from 1 to 4, with higher
score indicating a higher aversion to risk. This qualitative measure of risk aversion
is extensively used in the literature as a risk attitude measure (e.g., Malmendier and
Nagel 2011 and Guiso et al. 2018). Then, I use this risk aversion measure to construct
the variable “Change in risk aversion":
Change in risk aversioni,t =

−1, if risk aversion decreases between t− 1 and t
0, if risk aversion does no change between t− 1 and t
1, if risk aversion increase between t− 1 and t.
Figure 2.3 plots the distribution of the risk aversion and the change in risk aversion
variables. Panel (a) shows a very skewed distribution of the risk aversion variable,
with only 2% of the sample choosing “high return and high risk" and with 80% of the
households choosing between “moderate return and moderate risk" and “low return
and no risk". Panel (b) shows that between 2006 and 2016, almost 30% of the sample
experiences an increase in risk aversion, in contrast to almost 20% that sees a decrease.
The remaining 50% reports no change in its risk attitude.
I use the newly constructed variable to understand how UMP affects change in risk
aversion. I model the comulative probability of these ordinal outcomes with an ordered
probit model,
Pr(yi,t 6 |xi,t−1, UMP riskyt,average × riskyi,t−1, UMP
gov
t,average × gov bondsi,t−1) =
Φ(αj − β1UMP riskyt,average × riskyi,t−1 − β2UMP
gov
t,average × gov bondsi,t−1 − γxi,t−1), (2.5)
where yi,t ∈ {−1, 0, 1} denotes the change in risk aversion, Φ(.) is the cumulative
standard distribution function, the αj denote the cutoff points that must be estimated
(α1 < α2 < α3 < ∞) and xi,t−1 is a vector containing all control variables described
in Section 3.4. I estimate the model with maximum likelihood to obtain estimates
of β1, β2, γ and the cutoff points. The analysis is performed on the full sample and
when eliminating households that reported inconsistent answers to the risk aversion
measure/financial portfolio distribution.11 Because coefficients do not have a direct
11I eliminate answers where households define themselves as risk lovers but only invest in goverment
bonds and where households define themselves as highly risk averse but only invest in risky assets.
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economic interpretation, I focus especially on the marginal effect of the increase of one
unit in the UMP measures, leaving all other variables at their actual sample realization.

























(b) Change in Risk Aversion
Note: The figure shows the distribution of of Italian households’ level of
risk aversion (left panel) and the change in risk aversion (right panel) be-
tween 2006 and 2016. In SHIW, households are asked, “In managing your
financial investments, would you say you have preferences for investments
that offers: 1) A very high returns, but with a high risk of losing part of
the capital; 2) A good return, but also a fair degree of protection for the
invested capital; 3) a fair returns with a good degree of protection for
the invested capital; or 4) low returns with no risk of losing the invested
capital". In order to construct the variable “risk aversion", responses are
coded with integers from 1 to 4, with higher score indicating a higher
aversion to risk. The variable “change in risk aversion" is equal to -1 if
the household has experienced a decrease in risk aversion, is equal to 0
if household’s risk aversion has remained unchanged and is equal to 1 if
risk aversion has increased between t− 1 and t.
Source: Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth, 2006-
2016.
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Table 2.16 (in the Appendix) presents the results of the ordered probit estimated on
the 2006-2016 sample. The estimates of the parameters of interest are at the top of the
table. Results are presented separately for two different household groups (investors in
risky assets and investors in government bonds), when using the full sample (Column
1 and 3) and when dropping inconsistent answers (Column 2 and 4). The table shows
that an accomodative UMP shock increases the probability of decreasing risk aversion.
Moreover, consistent with all previous results, this effect happens only through risky
assets. Figure 2.4 plots the marginal effect of a one unit increase of the variable
the UMP riskyt,average. The economic magnitudes are sizeble. For households investing in
Italian risky assets (Panel a), an accomodative UMP shock, implies, on average a 72%
lower probability of increasing their risk aversion, a 16% higher probability of not
changing their risk aversion and a 56% increase in the probability in decreasing their
risk aversion. When I drop inconsistent answers (Panel b), results are quantitatively
and qualitatively similar. For households investing in Italian goverment bonds (Panel
c), results are qualitatively similar although the point estimates appear to be smaller in
magnitude. An accomodative UMP shock, implies, on average a 26% lower probability
of increasing their risk aversion and a 22% increase in the probability of decreasing
risk aversion. Thus, results show that households’ risk aversion is negatively affected
by accomodative monetary policy and that this result is stronger for investors in risky
assets. These findings are not only consistent with the increase in financial investment
discussed in the previous section, but are also in support of the confidence channel
of monetary policy: by reducing risk perception and uncertainty, monetary policy
lowers risk aversion, restores households’ confidence and boosts financial investment in
financial segments strongly hit by the crisis.
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(d) Eliminate inconsistent answers
Gov Bonds
Note: The figure plots the marginal effects of the variable UMPriskyaverage
on the change in risk aversion. The variable “change in risk aversion" is
equal to -1 if the household has experienced a decrease in risk aversion,
is equal to 0 if household’s risk aversion has remained unchanged and
is equal to 1 if risk aversion has increased between t − 1 and t. The
marginal effects are computed from an ordered probit model estimated
with maximum likelihood (Equation 3.4). The coefficients of interest are
reported for the two different samples used for the baseline estimation
(Risky assets and gov bonds, please refer to Table 2.2) and for the full
sample (Panel a and c) and when eliminating inconsistent answers (Panel
b and d). 90% confidence intervals.
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2.5 Robustness checks
This section reports a series of robustness checks to the results. First, I employ a
two-step model to correct for possible sample-selection bias. Second, I construct the
UMPs impact measures using different aggregation and estimation techniques. Third,
I include sampling weights to correct for survey data construction. Finally, I control
for the quality of survey answers. All sensitivity tests report results quantitatively and
qualitatively similar to the baseline findings.
2.5.1 Robustness checks to the model
In the portfolio allocation literature, it is well established that not all households invest
in risky asset markets. Furthermore, this literature also finds that the decision whether
to participate or not in risky markets and how much to invest are correlated. This, in
turn, creates a problem of self-selection into investing that should be taken into account
in the empirical analysis. The same issues may apply when considering the choice of
rebalancing. In fact, the investment and the rebalancing decision problems are very
similar; with the latter analyzing in terms of (financial investment) flows what the
former analyzes in terms of (financial investment) levels. In presence of self-selection,
the use of OLS would lead to inconsistent parameter estimates. For this reason, in this
section I make use of a latent variable model with a probit selection equation (Guiso
et al., 2000, 2002a,b; Guiso and Jappelli, 2005). I deal with the joint decision of whether
to rebalance and how much to rebalance using a Heckman selection model (Heckman,
1979). I estimate a probit model for the binary choice of rebalancing conditioning on
not being invested in the asset category in t− 1 (extensive margin decision) and then
a rebalancing equation for the participants accounting for selection between t− 1 and
t. Formally, the model is the following:
as
(f)
it = β2x2,i,t−1 + ρ12λ(β̂1x1,i,t−1) + e
(f)
2,i,t
with asit 6= 0 indicates the (stock of) active saving of the asset category f = {risky,
gov}, λ = φ(β̂1x1,i,t−1)/Φ(β̂1x1,i,t−1) is the inverse Mills ratio, φ is the normal density
and β̂1 is obtained by estimating the first-stage probit model
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where P (f)it−1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if HH i holds asset category f in t − 1,
0 otherwise. The error terms are both normal, e(f)1,it−1 ∼ N (0, 1) and e
(f)
2,it ∼ N (0, σ),
and ρ12 = Cov(e1,t−1, e2,t).




(f) + αHHs Controls(f)i,t−1 + β1UMP
gov













(f) + αHHs Controls(f)i,t−1 + +γR
(f)




The first equation is identical to the linear model in Equation (2.4) in Section 2.4.2.1.
P ji,t is a dummy equal to zero if the household has not rebalanced between t − 1
and t conditional that it did not hold asset j in t − 1 or 1 otherwise; Zi,t−1 contains
households’ financial and demographic characteristics; Ri,t−1 is the vector that includes
the exclusion restrictions needed to identify the model, i.e. variables that impact only
the binary decision of rebalancing. I employ the use of on-line banking, the ownership
of a brokerage account, and the fact that at least one member of the household works
in the financial industry. A well established literature finds that entry costs, trading
costs, and information costs have a primary role in explaining the (low) rate of risky
asset ownership (see, among others, Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) and Bertaut (1998)). I
argue that these three variables have a positive impact on the aforementioned costs,
by lowering the fixed (brokerage account), trading (on-line banking), and information
costs (one member of the household works in the financial industry).
Results are shown in Table 2.17. Column (1) and (3) report the second stage for the
risky asset and government bonds rebalancing. The first stage regressions are reported
in Column (2) and (4). The significance of the inverse Mills ratio indicates that for
both asset categories, the first and the second stages are not independent. Nonetheless,
comparing these estimates with the baseline regressions, it is possible to notice that
they are quantitatively very similar, implying that the bias introduced by not taking
into account the sample selection is negligible.
2.5.2 Robustness checks to the identification
The first robustness check that I perform to the identification regards the construction
of the two UMP measures. As described in Section 2.4.1, I construct the monetary
policy measures by aggregating the estimates of the β coefficients (Equation 2.3), disre-
garding their statistical significance. Thus, I repeat the procedure described in Section
2.4.1, but this time only including in the construction of the UMP measures only es-
timates that are significant at least at the 10% level. The two newly created UMP
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measures, UMPriskyt, only sign and UMP
gov
t, only sign are plotted in the top left panel of Figure
2.11 (in the Appendix).
Secondly, to assess whether the results are driven by the model used to estimate the
effects of ECB’s unconventional announcements on the financial indexes, I employ a














where rj,t is the daily return in the financial index j at time t; f={risky, gov} and j=
bot index, btp index, ctz index, cct index if f=gov and j= equity index, corporate bond
index, liquidity funds index, mixed funds index, bond funds index, and equity funds
index if f=risky. The two UMPs impact measures, UMP riskyt,panel and UMP
gov
t,panel (top
right panel of Figure 2.11) are then derived applying points 1) and 2) of the procedure
described in Section 2.4.1.
Furthermore, a general limitation associated with event-study analyses is that the
choice of the event window around the announcement is crucial. It involves a trade-off
between keeping the interval narrow enough to make sure it only captures the impact
of the monetary policy news and choosing a window wide enough to fully account the
reaction of market participants. Thus, I test the robustness of the baseline results by
extending the event window to two-day and, following Hachula et al. (2020), I employ
the following univariate model





aDa−1,t) + γ∆Eoniat +
N∑
n=1
δnzn,t + ηj,t (2.8)
where the dummy Da−1,t is equal to 1 if announcement a happens in t − 1 and 0
otherwise. The coefficient of interest is βa,j = β1a + β2a. The two UMP impact mea-
sures, UMP riskyt,two−day and UMP
gov
t,two−day (bottom panel of Figure 2.11), are then derived
applying the procedure described in Section 2.4.1.
Table 2.18 in the Appendix shows that results of all three robustness checks are
quantitatively and qualitatively similar to the baseline outcome.
2.5.3 Robustness checks to the estimation sample
Finally, the sensitivity of the baseline results is tested across different estimation sam-
ples.12 First, the analysis is repeated including sampling weights. Sampling weights
denote the inverse of the probability that each observation is included in the sample,
12Sampling weights are provided for all SHIW waves directly by the Bank of Italy.
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in order to correct for the sampling design, nonresponse or sample selection. In fact,
if, according to the selection process, all the elements of the population have an un-
equal chance to be included in the sample, then not correcting for sampling weights
might lead to biased estimates. On the other hand, using weights increase the sampling
variance, especially in small samples (for an exhaustive discussion about this trade-off,
see Solon et al. 2015). Second, I control for the quality of the survey data. For each
household, the interviewer is asked to rate the reliability of the information on saving
and financial investments provided by the respondent on a scale from zero to ten. All
households with a score below eight are eliminated from the sample. Column (1) and
(2) of Table 2.19 report the results when using the weighted sample, while Column (3)
and (4) show results when cutting the sample. In both cases the findings are similar
to the baseline results.
2.6 The impact of UMP-induced portfolio rebalancing on house-
holds’ financial portfolios
In this Section, I simulate the impact of unconventional monetary policy on households’
financial portfolios across the income distribution. In order to do so, I use the informa-
tion on investment in government bonds and risky assets that refer to December 31,
2006 (Table 2.20).13 This allows me to evaluate unconventional monetary policy ef-
fects across all years included in previous empirical analysis and to avoid the possibility
that financial wealth distribution in later waives might already embed unconventional
monetary policy effects. Then, I impose the valuation and rebalancing effect induced
by unconventional monetary policy between 2006 and the end of 2016. Finally, I com-
pare the value of the initial and the final portfolio, so to calculate the UMPs-induced
financial return.
The empirical analysis in Section 2.4.2.1 finds that 1) only households in the top
quartile rebalance their portfolio following unconventional stimulus (while the UMP’s
valuation the effect is common for all); and 2) the active rebalancing is expressed as
a fraction of household’s previous year investment in risky asset: an accomodative
announcement that increases risky asset return by 1% leads to a 6.62% ∗ riskyi,t−1 and
to a 3.16%∗ riskyi,t−1 positive rebalancing of, respectively, risky assets and government
bonds. Thus, the value of total the portfolio on December 31 2016 is, calculated as
13I assume that househols’d potfolio is composed only by government bonds and risky assets.
70






t=2008 govt−1,i(1 + UMP
gov
t ) + riskyt−1,i(1 + UMP
risky
t ), if Perc ≤ 75%
2016∑
t=2008
(govt−1,i + 3.16% ∗ riskyt−1,i)(1 + UMP
gov
t )+
riskyt−1,i(1 + 6.62%)(1 + UMP
risky
t )
, if Perc > 75%
(2.9)
where Port16,i is the value of the total portfolio of family i at the end of 2016; govt−1,i
and riskyt−1,i are the stocks of investment in government bonds and risky assets;
UMP govt and UMP
risky
t are the biennial vectors containing the UMPs-induced valua-
tion effect estimated in Section 2.4.1; if household i belongs to the top quartile of the
income distribution, the equation contains also the rebalancing effect (3.16%∗riskyt−1,i
for the government bonds and 6.62% ∗ riskyt−1,i for the risky assets). Finally, I cal-
culate the portfolio return of household i over the 10 year period under analysis,
Tot Port Ret2016,i =
Tot Port2016,i−Tot Port2006,i
Tot Port2006,i
. Thus, the total portfolio return is a func-
tion of the initial portfolio composition in terms of percentage investment in the two
categories, valuation effect and rebalancing.
Figure 3.5 shows the average total portfolio return in 2016 for twenty different groups
of households, ordered from left to right according to the quintile of income distribution
they belong to. The graph contains two different scenarios. The solid blue line is
the graphical representation of Equation (2.9), i.e. it depicts the portfolio rate of
return when including the active portfolio rebalancing. The red dashed line is its
counterfactual and considers the portfolio rate of return when the portfolio rebalancing
component is shut down. By construction, the two lines differ only for households in the
top quartile. From Figures 3.5, it emerges the portfolio return between the lower three
quartiles and the upper ends of the income distribution varies considerably, but that
this difference has to be attributed only to the rebalancing effect. Even more striking,
the dashed red line shows that, without considering the rebalancing, the portfolio return
for the top 5% households would be lower than the bottom 5%. This result is rooted
in the very poor performance of the Italian stock market in the crisis years (left panel
of Figure 2.7, red line) and in the ECB’s inability in sustaining that specific asset class
between 2006 and 2008. Figure 2.2 shows that the UMPs had a negative effect on risky
assets in the first two years under analysis. This result has to be attributed entirely to
the strong negative effects of unconventional tools announcements on the FTSE MIB
index.14 There is a positive correlation between percentage of the portfolio invested
in equity and income (Table 2.20). This explains why rich households’ portfolio have
14These results are not reported here, but are available upon request.
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experienced stronger capital losses. On the contrary, including the portfolio rebalancing
boosts portfolios’ return, with the top quartile gaining between 30-35% of the initial
value of their portfolio thanks to unconventional monetary policy valuation effects
and their UMPs-induced investment decisions. In contrast, the bottom three quartiles
increase the value of their portfolio by 3-4%. Thus, it is possible to conclude that
households’ heterogeneous portfolio rebalancing driven by UMPs is the major cause
for financial wealth polarization among households.
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Note: The graph shows the average cumulated total portfolio rate of re-
turn between 2006 and 2016 for twenty different groups of households,
ordered from left to right according to the quintile of income distribution
they belong to. Two different scenarios are represented. The solid blue
line depicts the cumulated portfolio rate of return when including both
the UMP-induced valuation effect and active portfolio rebalancing. The
red dashed line is its counterfactual and considers the cumulated portfolio
return when the portfolio rebalancing component is shut down. By con-
struction, the two lines only differ for households in the top quartile, as
the empirical analysis finds that they are the only one rebalancing their
financial portfolio following an accommodative unconventional monetary
policy shock. For the initial value of total portfolios on 2006, see Table
2.20. The value of financial portfolios in 2016 is calculated using Equa-
tion (2.9). For each household i, the portfolio return is calculated as
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It is important to highlight some caveats of this analysis. This simulation aims at
gauging the direct distributive implications of unconventional monetary policy on the
basis of the ex-ante distribution of financial wealth, considering only some of the asset
categories Italian households are invested in. Thus, it only measures what group of
households gains/losses the most ex-post conditioning to the two asset categories under
analysis, but it is mute with respect to the optimal portfolio rebalancing response to
unconventional monetary policy. In principle, there could be a scenario where house-
holds in the bottom three quartiles show inertia in rebalancing their government bond
or risky asset positions, but are active in other financial investments more heavily af-
fected by UMPs. This could boost the value of their portfolio but it would not be
captured by this analysis.
2.7 Conclusion
Unconventional monetary policy is expected to affect investors’ portfolio choices, yet
in the current academic debate on the impact of unconventional tools on households’
wealth redistribution it is always assumed that households do not adjust their portfolios
in response to monetary policy. This Chapter rejects this claim and shows that UMP
does indeed matter for households’ portfolio decisions, at least for households at the
top of the income distribution.
To understand the impact of unconventional tools, I combine several waves of the
Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth with financial indexes. This
allows me to construct a novel dataset that contains granular information on the ac-
tive portfolio rebalancing of a representative sample of Italian households from 2006 to
2016. Then, I identify monetary policy by isolating the unexpected change in house-
holds’ financial wealth due to ECB’s unconventional announcements. This allows me
to estimate the UMP wealth effect on portfolio rebalancing.
The analysis shows that in a period of financial turbulence in which households have
drastically reduced their financial investment, accommodative unconventional tools
have induced a positive shift toward both Italian government bonds and Italian risky
assets. These findings point toward the effectiveness of ECB’s unconventional actions
in restoring trust in the financial system and are consistent with the so-called confi-
dence channel of monetary policy. Moreover, the analysis also shows that households’
risk aversion is negatively affecte by accomodative UMP. Finally, I conduct a simula-
tion exercise that evaluates the impact of unconventional tools on households’ financial
wealth considering both UMP-induced valuation and rebalancing effects. It appears
that the difference in households’ portfolio performance across the income distribution
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has to be attributed almost only to the rebalancing component, suggesting that rebal-
ancing decision might play a prominent role in the redistributional effects of monetary
policy.
These findings have important policy implications. Understanding how households
are affected and heterogeneously respond to monetary policy changes can have impor-
tant implications for the transmission mechanism of monetary stimulus to households
and, through them, to the real economy. Moreover, although distributional politics are
not one of the the objectives of central banks, uncovering the unintended and nega-
tive consequences of monetary intervention should be of primary interest, in order to
understand where the risks are concentrated in the household sector.
Finally, I acknowledge that this Chapter leaves some open issues. Due to data
limitation, I am unable to uncover the role that households’ behavioral traits play on the
monetary policy/rebalancing decisions relationship. Moreover, comparing the impact
of conventional and unconventional monetary policy on rebalancing choices could also
be important. Addressing these questions is beyond the scope of this Chapter and
represents an interesting and exciting avenue for future research.
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2.A Figures
Figure 2.6: Italian households’ portfolio composition, 2006-2016
























Gov Bonds Risky Assets
Foreign assets Others
Note: The figure shows the evolution of Italian households’ portfolio
composition in the period 2006-2016, for three groups of households:
Group 1 (bottom two quartiles of the income distribution), Group 2
(third quartile) and Group 3 (top quartile). Government bonds include:
bot, btp, cct and ctz. Risky assets include: equity, corporate bonds, and
mutual funds. Foreign assets include all assets issued by non-residents.
Others include: postal bonds, certificates of deposits, repos, unlisted
equity, and managed portfolio. Deposits are excluded. Averages are
calculated using sample weights.
Source: Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth, 2006-
2016.
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Liq. Funds Bal. Funds Flex. Funds Bond Funds
Equity Funds Equity Bonds
Note: The figure shows the eleven financial indexes used to approximate
the return of the ten asset classes included in the analysis (Section 2.3.2)
and to estimate the impact of ECB’s UMP announcements on the Italian
financial asset classes included in the empirical analysis (Section 2.4.1).
All data are indexed to 100 on January 1, 2007.
Source: Bloomberg and Datastream.
76
Chapter 2 Unconventional Monetary Policy and Households’ Financial Portfolio
Choices
































































-20 -10 0 10 20 30
2016
































































-40 -20 0 20 40
2016
Risky asset rebalancing, stock (ten thousand of Euros)
Note: The figure shows the distribution of Italian households’ active
rebalancing over the 2006-2016 period for the two asset categories
included in the empirical analysis: Italian government bonds (bot, ctz,
btp, cct) in the top panel; Italian risky assets (liquidity funds, mixed
funds, bond funds, equity funds, equity and corporate bonds) in the
bottom panel. For a detailed explanation of the construction of the two
active rebalancing categories, please refer to Section 2.3.2. Only data
included in the estimation sample is used for the calculations. Thus,
rebalancing equal to zero as well as positive rebalancing in t conditioning
on not being invested in the asset category in t − 1 have been excluded
from the table. The unit is ten thousand euro.
Source: Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth,
Bloomberg, Datastream and own calculation.
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Risky assets rebalancing, stock (ten thousand of Euros)
Note: The graph shows the distribution of Italian households’ active
rebalancing over the 2006-2016 period for the two asset categories
included in the empirical analysis: Italian government bonds (bot,
ctz, btp, cct) in the top panel; Italian risky assets (liquidity funds,
mixed funds, bond funds, equity funds, equity and corporate bonds)
in the bottom panel. Three groups of households are included in the
graph: Group 1 (households in the bottom two quartiles of the income
distribution), Group 2 (households in the third quartile) and Group
3 (households in the top quartile). For a detailed explanation of the
construction of the two active rebalancing categories, please refer to
Section 2.3.2. Only data included in the estimation sample is used for
the calculations. Thus, rebalancing equal to zero as well as positive
rebalancing in t conditioning on not being invested in the asset category
in t − 1 have been excluded from the table. The unit is ten thousand
euro.
Source: Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth,
Bloomberg, Datastream and own calculation.
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(b) Risky Assets
Mean Median
Note: The figure shows the evolution over time of the mean and the
median value of households’ active rebalancing of the two categories in-
cluded in the analysis, Italian government bonds (Bot, Ctz, Btp, Cct)
and Italian risky assets (Liquidity funds, mixed funds, bond funds, eq-
uity funds, equity and corporate bonds) for the year 2006-2016. The unit
is thousands of euro. For a detailed explanation of the construction of
the two active rebalancing categories, please refer to Section 2.3.2. Only
data included in the estimation sample is reported here. Thus, rebalanc-
ing equal to zero as well as positive rebalancing in t conditioning on not
being invested in the asset category in t−1 have been excluded from the
picture.
Source: Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth,
Bloomberg, Datastream and own calculation.
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Note: The graph depicts the biennial cumulated impact of UMP an-
nouncements’ unexpected component on government bonds and risky
asset categories. The blue and red lines are obtained by estimating at the
daily frequency the effect of ECB’s UMP announcements on the returns
of several financial indexes (bot, btp, ctz, cct in the case of UMP gov and
equity, corporate bond, liquidity funds, mixed funds, bond funds and eq-
uity funds in the case of UMP risky), employing Equation (2.3) and then
only adding up significant estmates in the top left panel, Equation (3.6)
for the top panel and Equation (2.8) for the bottom panel. The daily
impact is then aggregated into a biennial series by summing within two
year window, as explained in Section 2.4.1. For a complete list of the
ECB’s announcements included in the analysis, see Table 2.10.
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hoicesTable 2.5: List of asset classes included in the SHIW, 2006-2016
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Current account Current account Current account Current account Current account Current account
Saving account Saving account Saving account Saving account Saving account Saving account
Certif. of dep Certif. of dep Certif. of dep Certif. of dep Certif. of dep Certif. of dep
Repos Repos Repos Repos Repos Repos
PO savings certificates PO savings certificates PO savings certificates PO savings certificates PO savings certificates PO savings certificates
BOTs (T-bills) BOTs (T-bills) BOTs (T-bills) BOTs (T-bills) BOTs (T-bills) (T-bills)
CCTs (T-certificates) CCTs (T-certificates) CCTs (T-certificates) CCTs (T-certificates) CCTs (T-certificates) CCTs (T-certificates)
. . . Infl-indexed BTPs Infl-indexed BTPs Infl-indexed BTPs
BTPs (T-bonds) BTPs (T-bonds) BTPs (T-bonds) BTPs (T-bonds) BTPs (T-bonds) BTPs (T-bonds)
CTZs (zero coupon) CTZs (zero coupon) CTZs (zero coupon) CTZs (zero coupon) CTZs (zero coupon) CTZs (zero coupon)
Other Gov. Bonds Other Gov. Bonds Other Gov. Bonds Other Other Gov. Bonds Other Gov. Bonds Other Gov. Bonds
Bonds Bonds . . . .
. . Bonds iss. by Italian firms Bonds iss. by Italian firms Bonds iss. by Italian firms Bonds iss. by Italian firms
. . Bonds iss. by Italian banks Bonds iss. by Italian banks Bonds iss. by Italian banks Bonds iss. by Italian banks
Equity funds Equity funds Equity funds Equity funds Equity funds Equity funds
Balanced equity funds Balanced equity funds . . . .
Balanced bond funds Balanced bond funds . . .
Balanced funds Balanced funds . . . .
Bond funds Bond funds Bond funds Bond funds Bond funds Bond funds
Money market funds Money market funds Money market funds . . .
Flexible funds Flexible funds Flexible funds
. . Flexible&balanced funds Flexible&balanced funds Flexible&balanced funds Flexible&balanced funds
. . Non-harmonized funds . . .
Indexed funds Indexed funds Indexed funds . . .
. . . Funds/ETFs in foreign cu. Funds/ETFs in foreign cu. Funds/ETFs in foreign cu.
Shares in listed c. Shares in listed c. Shares in listed c. Shares in listed c. Shares in listed c.
- of which in privatized c. - of which in privatized c. . . . .
Shares in unlisted c. Shares in unlisted c. Shares in unlisted c. Shares in unlisted c. Shares in unlisted c. Shares in unlisted c.
Shares in private c. Shares in private c. Shares in private c. Shares in private c. Shares in private c.
Shares in partnerships Shares in partnerships Shares in partnerships Shares in partnerships Shares in partnerships Shares in partnerships
Managed portfolios Managed portfolios Managed portfolios Managed portfolios Managed portfolios Managed portfolios
Bonds and inv funds Bonds and inv funds . . . .
(foreign) (foreign) . . . .
. . . Gov bonds (foreign) Gov bonds (foreign) Gov bonds (foreign)
. . . Bonds (foreign) Bonds (foreign) Bonds (foreign)
Shares (foreign) Shares (foreign) Shares (foreign) Shares (foreign) Shares (foreign) Shares (foreign)
. . Funds (foreign) . . .
Other (foreign) Other (foreign) Other (foreign) Other (foreign) Other (foreign) Other (foreign)
Loans to coop. Loans to coop. Loans to coop. Loans to coop. Loans to coop. Loans to coop.
Other fin. assets Other fin. assets Other fin. assets
Note: The table shows all asset classes included in the SHIW in the years 2006-2016. In case the asset class is not included in the survey,
the symbol . is used.
Source: Survey on Households Income and Wealth, Banca d’Italia,
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Table 2.6: Description of the asset classes included in the analysis
Asset classes Description Classification
Bot Government bills up to 1 year Gov bonds
Ctz Government bills up to 2 year Gov bonds
Btp Government bonds Gov bonds
Btpi Inflation linked bonds Gov bonds
Cct Government floating rate notes Gov bonds
Bonds issued by Ital-
ian banks
Bank bonds are bonds that are issued by banks. As with any type of
bond, bank bonds are a debt instrument
Corp bonds
Bonds issued by Ital-
ian firms
Firms bonds that are issued by firms. As with any type of bond, firms
bonds are a debt instrument
Corp bonds
Shares in listed Ital-
ian companies





A liquidity fund portfolio is comprised of short-term, or less than one





A balanced fund is a mutual fund that generally keeps to a 50-50 mix of




Mutual fund that allows capital to be invested as the financial profes-
sional sees fit. Flexible mutual funds do not have any restrictions on





Balanced fund with a higher percentage of equity Funds
Italian Balanced
Bond Funds
Balanced fund with a higher percentage of bonds Funds
Italian Bond Funds A bond fund is a fund invested primarily in bonds and other debt in-
struments. The exact type of debt the fund invests in will depend on
its focus, but investments may include government, corporate, municipal
and convertible bonds, along with other debt securities like mortgage-
backed securities
Funds
Italian Equity Funds Fund that invest primarily in stocks represent the largest category of
mutual funds. Generally, the investment objective of this class of funds
is long-term capital growth
Funds
Italian Mixed Funds Given by the sum of Italian Balanced Funds, Italian Balanced Bond
Funds, Italian Balance Equity Funds, Italian Flexible Funds
Funds
Note: The table lists all asset classes included in the analysis (Column 1), together with a brief description
(Column 2) and their final classification (Column 3).
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Table 2.7: Italian households’ average holding of financial assets
Assets classes 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Included in the analysis
Bota 0.064 0.083 0.071 0.045 0.048 0.047
Btpb 0.019 0.019 0.016 0.026 0.022 0.018
Cctc 0.021 0.018 0.017 0.010 0.017 0.013
Ctzd 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000
Equities 0.066 0.060 0.041 0.046 0.037 0.033
Corporate bondse 0.064 0.080 0.071 0.086 0.078 0.052
Mutual funds 0.072 0.061 0.072 0.057 0.059 0.064
Excluded from the analysis
Depositsf 0.894 0.898 0.916 0.942 0.930 0.938
Other goverment papers 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.003
Postal bonds 0.071 0.064 0.058 0.064 0.050 0.049
Certificates of deposits 0.015 0.021 0.018 0.015 0.018 0.026
Repos 0.005 0.015 0.010 0.010 0.012 0.014
Other mutual funds 0.035 0.029 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.003
Assets issued by non-nationals 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.006 0.007
Unlisted equity 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.008 0.008
Managed portfolios 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.021 0.012 0.010
Loans to cooperatives 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.015 0.012 0.011
Note: The table includes the percentage holding of all financial asset classes
contained in the Bank of Italy’s SHIW from 2006 to 2016. The top panel
reports the asset classes included in the analysis; the excluded ones are reported
in the bottom panel. Averages are calculated using sample weights.
Source: Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth, 2006-2016.
a Treasury bills up to one year maturity.
b Long-term government bond.
c Floating-rate Treasury credit certificates, 2-4 years in maturity indexed to
BOT.
d Treasury bills up to two year maturity.
e Bonds issued by Italian banks and firms.
f Current accounts, saving accounts, post office current accounts, post office
saving accounts.
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Table 2.8: Description of the financial indexes included in the analysis
Asset classes Index Index description
Bot FTSE MTS Italy
BOT Ex-Bank of
Italy
It measures the performance of short-term Italian gov-
ernment debt securities, or BOTs. The FTSE MTS
Ex-Bank of Italy BOT Index includes all the BOTs
listed on MTS
Btp/Btpi FTSE MTS Italy
BTP Ex-Bank of
Italy
It measures the performance of short-term Italian gov-
ernment debt securities, or BOTs. The FTSE MTS
Ex-Bank of Italy BTP Index includes all the BTPs
listed on MTS
Ctz FTSE MTS Italy
CTZ Ex Bank of
Italy Index
It measures the performance of short-term Italian gov-
ernment debt securities, or BOTs. The FTSE MTS
Ex-Bank of Italy CTZ Index includes all the CTZs
listed on MTS
Cct FTSE MTS Italy
CCT Ex-Bank of
Italy
It measures the performance of short-term Italian gov-
ernment debt securities, or BOTs. The FTSE MTS






It tracks the performance of EUR denominated invest-
ment grade corporate debt publicly issued in the eu-
robond or Euro member domestic markets
Equity FTSE MIB Gross
Total Return
It is the primary benchmark index for the Italian eq-
uity market. It captures approximately 80% of the do-
mestic market capitalization and it measures the per-
formance of the 40 most liquid and capitalized Italian
shares
Liquidity Fund Banca Fideuram In-
dice Fondi di Mer-
cato Monetario
It measures the performance of all Italian liquidity
funds. The index is calculated as the weighted average
of the daily net asset value of each included fund
Balanced Funds Italy Fideuram Bal-
anced Group
It measures the performance of all Italian balanced
funds. The index is calculated as the weighted average
of the daily net asset value of each included fund
Flexible Fund Italy Fideuram
Flexible
It measures the performance of all Italian flexible
funds. The index is calculated as the weighted average
of the daily net asset value of each included fund
Bond Fund Italy Fideuram
Bond Funds
It measures the performance of all Italian bond funds.
The index is calculated as the weighted average of the
daily net asset value of each included fund
Equity Fund Italy Fideuram Eq-
uity Funds
It measures the performance of all Italian equity funds.
The index is calculated as the weighted average of the
daily net asset value of each included fund
Note: The table reports the name and the description of the financial indexes used to approximate
the asset classes included in the empirical analysis. The first column lists the asset classes; the
second column contains the name and the provider of the indexes; the third column provides a brief
description of the indexes.
Source: Bloomberg and Datastream.
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Table 2.9: List of the macroeconomic news included in the analysis
Euro
area
EC Bus. Climate Ind.; Current Account Net WDA SA; EC Cons. Conf.
Ind; CPI YoY; CPI MoM; BOP CA Net NSA; New Orders (Manu.); YoY
GFCF QoQ; EC Serv. Conf. Ind.; Markit Comp. PMI SA; Markit Serv.
PMI SA; Retail Sales Vol. YoY WDA; Retail Sales Vol. MoM SA; ZEW
Exp. of Econ. Growth; Trade Bal. with non EZ; M3 Money Supply 3
M. MA; PPI Industry Ex Constr.YoY; PPI Industry Ex Constr. MoM;
Unem. Rate; GDP SA QoQ (real SA)
Italy CPI NIC Incl Tbc. YoY; NSA CPI NIC Incl Tbc. MoM NSA; Cons.
Conf. Ind. SA; Bus. Conf. Manu. Sector; Hourly Wages MoM SA; Ind.
Orders YoY NSA; Ind. Orders MoM SA; Ind. Prod. YoY WDA; Ind.
Prod. MoM SA; Ind. Prod. YoY; Ind. Sales YoY; Ind. Sales MoM SA;
Manu. PMI SA; Serv. PMI SA; PPI Manu. MoM; PPI Manu. YoY;
PPI Manu. YoY; Priv. Cons. QoQ SA WDA; Retail Sales MoM SA;
Retail Sales YoY; Trade Balance Total; Unem. Rate SA; Real GDP YoY
SA WDA; Trade Balance Non EU NSA
US C PI YoY NSA; CPI MoM SA; CPI Ex. Fd. & En. YoY NSA; UM Cons.
Conf. Ind; Pers. Cons. Exp. CPI YoY SA; Gov. Budget Balance;
Cons. Spend. GR MoM SA; Core PPI; Housing Starts/Permits; PPI
Fin. Goods SA; MoM% Avg. H Earnings YoY% SA; Dur. Goods Orders
MoM SA; Markit Manu. PMI SA; PPI - Fin. Goods; Diff. between Exp.
and Imp.; Cap. Util.n % of Tot. Cap.; Avg. H Earnings MoM% SA;
CB Leading Ind. MoM; Ind. Prod. MoM SA; In. Jobless Claims SA;
GDP QoQ SAAR; Bus. Inventories MoM SA; Constr. Spend. MoM SA;
Production Nonfarm QoQ SA
Note: The table lists all economic data releases included in Equation (2.3).
Source: Bloomberg
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Table 2.10: ECB’s unconventional monetary policy announcements
22.08.2007 Supplementary liquidity-providing longer-term ref oper (LTRO) with a maturity of 3 m
28.03.2008 LTROs with a maturity of six months
29.09.2008 Special term refinancing operation
08.10.2008 Fixed rate tender procedure with full allotment on the main refinancing operation(MROs)
15.10.2008 List of assets eligible as collateral in Eurosystem credit operations extended
07.05.2009 LTROs with a maturity of one year
04.06.2009 Details on Purchase program for covered bonds (CBPP)
03.12.2009 Phasing out of 6-month LTROs, indexation of new one year LTROs
04.03.2010 Phasing out of 3-month LTROs, indexation of six month LTROs
10.05.2010 Securities Markets Program (SMP)
28.07.2010 Risk control measures in collateral framework reviewed
03.03.2011 Further LTROs
09.06.2011 MROs as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment,at least until October 2011
04.08.2011 Further LTROs with a maturity of three and six months
08.08.2011 ECB will actively implement its Securities Market Program
06.10.2011 New covered bond purchase program (CBPP2)
08.12.2011 Two additional LTROs with a maturity of three years
21.12.2011 Results of first three year LTRO
09.02.2012 ECB’s Governing Council approves eligibility criteria for additional credit claims
28.02.2012 Results of second three year LTRO
06.06.2012 FRFA on MROs as long as necessary, and at least until January 2013
26.07.2012 ’Whatever it takes...’ speech by ECB President Mario Draghi in London
02.08.2012 Outright Monetary Transactions program (OMT)
06.09.2012 Technical features of OMT
06.12.2012 FRFA on MROs as long as necessary, and at least until July 2013
22.03.2013 Collateral rule changes for some uncovered government guaranteed bank bonds
02.05.2013 FRFA on MROs as long as necessary, and at least until July 2014
04.07.2013 Gov Council expects the key ECB interest rates to remain at present or lower levels for
an extended period of time (open-ended forward guidance)
08.11.2013 FRFA on MROs as long as necessary, and at least until July 2015
05.06.2014 Targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs)
03.07.2014 Details on TLTROs published
04.09.2014 Deposit rate -0.2
22.01.2015 Announcement of expanded asset purchase programme (APP)
16.07.2015 Reaffirmation that purchases are intended to run until end of September 2016
31.08.2015 New category of assets added as eligible collateral
03.09.2015 Increase in PSPP issue share limit
23.09.2015 Eurosystem adjust purchase process in ABS programme
22.10.2015 Questions on requirements for APP extension answered
09.11.2015 Increase in PSPP issue share limit enlarges purchasable universe
03.12.2015 APP extended until March 2017, deposit rate -0.3
21.01.2016 Review and possibly reconsider monetary policy stance at next meeting
10.03.2016 New targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO II), APP expanded, corporate
bonds added to APP, deposit rate -0.4
21.04.2016 Details on implementation of APP expansion
03.05.2016 Legal acts relating to TLTRO II is published
02.06.2016 Details on corporate sector purchase programme (CSPP) published
21.07.2016 Confirmation that APP at 80 billion per month to run at least until March 2017
08.09.2016 Council meeting confirming continuation of APP
05.10.2016 Changes to collateral eligibility criteria and risk control measures for unsecured bank
bonds
20.10.2016 Council meeting confirming continuation of APP
Note: The table lists all ECB unconventional announcements included in Equation (2.3)
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Table 2.11: UMP and active rebalancing - baseline results, extended table
Risky assets Government bonds
(1) (2)
Capital gains -1.352∗∗∗ -0.310
(0.307) (0.299)
Risky, lag × UMPaveragerisky 6.283∗∗∗ 4.599∗∗∗
(2.088) (1.712)
Gov, lag × UMPaveragegov bond -2.443 -1.782
(2.724) (2.567)
Risky, lag -0.504∗∗∗ 0.0713∗
(0.0415) (0.0398)
Gov, lag 0.223∗∗∗ -0.693∗∗∗
(0.0680) (0.0502)
∆ Income 0.303∗∗∗ 0.0870
(0.0775) (0.0602)
∆ Net wealth 0.0672∗∗∗ 0.0418∗∗∗
(0.00700) (0.00719)


















High ret/high risk 18967.5∗ -13023.6∗∗∗
(10600.8) (3521.0)
Good ret/fair risk 4689.7∗∗ -2934.5
(2380.7) (1803.1)
Fair ret/low risk 3488.9∗∗ -1125.9
(1547.5) (1200.7)
Constant yes yes
Time FE yes yes
Observations 3,093 3,023
R2 0.338 0.370
Note: The table reports the estimates from Equation (2.4) including data
from 2008 to 2016. The dependent variables are the stock (in euro) of
active rebalancing of risky assets (Column 1) and of government bonds
(Column 2). The variables UMPriskyaverage and UMP
gov
average are constructed
estimating Equation (2.3) with daily data and then following the proce-
dure explained in Section 2.4.1 to construct a biennial series. Standard
errors (in parenthesis) are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance lev-
els: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.12: UMP and risky assets active rebalancing - excluding 2016
Full Sample Group 1 Group 2 Group3
1-50% 51-75% 76-100%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Risky, lag × UMPriskyaverage 6.876∗∗∗ 0.473 5.424 7.843∗∗∗
(2.280) (5.399) (5.574) (2.635)
Gov, lag × UMPgovaverage -1.056 4.540 -3.966 2.690
(2.601) (10.07) (3.602) (3.461)
Risky, lag -0.473∗∗∗ -0.363∗∗∗ -0.500∗∗∗ -0.464∗∗∗
(0.0490) (0.117) (0.116) (0.0568)
Gov, lag 0.168∗∗∗ 0.109 0.131 0.162∗∗
(0.0652) (0.117) (0.107) (0.0820)
∆ Income 0.308∗∗∗ 0.315∗ 0.300 0.330∗∗∗
(0.0844) (0.167) (0.194) (0.103)
∆ Net wealth 0.0668∗∗∗ 0.0546∗∗∗ 0.0870∗∗∗ 0.0593∗∗∗
(0.00751) (0.0125) (0.0156) (0.00914)
Net wealth, lag 0.0197∗∗∗ 0.0216∗∗ 0.0136∗ 0.0194∗∗∗
(0.00424) (0.0104) (0.00729) (0.00536)
Income, lag 0.120∗ 0.201 0.0697 0.0846
(0.0727) (0.256) (0.383) (0.116)
Constant yes yes yes yes
Demographics, lag yes yes yes yes
Risk aversion yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 2,566 446 755 1365
R2 0.327 0.220 0.358 0.346
Note: The table reports the estimates from Equation (2.4) including
data from 2008 to 2014. In all four columns the dependent variable
is the stock (in euro) of Italian risky assets active rebalancing. The
first column shows the results when considering the full sample. In the
following three columns households are split according to the value of
their disposable income: Group 1 includes households in the bottom
two quartiles of the income distribution, Group 2 contains households
in the third quartile, and Group 3 comprises households in the top
quartile. The variables UMPriskyaverage and UMP
gov
average are constructed
estimating Equation (2.3) with daily data and then following the
procedure explained in Section 2.4.1 to construct a biennial series.
Only the coefficients of interest and the households’ financial con-
trols are reported here. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to
heteroskedasticity. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.13: UMP and government bonds active rebalancing - excluding 2016
Full Sample Group 1 Group 2 Group3
1-50% 51-75% 76-100%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Risky, lag × UMPriskyaverage 5.093∗∗∗ 11.91 -1.915 5.510∗∗
(1.928) (7.785) (4.692) (2.234)
Gov, lag × UMPgovaverage -3.040 7.206 -4.099 -4.728
(2.813) (7.144) (5.262) (3.078)
Risky, lag 0.0898∗ -0.0228 0.0245 0.0950∗
(0.0470) (0.100) (0.0887) (0.0551)
Gov, lag -0.648∗∗∗ -0.619∗∗∗ -0.669∗∗∗ -0.640∗∗∗
(0.0574) (0.118) (0.0897) (0.0932)
∆ Income 0.122∗ 0.423∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗ 0.0358
(0.0666) (0.133) (0.0966) (0.0939)
∆ Net wealth 0.0380∗∗∗ 0.0244∗∗∗ 0.0265∗∗∗ 0.0437∗∗∗
(0.00556) (0.00845) (0.00803) (0.00851)
Net wealth , lag 0.00750∗∗ 0.00173 -0.000383 0.0107∗∗
(0.00341) (0.00544) (0.00507) (0.00497)
Income , lag 0.153∗∗∗ 0.566∗∗∗ -0.133 0.0876
(0.0492) (0.146) (0.192) (0.0943)
Constant yes yes yes yes
Demographics, lag yes yes yes yes
Risk aversion yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 2,533 805 789 939
R2 0.433 0.342 0.563 0.417
Note: The table reports the estimates from Equation (2.4) including
data from 2008 to 2014. In all four columns the dependent variable
is the stock (in euro) of Italian government bonds active rebalancing.
The first column shows the results when considering the full sample.
In the following three columns households are split according to the
value of their disposable income: Group 1 includes households in the
bottom two quartiles of the income distribution, Group 2 contains
households in the third quartile, and Group 3 comprises households
in the top quartile. The variables UMPriskyaverage and UMP
gov
average are
constructed estimating Equation (2.3) with daily data and then fol-
lowing the procedure explained in Section 2.4.1 to construct a biennial
series. Only the coefficients of interest and the households’ financial
controls are reported here. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to
















hoicesTable 2.14: UMP and risky assets active rebalancing - controlling for UMP second order effects
Always Employed No Mortgage Home Owner
Full Sample Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Full Sample Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Full Sample Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
1-50% 51-75% 76-100% 1-50% 51-75% 76-100% 1-50% 51-75% 76-100%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Risky, lag × UMPriskyaverage 5.781∗∗∗ 1.721 5.714 6.147∗∗ 6.505∗∗∗ 2.257 4.666 7.399∗∗∗ 6.073∗∗∗ 1.088 3.229 7.007∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.734) (0.269) (0.017) (0.003) (0.651) (0.354) (0.004) (0.003) (0.861) (0.383) (0.005)
Gov, lag × UMPgovaverage -2.772 -2.422 -3.413 -0.108 -2.115 0.399 -3.692 0.690 -2.446 2.415 -2.689 -0.711
(0.326) (0.822) (0.266) (0.978) (0.466) (0.971) (0.261) (0.861) (0.385) (0.828) (0.342) (0.850)
Risky, lag -0.501∗∗∗ -0.361∗∗∗ -0.490∗∗∗ -0.512∗∗∗ -0.498∗∗∗ -0.288∗∗∗ -0.513∗∗∗ -0.504∗∗∗ -0.497∗∗∗ -0.297∗∗∗ -0.580∗∗∗ -0.489∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000)
Gov, lag 0.224∗∗∗ 0.276∗ 0.117 0.247∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.175 0.133∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.100 0.122 0.270∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.068) (0.128) (0.009) (0.001) (0.106) (0.083) (0.008) (0.001) (0.607) (0.121) (0.003)
∆ Income 0.299∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗ 0.296 0.296∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗ 0.437∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.405∗ 0.406∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.009) (0.111) (0.003) (0.001) (0.025) (0.028) (0.010) (0.000) (0.052) (0.024) (0.003)
∆ Net wealth 0.0690∗∗∗ 0.0695∗∗∗ 0.0872∗∗∗ 0.0624∗∗∗ 0.0697∗∗∗ 0.0685∗∗∗ 0.0883∗∗∗ 0.0623∗∗∗ 0.0684∗∗∗ 0.0763∗∗∗ 0.0755∗∗∗ 0.0633∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Net wealth 0.0179∗∗∗ 0.00978 0.0157∗∗ 0.0180∗∗∗ 0.0189∗∗∗ 0.0181∗ 0.0132∗ 0.0191∗∗∗ 0.0164∗∗∗ 0.0214∗ 0.00846 0.0161∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.305) (0.049) (0.002) (0.000) (0.074) (0.082) (0.002) (0.001) (0.086) (0.292) (0.008)
Income 0.147∗∗ 0.626∗∗ -0.00232 0.142 0.131∗ 0.297 0.167 0.151 0.139∗ 0.589∗ -0.0215 0.130
(0.044) (0.013) (0.995) (0.217) (0.090) (0.240) (0.667) (0.252) (0.060) (0.095) (0.956) (0.278)
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Demographics, lag yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Risk aversion yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2,882 483 817 1582 2,703 511 791 1,401 2,655 372 761 1,522
R2 0.335 0.227 0.350 0.353 0.338 0.210 0.379 0.354 0.339 0.243 0.398 0.347
Note: The table reports the estimates from Equation (2.4) for different subsamples of households, i.e households that are employed both in t− 1 and t (Column 1-4),
households that have no mortgage both in t − 1 and t (Column 5-8) and households that are home owners both in t − 1 and t (Column 9-12). For each subsample,
four columns are reported. The first column shows the results when considering the full sample. In the following three columns households are split according to
the value of their disposable income: Group 1 includes households in the bottom two quartiles of the income distribution, Group 2 contains households in the third
quartile, and Group 3 comprises households in the top quartile. In all columns the dependent variable is the stock (in euro) of Italian risky asset active rebalancing.
The variables UMPriskyaverage and UMP
gov
average are constructed estimating Equation (2.3) with daily data and then following the procedure explained in Section 2.4.1 to
construct a biennial series. Only the coefficients of interest and the households’ financial controls are reported here. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to

















Table 2.15: UMP and government bonds active rebalancing - controlling for UMP second order effects
Always Employed No Mortgage Home Owner
Full Sample Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Full Sample Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Full Sample Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
1-50% 51-75% 76-100% 1-50% 51-75% 76-100% 1-50% 51-75% 76-100%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Risky, lag × UMPriskyaverage 4.799∗∗∗ 6.699 0.807 4.946∗∗ 4.748∗∗∗ 10.99 -0.987 4.998∗∗ 3.966∗∗ 18.27∗∗ -0.310 4.016∗∗
(0.006) (0.352) (0.874) (0.015) (0.007) (0.131) (0.862) (0.015) (0.023) (0.029) (0.955) (0.048)
Gov, lag × UMPgovaverage -3.189 8.781 -4.955 -4.593∗ -1.573 9.016 -3.320 -3.099 -1.986 11.89∗∗ -3.272 -4.084
(0.232) (0.148) (0.305) (0.098) (0.563) (0.131) (0.520) (0.283) (0.477) (0.039) (0.538) (0.151)
Risky, lag 0.0803∗∗ 0.0773 0.0632 0.0849∗ 0.0877∗∗ -0.00624 0.0774 0.0924∗ 0.0757∗ 0.0383 0.0864 0.0705
(0.048) (0.455) (0.394) (0.083) (0.033) (0.944) (0.311) (0.063) (0.068) (0.734) (0.263) (0.164)
Safe, lag -0.647∗∗∗ -0.615∗∗∗ -0.627∗∗∗ -0.660∗∗∗ -0.685∗∗∗ -0.658∗∗∗ -0.683∗∗∗ -0.687∗∗∗ -0.680∗∗∗ -0.676∗∗∗ -0.671∗∗∗ -0.667∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆ Income 0.0689 0.393∗∗ 0.122 -0.000351 0.108 0.398∗∗∗ 0.167∗ 0.0299 0.0980 0.428∗∗∗ 0.181∗ 0.0394
(0.298) (0.011) (0.192) (0.997) (0.104) (0.002) (0.082) (0.756) (0.140) (0.002) (0.057) (0.666)
∆ Net wealth 0.0399∗∗∗ 0.0365∗∗∗ 0.0292∗∗∗ 0.0422∗∗∗ 0.0375∗∗∗ 0.0304∗∗∗ 0.0251∗∗∗ 0.0419∗∗∗ 0.0362∗∗∗ 0.0304∗∗∗ 0.0226∗∗∗ 0.0396∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.007) (0.000)
Net wealth 0.00942∗∗∗ 0.00920 0.00317 0.0110∗∗ 0.00719∗∗ 0.00583 -0.000778 0.00939∗ 0.00524 0.00391 -0.00499 0.00747
(0.007) (0.127) (0.540) (0.025) (0.037) (0.287) (0.881) (0.064) (0.151) (0.565) (0.390) (0.136)
Income 0.122∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗ -0.00177 0.0361 0.144∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗ 0.112 0.0564 0.169∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗ 0.0968 0.0813
(0.016) (0.003) (0.993) (0.691) (0.004) (0.000) (0.592) (0.569) (0.001) (0.000) (0.646) (0.393)
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Demographics, lag yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Risk aversion yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2,755 834 861 1,060 2,772 931 856 985 2,530 668 829 1,033
R2 0.415 0.357 0.540 0.390 0.437 0.386 0.554 0.407 0.421 0.439 0.533 0.381
Note: The table reports the estimates from Equation (2.4) for different subsamples of households, i.e households that are employed both in t− 1 and t (Column 1-4),
households that have no mortgage both in t− 1 and t (Column 5-8) and households that are home owners both in t− 1 and t (Column 9-12). For each subsample, four
columns are reported. The first column shows the results when considering the full sample. In the following three columns households are split according to the value
of their disposable income: Group 1 includes households in the bottom two quartiles of the income distribution, Group 2 contains households in the third quartile,
and Group 3 comprises households in the top quartile. In all columns the dependent variable is the stock (in euro) of Italian government bonds active rebalancing.
The variables UMPriskyaverage and UMP
gov
average are constructed estimating Equation (2.3) with daily data and then following the procedure explained in Section 2.4.1 to
construct a biennial series. Only the coefficients of interest and the households’ financial controls are reported here. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to
heteroskedasticity. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.16: The effects of UMP on households’ change in risk aversion
HHs investing in risky assets HHs investing in gov bonds
Full Sample No Inconsistent Full Sample No Inconsistent
Answers Answers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Risky, lag × UMPrisky -0.0000721∗∗ -0.0000638∗∗ -0.000104∗∗ -0.000105∗∗
(0.0000288) (0.0000292) (0.0000463) (0.0000463)
Safe, lag × UMPsafe 0.0000124 0.00000338 0.0000162 0.0000158
(0.0000487) (0.0000472) (0.0000457) (0.0000458)
Risky, lag -0.00000125∗∗ -0.00000115∗∗ -0.00000334∗∗∗ -0.00000338∗∗∗
(0.000000508) (0.000000529) (0.000000940) (0.000000942)
Safe, lag -0.000000733 -0.00000135 0.000000625 0.000000668
(0.00000128) (0.00000129) (0.000000951) (0.000000952)
∆ Income -0.00000585∗∗∗ -0.00000527∗∗ -0.00000479∗ -0.00000474∗
(0.00000216) (0.00000244) (0.00000267) (0.00000267)
∆ Net wealth -0.000000312∗∗ -0.000000415∗∗∗ -0.000000317∗ -0.000000317∗
(0.000000138) (0.000000154) (0.000000179) (0.000000180)
Net wealth -7.37e-08 5.02e-08 -0.000000222∗ -0.000000227∗
(0.000000102) (0.000000114) (0.000000131) (0.000000132)
Income -0.00000562∗∗∗ -0.00000644∗∗∗ -0.00000845∗∗∗ -0.00000845∗∗∗
(0.00000167) (0.00000182) (0.00000202) (0.00000202)
Cuts yes yes -yes yes
Demographics, lag yes yes -yes yes
Risk aversion yes yes -yes yes
Time FE yes yes -yes yes
Observations 3,093 2,350 3,023 3,014
Pseudo R2 0.174 0.123 0.223 0.221
Note: The table reports the estimates from Equation (3.4) including data from 2008 to 2016. In
all four columns the dependent variable is households’ change in risk aversion, a variable equal
to -1 if the household has experienced a decrease in risk aversion, is equal to 0 if household’s
risk aversion has remained unchanged and is equal to 1 if risk aversion has increased between
t − 1 and t. Column 1 shows the results when considering the full sample of households
investing in Italian risky assets. Column 2 reports results when eliminating inconsistent
answers. Column 3 shows the results when considering the full sample of households investing
in Italian goverment bonds. Column 4 reports results when eliminating inconsistent answers.
The variables UMPriskyaverage and UMP
gov
average are constructed estimating Equation (2.3) with
daily data and then following the procedure explained in Section 2.4.1 to construct a biennial
series. Only the coefficients of interest and the households’ financial controls are reported here.
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.17: Robusness checks - Heckman selection model
Risky assets Risky assets Gov Bonds - Gov Bonds -
2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Risky, lag × UMPriskyaverage 6.239∗∗∗ 4.589∗∗∗
(0.948) (1.100)
Gov, lag × UMPgovaverage -2.501 -1.851
(1.910) (1.141)
Risky, lag -0.507∗∗∗ 0.0665∗∗∗
(0.0171) (0.0211)
Gov, lag 0.221∗∗∗ -0.693∗∗∗
(0.0435) (0.0232)
∆ Income 0.294∗∗∗ 0.0785
(0.0723) (0.0607)
∆ Net wealth 0.0673∗∗∗ 0.0417∗∗∗
(0.00455) (0.00397)
Net wealth, lag 0.0168∗∗∗ 5.04e-07∗∗∗ 0.0108∗∗∗ 5.81e-08
(0.00350) (5.62e-08) (0.00303) (5.41e-08)
Income, lag 0.0745 1.51e-05∗∗∗ 0.0910∗ 1.02e-05∗∗∗
(0.0615) (9.50e-07) (0.0552) (8.88e-07)
Inverse Mills ratio -4415.6∗∗∗ -4484.8∗
(1588.3) (2720.2)
Constant yes yes yes yes
Demographics, lag yes yes yes yes
Risk aversion yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 19,675 19,730
Note: The table reports the estimates from an Heckman selection model (Equation
2.6) including data from 2008 to 2016. Column 2 and 4 report the estimates of the
first stage of the model, i.e. a probit model for the binary choice of rebalancing
conditioning on not being invested in the asset category in t− 1 (extensive margin
decision); The dependent variables are dummy variables equal to 1 if a rebalancing
of risky assets (Column 2) and government bonds (Column 4) has occurred between
t−1 and t, zero otherwise. Column 1 and 3 include the estimates of the rebalancing
equation conditioning to participation. The dependent variables are the (stock
of) active rebalancing of risky assets and government bonds, respectively. The
variables UMPriskyaverage and UMP
gov
average are constructed estimating Equation (2.3)
with daily data and then following the procedure explained in Section 2.4.1 to
construct a biennial series. Only the coefficients of interest and the households’
financial controls are reported here. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to
heteroskedasticity. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.18: Robusness checks - UMP identification
Risky assets Gov bonds Risky assets Gov bonds Risky assets Gov bonds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Risky, lag × UMPriskyonly sign 4.535∗∗∗ 3.750∗∗
(1.608) (1.506)
Safe, lag × UMPgovonly sign -2.484 -2.343
(2.858) (2.746)
Risky, lag × UMPriskypanel 7.174∗∗∗ 4.710∗∗
(2.260) (1.838)
Safe, lag × UMPgovpanel -2.258 -1.962
(2.689) (2.532)
Risky, lag × UMPriskytwo-day 5.801∗∗ 4.597∗∗
(2.252) (1.785)
Safe, lag × UMPgovtwo-day -2.352 -2.086
(2.495) (2.399)
Risky, lag -0.496∗∗∗ 0.0873∗∗ -0.525∗∗∗ 0.0614∗ -0.501∗∗∗ 0.0798∗∗
(0.0427) (0.0428) (0.0399) (0.0353) (0.0420) (0.0394)
Safe, lag 0.218∗∗∗ -0.678∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ -0.680∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ -0.681∗∗∗
(0.0683) (0.0497) (0.0678) (0.0485) (0.0675) (0.0480)
∆ Income 0.307∗∗∗ 0.0913 0.305∗∗∗ 0.0926 0.298∗∗∗ 0.0899
(0.0775) (0.0598) (0.0774) (0.0598) (0.0776) (0.0596)
∆ Net wealth 0.0672∗∗∗ 0.0369∗∗∗ 0.0671∗∗∗ 0.0369∗∗∗ 0.0671∗∗∗ 0.0370∗∗∗
(0.00703) (0.00543) (0.00699) (0.00545) (0.00701) (0.00545)
Net wealth 0.0184∗∗∗ 0.00793∗∗ 0.0183∗∗∗ 0.00800∗∗ 0.0185∗∗∗ 0.00799∗∗
(0.00436) (0.00323) (0.00434) (0.00321) (0.00434) (0.00320)
Income 0.140∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗
(0.0690) (0.0457) (0.0685) (0.0456) (0.0687) (0.0456)
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes
Demographics, lag yes yes yes yes yes yes
Risk aversion yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 3,093 3,023 3,093 3,023 3,093 3,023
R2 0.335 0.431 0.339 0.431 0.336 0.431
Note: The table reports the estimates from Equation (2.4) including data from 2008 to
2016. The dependent variables are the stock (in euro) of active rebalancing of risky assets
(Column 1 and 3) and of government bonds (Column 2 and 4). The variables UMPriskyonly sign
and UMPgovonly sign are constructed estimating Equation 2.3 and theb following the procedure
expalined in Section 2.4.1 but aggregating only significant betas. The variables UMPriskypanel
and UMPgovpanel are constructed using panel techniques to estimate the daily impact of ECB’s
unconventional announcements (Equation 3.6) and then following the procedure explained
in Section 2.5.2. Variables UMPtwo-dayrisky and UMP
gov
two-day are constructed using a two-day
window to capture the impact of ECB’s unconventional announcements (Equation 2.8) and
then following the procedure explained in Section 2.4.1. Only the coefficients of interest
and the households’ financial controls are reported here. Standard errors (in parenthe-
sis) are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.19: Robusness checks - estimation sample
Risky Assets Gov Bonds Risky Assets Gov Bonds
weighted weighted quality check quality check
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Risky, lag × UMPriskyaverage 6.876∗∗∗ 2.666∗ 7.576∗∗∗ 4.363∗∗
(2.549) (1.512) (2.565) (2.100)
Gov, lag × UMPgovaverage -3.717 -0.563 -2.397 -0.735
(3.565) (2.532) (2.802) (3.590)
Risky, lag -0.534∗∗∗ 0.0353 -0.491∗∗∗ 0.0750
(0.0549) (0.0339) (0.0500) (0.0487)
Gov, lag 0.257∗∗∗ -0.772∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ -0.681∗∗∗
(0.0886) (0.0490) (0.0816) (0.0591)
∆ Income 0.168 0.0689 0.327∗∗∗ 0.145∗
(0.109) (0.0649) (0.106) (0.0846)
∆ Net wealth 0.0640∗∗∗ 0.0307∗∗∗ 0.0741∗∗∗ 0.0405∗∗∗
(0.00834) (0.00652) (0.00925) (0.00805)
Net wealth, lag 0.0133∗∗ 0.00914∗∗ 0.0160∗∗∗ 0.0119∗∗
(0.00528) (0.00382) (0.00593) (0.00472)
Income , lag 0.147∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.150∗ 0.106∗
(0.0778) (0.0470) (0.0908) (0.0620)
Constant yes yes yes yes
Demographics, lag yes yes yes yes
Risk aversion yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 3,093 3,023 1,877 1,619
R2 0.388 0.470 0.348 0.423
Note: The table reports the estimates from Equation (2.4) including data from 2008
to 2016. The dependent variables are the stock (in euro) of active rebalancing of
risky assets (Column 1 and 3) and of government bonds (Column 2 and 4). Column
(1) and (2) of Table 2.19 report the results when using the weighted sample, while
Column (3) and (4) show results when cutting the sample to control for the quality
of the survey data. The variables UMPriskyaverage and UMP
gov
average are constructed
estimating Equation (2.3) and then following the procedure explained in Section
2.4.1. Only the coefficients of interest and the households’ financial controls are
reported here. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to heteroskedasticity.
















hoicesTable 2.20: Composition of Italian households’ financial portfolio
Perc Risky Assets Gov Bonds Tot Port Perc Risky Assets Gov Bonds Tot Port
1-5% 282.05 243.32 525.37 51-55% 2708.66 3709.46 6418.12
6-10% 102.74 600.40 703.14 56-60% 5330.80 9706.12 15036.92
11-15% 193.73 1561.69 1755.42 61-65% 3227.68 9259.44 12487.12
16-20% 279.19 1460.13 1739.31 66-70% 4535.45 7019.62 11555.06
21-25% 848.93 2025.16 2874.09 71-75% 6031.49 13256.72 19288.21
26-30% 893.31 2001.81 2895.11 76-80% 11004.80 13590.84 24592.32
31-35% 1285.07 2512.35 3797.41 81-85% 10227.97 7731.53 17959.49
36-40% 1282,79 4631.78 5914.57 86-90% 11284.95 8359.34 19644.29
41-45% 3661.5 2707.35 5368.85 91-95% 14073.27 13393.51 27466.78
46-50% 3706.02 4726.50 8432.52 96-100% 40792.87 14446.77 55239.64
Note: The table shows the average holding of risky assets, government bonds and the value of total
portfolio along the income distribution. Averages are computed using sample weights provided in
the SHIW.




The Effect of Monetary Policy on Stock Market In-
vestment Decisions: The Role of Gender and Marital
Status1
3.1 Introduction
The primary mandate of major central banks is to maintain price stability, which is
the reason why central bankers have traditionally payed less attention to the distri-
butional impact of their policy measures on inequality. However, in the aftermath of
the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, economic inequality in industrialized countries in-
creased drastically and the public raised concerns that the long-enduring low interest
rate environment was exacerbating this problem, since low interest rates might only
benefit certain groups of households (Bivens, 2015). One key aspect of the debate on
possible redistributional effects of central banks’ actions is to understand how financial
and demographic characteristics of households may interact with monetary policy. Sev-
eral papers document monetary policy’s heterogeneous effects along income, wealth,
house ownership, and employment status of households (see, among the others, Adam
and Tzamourani, 2016; Ampudia et al., 2018; Wong, 2019).
In this Chapter we take a different perspective and evaluate the impact of gender
and marital status on monetary policy-driven financial portfolio decisions of differ-
ent household groups, focusing in particular on single female-headed households in
contrast to both single and married male-headed households. Insights of feminist eco-
nomics show how traditional monetary policy, in combination with finance-dominated
capitalism, may favor men at the expense of women (Bakker, 1994; Van Staveren,
1This chapter is based on joint work with Chi Hyun Kim. We thank Franciska Bremus, Marco del
Negro, Alexander Kriwoluzky, Dieter Nautz, seminar participants at the 2019 and 2020 Time Series
Workshop in Tornow, at the 20th IWH-CIREQ-GW Macroeconometric Workshop in Halle and three
anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions.
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2014a,b; Young, 2018). In particular, in the financial literature the link among gen-
der, marital status, risk preferences, and investment decisions is well established. The
empirical evidence shows that men invest significantly more in financial assets than
women. Moreover, women are more risk averse (Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998; Sun-
den and Surette, 1998; Fisher and Yao, 2017) and less confident (Barber and Odean,
2001; Croson and Gneezy, 2009). The few works that consider gender and marital sta-
tus jointly when analyzing their implications on financial decisions find similar results,
with single female-headed households being the most fragile. Married women have a
higher propensity to invest in risky assets than single ones, while the marital status gap
does not apply to men (Bertocchi et al., 2011). Single women are more risk averse in
their financial decisions than single and married men (Sung and Hanna, 1996; Sunden
and Surette, 1998; Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998). Moreover, Barber and Odean
(2001) find that differences in portfolio turnover and net return performance are larger
between the accounts of single men and single women than between the accounts of
married men and married women. In a prolonged period of low interest rates - and,
thus, high asset prices - the single female-headed households’ low propensity to bear
financial risks and invest in financial assets may lead to a distributional divergence
between this household group and the rest of the population.
We investigate how monetary policy influences financial investment decisions focus-
ing on the portfolio choices of US households in the stock market between 2001 and
2017. The choice to concentrate on US households is twofold. First, US households’
investment decisions are crucial not only for financial security during the working life,
but also for retirement. The lower propensity of single women to invest in risky as-
sets like stocks could translate into large differences in the accumulation of financial
wealth for retirement. Combined with lower earnings, lower savings, longer life spans
and higher risk aversion, this implies that single female-headed households are more
likely to be living in poverty (Cawthorne, 2008). And the data confirm it. According
to Statista - a data portal of households - in the year 2018 there are about 15 million
US single female-headed households between 25 and 65 years old, representing almost
12% of the US total households. Nonetheless, the distribution of poverty across the
US society is skewed towards single women, as 24.9% of them have a family income
below the poverty line, compared to 12.7% of single male-headed households and only
4.7% of married couples (2018 data). Thus, given the prominence of monetary policy
over the past decade, understanding how it influences single women’s financial wealth
accumulation is crucial. Second, it allows us to use the household survey data from
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID is a nationally representative
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longitudinal study of US families and it is a rich source of disaggregated and detailed
information on households’ portfolio composition, wealth, and demographics.
As a first step, we investigate the effect of monetary policy on households’ stock
market participation, focusing on the binary entry and exit choices of single female- and
both married and single male-headed households separately. Our results show that only
entry decisions of single women are affected by monetary policy. After a contractionary
monetary policy shock, single female-headed households are 11% less likely to enter
the stock market. Male-headed households’s entry decisions and the exit decisions of
both household groups are not affected. This result is interesting because we observe
household groups-specific effects of monetary policy only in the entry decisions, even
if we control for characteristics that are correlated with gender, marital status and
financial wealth, as position in their life cycle, education and income. To the contrary,
monetary policy does not affect different household groups’ probability to exit the stock
market, suggesting that female- and male-headed households do not behave differently
once they both participate in the stock market. This result is in line with the findings in
the literature that stock market nonparticipant women are more risk averse than men
(both participant and nonparticipant) and participant women, and that women react
more strongly to economic events that negatively affect their wealth (Jianakoplos and
Bernasek, 1998; Barber and Odean, 2001; Fisher and Yao, 2017). In order to visualize
the impact of monetary policy, we conduct a static simulation exercise and calculate
how single female-headed households’ entry rate is affected between 2001 and 2017
and how much financial wealth they potentially missed out or gained because of stock
market participation choices driven by monetary policy. Our exercise suggests that
single female-headed households lost more that $2000 million over the entire period,
suggesting that monetary policy has a sizeable impact.
As a second step, we concentrate on stock market participants and we analyze how
single female- and both married and single male-headed households adjust their stock
market investment after a (contractionary) monetary policy shock. We do not find any
group-specific response to monetary shocks, confirming that households with different
gender/marital status do not behave differently once they both participate in financial
markets.
One empirical challenge lies on the identification of US monetary policy shocks. We
identify monetary policy shocks of the Federal Reserve (Fed) at a daily frequency fol-
lowing the method proposed by Nakamura and Steinsson (2018). With this method,
we capture exogenous variations in interest rate futures within a narrow time win-
dow around the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings. Subsequently,
in order to match the frequency of the household survey data, we aggregate the daily
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monetary policy shocks into a series with biennial frequency. In doing so, we take into
account the month of the year in which each household answers the survey questions,
thus allowing us to construct an idiosyncratic biennial monetary policy shock series
for each household. Afterwards, we improve our identification by exploiting house-
holds’ heterogeneity in financial wealth and gender, which influences their exposure to
monetary policy shocks.
Our study contributes to the growing literature that uses micro-level data on the
composition of households’ wealth and income to evaluate the heterogeneous effects of
monetary policy and its impact on wealth inequality. Bivens (2015), Domanski et al.
(2016), Lenza and Slacalek (2018), and Ampudia et al. (2018) focus on unconventional
monetary policy tools and conduct empirical reduced-form simulation exercises. They
quantify the distributional effects of monetary policy through the valuation of asset
prices by examining households’ financial portfolio structure. They show that uncon-
ventional monetary policy disproportionately benefits households at the top wealth
distribution. The same result is reached by Adam and Tzamourani (2016) in the
context of conventional monetary policy. In addition, a new strand of literature inves-
tigates the effect of interest rate changes on the active risk-taking behavior of private
investors, finding that investors’ risk appetite increases if monetary policy is loosened
(Lian et al., 2018; Daniel et al., 2018; Forti Grazzini, 2020). Our analysis provides
new insights to this literature by examining gender and marital status as an addi-
tional source of household heterogeneity that might interact with monetary policy.
Young (2018) is the first to formulate potential mechanisms through which unconven-
tional monetary policies can affect gender wealth inequality. However, the study only
provides descriptive results. Our study complements her arguments by providing a
structural analysis.
So far the literature investigating how gender and marital status affect portfolio
decisions is limited. Several papers focus on the US. Sunden and Surette (1998) high-
light the interaction between gender and marital status in determining the allocation
of assets in retirement savings plans. Agnew et al. (2003) find that men invest more
in equities and trade more frequently than women and married investors invest more
aggressively than their single counterparts. Barber and Odean (2001) report that the
differences in portfolio turnover and net return performance are larger between the ac-
counts of single men and single women than between the accounts of married men and
married women. Few studies consider other countries. In particular, Bertocchi et al.
(2011) for Italy and Christiansen et al. (2010) for Denmark gauge the relevance of
gender and marital status on stock market participation decisions. Compared to these
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studies, our paper compare different household groups’ portfolio choices conditioning
on a specific shock, a monetary policy shock.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data
and the construction of our final data set. Section 3.3 discusses the identification of
monetary policy, while Section 3.4 outlines the empirical framework, and the results.
In Section 3.5, we provide a simulation study to calculate the impact of our results on
the capital gains/losses of women through monetary policy. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 The Panel Study of Income Dynamics
We use Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) survey data, which is a nationally
representative longitudinal study of US families and their offspring over time. In the
PSID, the unit of observation is the household, which is defined as a group of people
living together as a family. Besides a broad range of socio-economic variables - such
as gender, age, marital status, number of children, etc. - the PSID also provides rich
information on the households’ financial wealth and portfolio composition.
With respect to the financial portfolio volume and composition, households are asked
to report information on their holdings of three broad asset classes: (i) stocks (shares of
stock in publicly held corporations, mutual funds, and investment trusts); (ii) riskless
assets (checking and savings accounts, money market funds, certificates of deposits,
savings bonds, treasury bills); and (iii) other assets (bond funds, cash value in a life
insurance policy, a valuable collection for investment purposes, or rights in a trust
or estate). While for stocks the PSID additionally asks the households about their
purchases or sales, for the riskless asset class it does not. Finally, although provided
by the PSID, we do not include any assets held in employer-based pensions or IRAs.2
The PSID survey is of biennial frequency and we include waves from 2001 to 2017
(the last available survey wave). One important feature of the PSID data is that the
interviews happen every other year (in odd years) between March and December, and
the answers to questions regarding wealth refer to the month in which the interview
takes place. For questions regarding income, however, the households are asked to
report their annual income of the previous year. This implies that data on income and
wealth are not perfectly aligned, but for our analysis this does not constitute an issue,
as we mainly focus on wealth variables which are all measures at the same point in
2We exclude investments in retirement accounts because there is little trading in these accounts
(Ameriks and Zeldes, 2004). Furthermore, the liquidity and payoff properties of retirement accounts
are different from direct stock ownership (Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995).
103
Chapter 3 The Effect of Monetary Policy on Stock Market Investment Decisions:
The Role of Gender and Marital Status
time for any given household. Finally, to make magnitudes comparable over time, we
deflate all income and wealth data by the consumer price index (CPI) into December
2007.
3.2.1.1 The definition of household groups
The focus of the paper is to understand how different household groups react to mon-
etary policy. These groups are identified with a combination of their household head’s
gender (female/male) and marital status (single/married). The choice of keeping the
household as the unit of observation for the anaysis, instead of only the household
head, is driven by the impossibility to recover the family member in charge of financial
decisions in the married families. In fact, in the PSID the term head refers by default
to the husband in a heterosexual married couple, irrelevant of whether it is the hus-
band who makes financial decisions for the family unit or not. Thus, it is not trivial
to recover who is in charge of financial decisions. Moreover, even if we were able to
identify the financially responsible person in a married couple, we still cannot rule out
the possibility that married couples tend to make joint investment decisions (Sunden
and Surette, 1998; Barber and Odean, 2001; Agnew et al., 2003).
The groups included in the analysis are single female-headed households (SFHHs),
male-headed households (MHHs), which include both single and married households,
andmarried male-headed households (MMHHs). Since we are interested in the behavior
of single female-headed households, throughout the paper we compare single female-
with male-headed households and married male-headed households, using the former
as our baseline comparison.3
Finally we identify as stock market participants the group of households investing at
least $1 dollar in the stock market in two consecutive waves.
3.2.1.2 Construction of the relevant variables
In the first part of the analysis we focus on households’ dynamic stock market partici-
pation choices. We construct two binary variables, Entryi,t and Exiti,t, which visualize
stock market entry or exit decisions. Entryi,t equals one if household i has a zero stock
market investment in t− 1, but a positive one in t, and zero if its stock market invest-
ment is null in both waves. Exiti,t is equal to one if household i owns stocks in t− 1,
but does not in t, and zero if the household owns stocks in both waves.
In the second part of the analysis, we consider only stock market participants to
analyze their stock market portfolio choices. In order to do so, we need to decompose
3Unfortunately, it is not possible to directly compare single female- vs single male-headed due to the
low number of observations of the latter group.
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the change in the amount of held stocks held into an active investment/disinvestment
component and a passive capital gains/losses component. In every wave the PSID
asks subjects to report on the amount of stocks and mutual funds bought and/or sold
during the time since the previous wealth survey. We use this information to calculate
the stock active saving as the the sum of all stocks sold or/and purchased between
t − 1 and t. In addition, we calculate riskless asset active saving. As the PSID does
not include information on this asset classe purchases or sells, we proceed as follows.
First, we approximate the capital gain/loss on this asset class between t−1 and t with
the return on the 1-year US Treasury.4 Second, we subtract it from the change in the
amount of riskless assets held between t − 1 and t (provided by the PSID) to extract
the riskless asset active saving, that is the amount of riskless assets sold or bought
between t− 1 and t.5
Finally, we define liquid assets as the sum of holdings of stocks, riskless assets and
other assets.
3.2.1.3 Sample selection
We include only households that participate in the survey for at least three consecutive
waves.6 We exclude households where the age of the head is younger than 25 years or
older than 65 years. Also, we only consider households where the marital status of the
head does not change throughout the sample. We also control for possible mismatches
in the reported answers and eliminate households that do not report consistent data. In
particular, we discard households that (i) declare not to have stocks, but then report
a positive value of stock wealth; (ii) indicate a negative value of stock wealth; and
(iii) declare a non-zero active saving, but at the same time report zero purchases or
sales of assets. Moreover, we trim all wealth variables at the 1% level to mitigate the
impact of outliers. Finally, we use sample weights provided by PSID when producing
the summary statistics, but we do not weight observations in the regression analysis,
as it would be inefficient (Deaton, 1997).7
4As a robustness check, we also use the 2-year and the 10-year Treasury to approximate the return
on the riskless asset capital gains.
5Please refer to Forti Grazzini (2020) for further explanations of the methodology.
6This choice is driven by the large number of households appearing in the PSID for only one wave.
Moreover, in the robustness check section in the appendix, we relax this constraint and show that
results do not change.
7There are two sets of explanations for the choice of not using sample weights in this context. First,
as we control for outliers and trim the data set at the cross section, we reduce the representativeness
of the weighted data. The second issue arises from the usage of panel data. When applying fixed
effect estimation, it is not possible to assign different weights over time for the same family unit. This
would dramatically reduce the accuracy of the weighted data in representing the target population.
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Although the sample size of each wave ranges over 5000 to 7000, the size or our final
data set is significantly reduced due to the data requirements that we impose.
3.2.2 Summary statistics
Table 3.1 provides some household-level summary statistics of our final data set, pool-
ing all waves. Panel A reports the statistics for all households that satisfy all minimum
requirements to be included in the analysis (the full sample). Panel B shows the
statistics of the stock market participants. We compare single female-headed house-
holds versus households where the head is a man (both single and married). Summary
statistics are calculated using sample weights provided by the PSID.8
With regard to all households of our sample (Panel A), on average, 29% of the
male-headed households participate in the stock market during 2001-2017. In contrast,
only 16% of single female-headed households invest in the stock market. In addition,
single female-headed households seem to display higher risk aversion, as their rate of
stock market entry is lower than for male-headed households. On average, the value of
male-headed family financial portfolio sums up to more than $100,000, which is three
times higher than their female counterpart. Moreover, stock holding of male-headed
households is about four times higher than woman’s, implying that the former prefer
riskier financial investments (with a 17% of their portfolio invested in risky assets,
compared to the female 9%). Thus, female-lead households appear to hold less wealth
and to invest a lower percentage of their net worth and financial portfolio in risky
assets. This stock investment rate differential might be explained by several factors
and household charachteristics, but is also in line with the literature documenting that
women are more risk averse (and thus cautious) in their investment behavior.
The picture is slightly different when considering participating households (Panel
B). Although female-headed households still invest a lower share of their net worth
in risky assets, the financial gap partially closes, with the composition of the financial
portfolio being the same across groups (roughly 60% invested in risky assets). Stock
market participants tend to be wealthier with higher financial wealth and with higher
education level. Moreover, participants invest a higher share of their financial portfolio
in stocks. However, home ownership and employment are comparable. When taking a
closer look, however, we see that the net worth ratio between female-headed households
in the participating and full sample groups is roughly 5, while that of male-headed
households is around 2.3, suggesting that the former might require more wealth to bear
the risk to invest in risky assets being, in turn, more risk averse. The ratios between
8In particular, each household is weighted using the sample weight provided by the PSID for the first
wave the household appears in our data set. For an overview of the unweighted summary statistics,
see Table 3.7 in the Appendix.
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SFHHs and MHHs that hold stocks in Panel A and B (7.6 and 4.4, respectively) point
in the same direction.
Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
All households Single female-headed HHs Male-headed HHs
Panel A: Full sample
Stock market participation 0.27 0.44 0.16 0.37 0.29 0.45
Stock market exit 0.30 0.46 0.34 0.47 0.30 0.46
Stock market entry 0.10 0.30 0.06 0.24 0.11 0.31
Stocks 55056.19 627113.15 14580.03 106326.21 63486.96 687198.74
Riskless assets 27205.67 90301.63 13009.60 30310.10 30128.64 98018.67
Stock active saving 235668.44 12375997.76 67.43 2235.77 284996.11 13609611.55
Riskless asset active saving 5882.27 88949.70 2403.31 29122.42 6595.02 96837.34
Liquid assets 96771.38 702582.00 35212.30 166566.79 109567.22 767798.25
Stock/liquid assets 0.15 0.30 0.09 0.24 0.17 0.31
Net worth 365631.10 1333478.63 218791.56 1550873.64 396103.14 1283039.44
Income 92487.03 123296.94 46927.72 39714.12 101881.37 132306.03
Home ownership 0.84 0.37 0.68 0.46 0.87 0.33
Observations 14807 2105 12673
Panel B: Stock market participants
Stocks 253891.93 1404329.77 113215.46 299449.61 269248.76 1474872.99
Riskless assets 57592.73 157731.34 36930.01 59835.86 59849.30 164785.85
Stock active saving 3387.74 30543.59 114.58 6042.69 3749.08 32103.14
Riskless asset active saving 12960.12 157328.94 7205.88 53615.60 13588.52 164736.41
Liquid assets 342547.85 1548857.51 175188.84 421582.63 360820.18 1624224.00
Stock/liquid assets 0.60 0.29 0.58 0.30 0.60 0.29
Net worth 878261.14 2234640.50 1090033.29 4460878.19 855101.66 1834792.98
Income 141347.15 203069.50 68378.32 84711.07 149304.05 210512.67
Home ownership 0.93 0.25 0.86 0.35 0.94 0.24
Observations 2389 162 2227
Note: The table shows the summary statistics of the relevant wealth and income variables included in
the analysis. Panel A presents figures for the full sample; Panel B for the sub-sample of stock market
participants (at least $1 invested in stocks in both t−1 and t). The sample period is 2001-2017. Household’s
observations are weighted by the longitudinal weights provided by the PSID.
Source: PSID and own calculations.
3.3 The identification of monetary policy
The identification of the effects of monetary policy on the investment behavior of
households poses several challenges. First, it is crucial to obtain exogenous monetary
shocks. Second, it is necessary to combine the monetary policy shocks with biennial
data on household financial and investment characteristics that we obtain from the
PSID. Third, we have to overcome the issue that the identified monetary policy shocks
are of small size and transitory nature, which can pose challenges on the estimated
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responses of our variable of interest to them. Fourth, we need to take into account the
household head’s gender/marital status.
3.3.1 Monetary policy shocks
In order to measure monetary shocks we use a high frequency identification technique
(see, among the others, Kuttner, 2001; Gürkaynak et al., 2005; Gertler and Karadi,
2015; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018). This method employs high frequency data on
interest rate futures to identify the surprise component of monetary policy announce-
ments. To derive this shock measure, changes in these futures are measured in a narrow
time window around the FOMC meetings. If all publicly available information is al-
ready incorporated into the financial markets at the beginning of the time window,
fluctuations in the interest rate futures around the FOMC announcement are only
driven by the unexpected component of the monetary policy announcement itself. In
order to ensure the exogeneity of the shock measure, it is crucial that the time span
around the FOMC meeting is short enough, so to make it highly likely that the only
relevant shock during that time period (if any) is the monetary policy shock.
We adopt the method of Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) and construct monetary
policy shocks as the first principle component of the daily change in five interest rate
futures. These include federal funds futures (the current-month contract rate and the
contract rates for each of the next three months) and Eurodollar futures (at two to four
quarters in the future). We refer to the identified shocks as “high frequency monetary
policy news shocks”. For convenience, we scale the shocks such that their effect on the
1-year nominal Treasury is 100 basis points.9 We use daily data from January 1, 2001,
to December 31, 2017, and we include all FOMC scheduled meetings that happened
throughout this 17 year period. Figure 3.1 depicts the time series of the policy news
shock.10
3.3.2 Obtaining biennial household-specific monetary policy shocks
After identifying daily monetary policy shocks, we need to aggregate them into biennial
frequency to match the frequency of the household survey data. The simplest option
would be to aggregate the monetary policy shocks over 24 months (from January of
wave t − 1 to December of wave t). However, by doing so, we would neglect the fact
that households are not interviewed in the same month and, thus, that their answers
9For a more detailed description of the method of Nakamura and Steinsson (2018), see Appendix 3.A.
10For a visual comparison of the high frequency monetary policy news shocks and the original daily
Nakamura and Steinsson (2018)’s monetary shocks, see Table 3.7 in the Appendix. Between 2001
and 2014 (the Nakamura and Steinsson (2018)’s monetary shock series is available only until end
2014) The correlation between the two shock series is 0.88.
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Note: The graph shows the monetary policy news shocks for the period
2001−2017 estimated at the daily frequency. The shocks are constructed
as the first principal component of the daily change in five interest rate
futures around Fed’s FOMC meetings. The included futures are the
federal funds futures (the current-month contract rate and the contract
rates for each of the next three months) and Eurodollar futures (at two
to four quarters in the future). The monetary policy shocks is scaled to
have a 100 basis point impact on the 1-year US Treasury yield.
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regarding the financial variables refer to different periods. Indeed, as can be seen in
Figure 3.6 in the Appendix, the interview dates are dispersed throughout all months
of an interview year (with the exclusion of January and February).
Why should the difference in the interview dates matter for our analysis? Consider
two households (A and B) that have been interviewed during the years 2001 and 2003.
Suppose that in the year 2001 they are both interviewed in March, while in 2003,
household A is interviewed in March while household B in May. Figure 3.2 provides
a graphical presentation of the monetary policy shock information set that the two
households experienced between the two surveys. We can clearly see that household A
experienced fewer FOMC meetings than household B and, thus, is possibly exposed to
fewer monetary policy shocks. Therefore, if we would aggregate the monetary policy
news shocks from January 2011 to December 2013 and then evaluate its effects on the
investment behavior of both households, then we would obtain biased results. This
can be especially problematic if, referring again to the example in Figure 3.2, there is
a major monetary policy shock between March 2003 and May 2003.
Figure 3.2: PSID interview dates and FOMC meetings
Mar ’01 · · · Mar ’03 Apr ’03 May ’03 · · · Dec ’03
Household A
Household B
Difference in information set
Note: The figure helps visualizing how the PSID feature of staggered
interviews in different months of the year implies that households A and
B might be subject to different monetary policy shocks between waves
t−1 (ending in March 2001 for both A and B) and t (ending in March 2003
for A and in May 2003 for B) if any FOMC meeting happens between
March and May 2003.
Therefore, we construct a household-specific monetary policy news shock series that
takes into account households’ different information set by summing up the monetary





where MPi,t is the biennial monetary policy news shock series for household i in wave
t; Ii,t−1 and Ii,t are the day of household i’s interview in wave t− 1 and t, respectively;
mpsj is the daily monetary policy news shock on day j. Figure 3.3 depicts a boxplot
of the household specific biennial shocks by wave. The green dots are the household
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specific biennial shocks data points, while the ends of the blue and read boxes are
the lower and upper quartiles, respectively. The figure highlights the high level of
data dispersion within each wave, confirming the importance of taking into account
households’ idiosyncratic exposure to monetary shocks when constructing the biennial
monetary variable.















2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Note: The graphs depicts the boxplot of the biennial household-specific
monetary policy news shock by wave. The green dots are the household
specific biennial shocks data points. They are obtained by summing
up the monetary policy shock series at the daily frequency (Figure 3.1)
within a two-year window that depends on the household’s interview
month to the PSID survey in each wave. The ends of the blue and red
boxes are the lower and upper quartiles, respectively.
Finally, Table 3.8 in the Appendix compares the summary statistics of the daily
monetary policy news shock with the average biennial household-specific series over
the empirical analysis period (2001-2017).
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3.3.3 Households’ heterogeneous exposure to monetary policy
The small size and transitory nature of monetary shocks makes it challenging to obtain
tight standard errors for estimated responses of household variables to the monetary
shocks obtained in the previous section, especially when considering the effects of those
shocks on data on low frequency data. However, the estimate precision increases greatly
for estimates of the differential responses across households. Households differ along
different dimensions that can affect their response to monetary policy (see, among
the others, Wong, 2019; Forti Grazzini, 2020; Cumming and Hubert, 2020). This
heterogeneity can be exploited to understand their exposure to monetary policy and,
in turn, their different response to it. Thus, comparing the behavior of households
that are supposed to be more and less affected should improve identifying the effect of
monetary policy on the variables of interest. Moreover, the differential responses allow
for a better understanding of the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy. We
follow Forti Grazzini (2020) and consider their financial wealth as source of household
heterogeneity. The intuition behind this choice is that the more financial wealth a
household holds, the more it is affected by monetary shocks due to their valuation
effects : monetary policy impacts yields and prices of assets and, thus, it affects the
value of households’ stock of financial wealth. The more a household is impacted by
monetary policy, the stronger it should react to it. Thus, we interact our biennial
household-specific aggregated monetary policy shocks, MPi,t, with the household’s
lagged financial wealth, Wi,t−1,
MP ∗i,t = MPi,t ×Wi,t−1. (3.2)
Wi,t−1 can be, depending on the empirical exercise we perform, either the lagged liquid
assets or the lagged stock holding.
Finally, we also interact our monetary policy shock variable with a dummy variable
that visualizes different households groups. If not stated otherwise, throughout the
Chapter the dummy variable Headi takes value one if the household’s head is female
and single and zero if the head is male (baseline results). In this way, we are able to
capture the possible gender/marital status-specific effects of monetary policy.
MP ∗i,t ×Headi = MPi,ti ×Wi,t−1 ×Headi. (3.3)
Furthermore, we also interact the monetary policy shock variable MP ∗i,t with other
dummy variables that distinguishes between (i) single female-headed households and
married male-headed households; and (ii) married male-headed households and single
male-headed households. We do this in order to confirm the robustness of our results.
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3.4 Results
In this section, we present our econometric framework and results. First, we examine
the effect of monetary policy on the change in stock market participation (entry and
exit). Afterwards, we focus exclusively on stock market participants (i.e., having pos-
itive investment in stocks for at least two consecutive waves) and analyze the effect
of monetary policy on their trading activity. Throughout this section we evaluate the
impact of a contractionary monetary policy scaled such to increase the 1-year Treasury
yield by 100 basis points.
3.4.1 Monetary policy and stock market participation
We start by investigating how changes in monetary policy stance affects the stock
market participation status of households. We follow Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008)
and employ the following probit model,
y∗i,t = δt + δr + αXi,t−1 + β1MPi,t + β2MPi,t ×Headi + β3MP ∗i,t+
β4(MP
∗





where yi,t can be either Exiti,t or Entryi,t; Xi,t is a vector of household-level controls
that includes financial characteristics (lagged net worth and family income, change in
net worth and family income, total inheritance, dummy for the first mortgage, dummy
for the second mortgage), and demographic characteristics (the number of children, the
age of the head, the head’s age squared, marital status, completed college education,
working in the finance industry, total number of family components, home ownership).
We also include time- and region of residency- fixed effects (δt and δr). Headi is a
dummy variable that, depending on the excercise we perform, allows us to compare
different household groups. Wi,t−1 is the lagged liquid assets. The remaining terms
in Equation (3.4) are the triple interaction term constructed in section 3.3.3 and all
other mean and double interaction effects that should be included when employing a
three-way interaction term. Thus, with our empirical model we are able to capture the
mean effect of monetary policy (β1) and how the monetary policy impact changes for
different household groups (β2), for different values of the exposure variable (β3) and
for different household groups along different values of the exposure variable (β4). ui,t
is the error term. We estimate the model with maximum-likelihood on the 2001-2017
sample. Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
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Table 3.2 presents the results. It shows marginal effects at the means, i.e. evaluated
at the sample mean of the explanatory variables. We only show the marginal effects of
the parameters of interest. Column (1) and (2) present the baseline results, where we
compare single female- and male-headed households. Thus, the dummy Headi equals
1 if the household head is single and female, 0 if the head is male (married or single).
Results in Column (1) show no differences between SFHHs and MHHs stock market
exit. On the contrary, Column (2) suggests that there is a negative effect for single
female headed households on stock market entry decision, as they are 3.4% less likely to
enter the stock market. This last finding is in line with the literature that documents a
high female non-participation rate in the financial markets (Sunden and Surette, 1998;
Barber and Odean, 2001; Dwyer et al., 2002; Agnew et al., 2003). Then we turn to the
effects of monetary policy. While a contractionary shock does not have a significant
effect on households’ exit decision, Column (2) shows that it does have a negative and
highly significant effect on SFHHs probability of stock market entry, as their likelihood
of entering the stock market decrease by 11%. On the contrary, the entry probability
of MHH is not significant.
Note that the male-headed household group contains both single and married house-
holds. To make sure that the baseline results are not driven by any of the two male-
headed subgroups, we repeat the analysis comparing single female-headed households
with only married male-headed households. Marginal effects are reported in columns
3 and 4 of Table 3.2.11 Results are very similar to the baseline, both in sign and mag-
nitude: monetary policy does not have significant impact on households’ stock market
exit decision and it only affects the entry choice of single female-headed ones.
Taken together, these findings suggest that single female-headed households are the
only group being significantly affected by monetary policy in their stock market partic-
ipation decision. Moreover, we find that the monetary policy-driven difference between
single female- and male-headed housholds in the entry decision is sizeable even when
holding constant characteristics that are correlated with gender, marital status and
financial wealth, as position in the life cycle, education and income. To the contrary,
monetary policy does not affect different household groups’ probability to exit the stock
market, suggesting that female- and male-headed households do not behave differently
once they participate in financial markets. This implies that there is some unobserved
characteristics that correlates with the interaction between gender/marital status and
monetary policy and that makes nonparticipant single female- and male-headed house-
11Here Headi equals one if the household head is single and female, it equals zero if it is married and
male.
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holds significantly different from each other in their entry decision but not in their exit
choice.
Table 3.2: Monetary policy and stock market participation decision - marginal effects
Single female-headed HH Single female-headed HH
VS VS
Male-headed HH Married male-headed HH
Exit Entry Exit Entry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Single female-headed HH -0.017 -0.034∗∗∗ -0.027 -0.045∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.0076) (0.070) (0.008)
MP if single female-headed HH 0.211 -0.110∗∗ 0.248 -0.105∗∗
(0.273) (0.053) (0.275) (0.050)
MP if male-headed HH -0.068 -0.097
(0.164) (0.065)
MP if married male-headed HH -0.047 -0.107
(0.169) (0.069)
Constant yes yes yes yes
Other inter. terms yes yes yes yes
Financial var., lag yes yes yes yes
Demographics, lag yes yes yes yes
Household FE no no no no
Time FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 3649 11,129 3,437 10,339
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07
Note: This table presents the marginal effects of a contractionary monetary policy shock
that increases the US 1-year Treasury by 100 basis points on stock market entry and exit
decisions. We compare different households subsamples: single female-headed households
and both married and single male-headed households in columns 1 and 2; single female-
headed households and married male-headed households in columns 3 and 4. All models
include data from 2001 to 2017. The variable Exiti,t is a dummy equal to 1 if the household
exits the stock market in t and 0 if it stays in; the variable Entryi,t is a dummy equal to 1 if
the household entries the stock market in t and zero if it does not. All marginal effects are
obtained after estimating Equation (3.4) and are evaluated at the sample average of the
explanatory variables. Only the coefficients of interest are reported here. Standard errors
(in parentheses) are clustered at the household level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
3.4.1.1 Monetary policy and stock market participation at different levels of liquid
assets
As explained in Section 3.3.3, we improve the the identification of monetary policy
using lagged liquid assets, Wi,t−1, as the exposure variable to monetary policy. The
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intuition behind this choice is that the more financial wealth a household holds, the
more it is affected by monetary policy through the valuation effects of monetary shocks.
In the previous section we decribe the (marginal effect) of monetary policy on exit and
entry decisions for both female- and male-headed households considering the average
holding of lagged liquid assets.12 In this section we refine the analysis looking at how
the reponse changes for different levels of liquid assets.
Figure 3.4 plots the effect of a contractionary shock normalized so to increase the
1-year Treasury bond yields by 100 basis points on the probability of exit the stock
market (left panel) and entry (right panel) for single female-headed households (red
line) and male-headed household (blue line) at different percentiles of the lagged liquid
assets distribution.13 The reported coefficients are the marginal effects (with the 90%
confidence bands) calculated after estimating Equation (3.4) all evaluated at the sample
mean of the explanatory variables but the exposure variable. Figure 3.4 confirms
previous section findings. Specifically, monetary policy is found to have no significant
effect on the probability to exit the stocl market for both household groups (left panel),
and on the probability to entry the stock market for male-headed households (right
panel), irrespective of the level of liquid assets. On the contrary, for single female-
headed households the impact of monetary policy on entry decision is increasing in
liquid assets, as described in Section 3.3.3: the more financial wealth a household
holds, the more it gets affected, the more it responds to monetary policy. In fact, the
impact of monetary shocks moves from being insignificant for female households in the
25th liquid assets percentile to bigger (in absolute value) significant coefficients, up to
a -19% at a p-value of 0.02 for households in the 90th percentile.
12The average holding of lagged liquid assets is equal to $260,064 in the sample used to estimate the
impact of monetary policy on exit decisions and it is equal to $26,672 in the sample used to estimate
the impact of monetary policy on entry choice.
13We consider the 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles. They correspond to $26,147 $68,800 $194,035
and $473,445, respectively, in the sample used to estimate the impact of monetary policy on exit
decision. They correspond to $1,749, $5,433, $18,127, $53,557, respectively, in the sample used to
estimate the impact of monetary policy on entry decision.
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Figure 3.4: Monetary policy and stock market participation decision at different levels
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Note: The figure plots the marginal effect of a contractionary monetary
policy shock that increases the US 1-year Treasury by 100 basis points
on single female-headed households’ (red line) and male-headed house-
holds’ (blue line) probability on exit the stock market (left panel) and
entry the stock market (right panel). The marginal effects are calculated
after estimating Equation (3.4) and evaluated at different percentile of
the liquid assets distribution (25%, 50%, 75%, 90%). All other explana-
tory variables are evaluated at their sample average. 90% confidence
intervals.
3.4.1.2 Monetary policy and stock market participation when allowing for more het-
erogeneity across household groups
The baseline results described in the previous two sections and contained in columns 1
and 2 of Table 3.2 are marginal effects evaluated at sample averages of the explanatory
variables, obtained pooling together data for both female- and male-headed households.
On the positive side, this choice allows us to compare the effect of monetary policy
on the two household groups having the same characteristics. On the negative side,
the summary statistics in Section 3.2.2 show that the explanatory variable averages
for single female- and male-headed households are very different, implying that the
sample averages used to calculate the marginal effects in the baseline results are not
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representative for the average single female- nor male-headed household. Thus, we
estimate a different probit model that allows us to calculate marginal effects at the
household group-specific subsample averages. All regressors are interacted with the
dummy Headi,







yi,t can be either Exiti,t or Entryi,t. Xi,t is a vector of control variables that includes
household financial characteristics (lagged net worth and family income, change in net
worth and family income, total inheritance, dummy for the first mortgage, dummy for
the second mortgage), and demographic characteristics (the number of children, the
age of the head, the head’s age squared, marital status, completed college education,
working in the finance industry, total number of family components, home ownership).
We also include time- and region of residency- fixed effects (δt and δr). The dummy
Headi is equal to 1 if the household head is single and female, 0 if it is male. The
household-specific monetary policy variable is denoted byMPi,t andWi,t−1 is the lagged
liquid assets.
Results are reported in Table 3.3. A contractionary monetary policy shock that
increases 1-year Treasury bond by 100 basis point has no impact on the probability
of exit the stock market (Column 1), but it does affect the likelihood of single female
households to entry (Column 2), decreasing it by 8.6%. This figure is comparable with
the baseline result (Table 3.2, Column 2). All in all, this last set of results confirm the
baseline findings that only SFHH’s entry decisions are affected by monetary policy.
3.4.2 Monetary policy and active saving
In this section, we focus exclusively on stock market participants and examine how
different groups of households adjust their stock investments following a monetary
policy shock. Following Juster et al. (2006) and Calvet et al. (2009a) employ a fixed
effect model,
ASi,t =δi + δt + αXi,t−1 + β1MPi,t + β2MPi,t ×Headi + β3MP ∗i,t+
β4(MP
∗
i,t ×Headi) + β5(Wi,t−1 ×Headi) + β6Wi,t−1 + β7Headi + εi,t
(3.6)
where ASi,t is the net purchase amount of stocks of household i between t− 1 and t; δi
and δt are the individual- and time fixed effects, respectively; Xi,t−1 includes the same
financial and demographic characteristics as the probit model described in Section 3.4.
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Table 3.3: Monetary policy and stock market participation decision - marginal effects
at the group-specific sample average
Exit Entry
(1) (2)
MP if single female-headed HH -0.058 -0.086∗∗
(0.185) (0.038)





Other inter. terms yes yes
Financial var., lag yes yes
Demographics, lag yes yes
Household FE no no
Time FE yes yes
Note: This table presents the marginal effects of a contractionary
monetary policy shock that increases the US 1-year Treasury by
100 basis point on stock market entry and exit decisions of two
groups of households, single female- and male-headed households.
The variable Exiti,t is a dummy equal to 1 if the household exits
the stock market in t and 0 if it stays in; the variable Entryi,t is
a dummy equal to 1 if the household entries the stock market in
t and zero if it does not. The marginal effects are calculated after
estimating the probit regression in Equation (3.3) with data from
2001 to 2017 and are evaluated at the group-specific sample average
of the explanatory variables. Only the coefficients of interest are
reported here. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the
household level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent statistical significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
119
Chapter 3 The Effect of Monetary Policy on Stock Market Investment Decisions:
The Role of Gender and Marital Status
All remaining terms capture the three-way interaction effect. We are interested in the
coefficients β1-β4, as they capture the mean effect of monetary policy (coefficient β1)
and how the monetary policy effect changes for different household groups (coefficient
β2), along different values of the exposure variable (coefficient β3) and for different
household groups along different values of the exposure variable (coefficient β4). Since
we consider households that participate in the stock market both in t − 1 and t, in
this exercise we use the previous wave stock investment as the exposure variable for
monetary policy (Wi,t−1). Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
Results are reported in Table 3.4. In our baseline specification we compare single
female-headed households with all male-headed households (Column 1). afterwards,
we analyze households with single female and married male heads (Column 2). Finally,
in columns 3 we contrast single male- and married male-headed households. Let us
first concentrate on the baseline results in Column 1. Monetary policy seems to play an
important and significant role for the investment behavior of households, and after a
contractionary monetary policy shock households sell stocks (-0.003, MP ∗ coefficient).
We calculate the economic numbers of this effect: a shock that increases 1-year Treasury
yields by 100 basis points, induces investors to sell, on average, $762 of their stock
investment.14 Nevertheless, the gender/marital status of the household head seems to
play no role as the coefficients attached to any of the terms that include the dummy
Headi are not significant. This result indicates that once female headed-households
participate in the stock market, their active saving decisions are not systematically
different from those of housholds with a male head. This homogeneous response to
monetary policy may seem controversial to the literature that documents behavioral
differences between genders in the financial markets. Nonetheless, it is important
to point out that our results do not reject the fact that different household groups
invest heterogeneously, but rather provide evidence that, when participating in the
financial markets, single female- and male-headed households react to monetary policy
in a homogeneous manner. Therefore, both household groups seem to understand
the inverse relationship between the interest rates and asset prices. We perform two
robustness checks. First, we use the value of the financial portfolios of the previous
wave as an exposure variable. Second, we repeat the analysis including households
that participate in the survey for two consecutive waves (in contrast to three). The
results are contained in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.10 in the Appendix, and they are
very similar to the baseline results.
14The figures are calculated by multiplying the coefficients with the average stock holdings
($253891.93).
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Column (2) in Table 3.4 show that previous results on stock investment rebalanc-
ing following a constractionary monetary shock are not specific to the single female-
and male-headed households contrast, but can be extended to the other two compar-
ison (Column 2). The coefficients attached to (MP ∗) are identical to the baseline
result in Column (1) (-0.003, significant at the 1% level) and the triple interactions are
non significant, implying that there is no statistical difference between the compared
household groups.
To sum up, the analysis shows that, consistent with finding in the previous section,
single women do not behave differently from single and married male-headed households
once they participate in financial markets. This suggests that these household groups
are not systematically different in their stock active saving decisions when controlling
for financial and demographic characteristics.
3.4.2.1 Monetary policy and riskless active saving
According to both the rebalancing channel (Gagnon et al., 2010; Joyce et al., 2012)
and the risk-taking channel of monetary policy (Lian et al., 2018; Daniel et al., 2018),
a contractionary monetary policy shock should induce investors to rebalance their
portfolio by selling risky assets (like stocks) to purchase safer options (like Treasury
bonds). In this section, as an additional result, we investigate whether there exists any
significant difference among different groups of households in the way they rebalance
their riskless investment.
We re-estimate Equation (3.6) using as dependent variable the net purchase amount
of riskless assets of household i between t− 1 and t.15 Results are shown in Table 3.5.
Also in this case, we report the results of two comparisons, SFHHs vsMHHs (Column
1) and SFHHs vs SMHHs (Column 2).
The results on the comparison of single female-headed with all male-headed house-
holds are mixed. Column (1) shows that, consistent with the rebalancing channel of
monetary policy, after a contractionary monetary shock, on average households buy
more riskless assets (+0.088, MP ∗ coefficient). On the other, hand we also find a neg-
ative and slightly significant coefficient attached to the interaction between monetary
policy and the household head’s gender/marital status (-0.700), suggesting that the
overall effect for female-headed households is negative. One possible explanation for
this finding is the choice of using the 1-year Treasury to calculate the riskless asset
active saving component. Thus, we repeat the analysis using alternative US Treasury
maturities. Results are reported in Table 3.9. For ease of comparison, Column (1)
shows the same results as the corresponding column in Table 3.5. Column (2) and
15Please refer to Section 3.2.1.2 for the construction of the stock active saving variable.
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Table 3.4: Monetary policy and stock active saving
Dummy Head = 1 if Single female-headed HH Single female-headed HH
VS VS




MP ×Head 8776.6 9222.2
(7041.6) (7565.8)
MP ∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
MP ∗ ×Head 0.046 0.053
(0.036) (0.042)
Constant yes yes
Other inter. terms yes yes
Financial var., lag yes yes
Demographics, lag yes yes
Household FE yes yes
Time FE yes yes
Observations 2,389 2,236
R2 0.01 0.01
Note: This table presents the results of the fixed effect model in Equation (3.6)
estimated using the sub-sample of households participating in the stock market
over the years 2001-2017. The dependent variable is stock active saving. In
Column (1) the dummy Headi is equal to 1 if the household head is single
and female, it is equal to 0 if the household head is male; in Column (2) the
dummy Headi is equal to 1 if the household head is single and female, it is
equal to 0 if the household head is married and male. The variableMPi,t is the
household-level biennial monetary policy shock series constructed in Section
3.3.2. The variableMP ∗i,t is the interaction betweenMPi,t and the household’s
lagged stock holding, Wi,t−1. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at
the household level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels.
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(3) include results when the dependend variable is calculated using the 2-year and the
10-year Treasury, respectively. While the coefficients attached to MP ∗ is very similar
in all three columns (0.088-0.089), in columns 2 and 3 there is no significant difference
in the way single female- and male-headed households the riskless investment. This
implies that the gender/marital status impact on the response to monetary policy is
sensitive to the Treasury maturity used for the calculation of the dependent variable.
To investigate further more, we repeat the analysis using the value of the financial
portfolios of the previous wave as an exposure variable and including households that
participate in the survey for two consecutive waves (in contrast to three). The results
are contained in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.11. The robustness check exercises support
the finding that there is no gender/marital status-specific response to monetary policy
in the riskless investment rebalancing choice.
The remaining column in Table 3.5 shows that there is no significant difference also
when contrasting single female- with only married male-headed households.16
3.4.2.2 Monetary policy and active saving at different levels of financial wealth
One might suspect that the absence of a household group specific response to monetary
policy is driven by the investment decisions of wealthier households. In fact, differences
in risk aversion, inertia, and financial literacy across gender could progressively decline
for increasing values of financial investment. This, in turn, would increase the chance
that single female- and male-headed household heads at the top of the financial wealth
distribution react homogeneously to monetary shocks, therefore influencing the direc-
tion and magnitude of our estimates.
In order to examine this hypothesis, we repeat our baseline analysis splitting our
sample in two. Results are reported in Table 3.12. In panel A we compare single female-
and male-headed households in the top 50% of ther respective group liquid assets
distribution; in panel B we analyze households in the bottom 50%. The dependent
variable is stock active saving. Let us first concentrate on Column (1). Panel A shows
that the coefficients are similar to our baseline estimates presented in Table 3.4 (Column
1), although slighly bigger in absolute value. This confirms that wealthier households
respond more heavily to monetary policy and that they display no heterogeneity in
their response. Compared to this, the picture of the bottom 50% is quite different, as
there is no evidence of a systematic response to monetary policy.
Taken together, these findings confirm that first, there is no gender/marital status-
specific response to montary policy; second, they show that the baseline results in
16We repeat the analysis in Column (2) using the 2-year and the 10-year Treasury for the calculation
of the riskless asset active saving and we find that the results remain robust. This extra set of
findings are not reported here but are available upon request.
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Table 3.5: Monetary policy and riskless asset active saving
Dummy Head = 1 if Single female-headed HH Single female-headed HH
VS VS




MP ×Head 1949.8 -6510.8
(41660.9 ) (42237.1)
MP ∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010)
MP ∗ ×Head -0.700∗ -0.586
(0.423) (0.466)
Constant yes yes
Other inter. terms yes yes
Financial var., lag yes yes
Demographics, lag yes yes
Household FE yes yes
Time FE yes yes
Observations 2,389 2,236
R2 0.10 0.11
Note: This table presents the results of the fixed effect model in Equation
(3.6) estimated using the sub-sample of households participating in the stock
market over the years 2001-2017. The dependent variable is riskless asset
active saving. In Column (1) the dummy Headi is equal to 1 if the household
head is single and female, it is equal to 0 if the household head is male; in
Column (2) the dummy Headi is equal to 1 if the household head is single and
female, it is equal to 0 if the household head is married and male. The variable
MPi,t is the household-level biennial monetary policy shock series constructed
in Section 3.3.2. The variable MP ∗i,t is the interaction between MPi,t and the
household’s lagged stock holding, Wi,t−1. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered at the household level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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Column (1) of tables 3.4 and 3.5 are driven by the wealthiest households, supporting
once again the choice of using financial wealth as exposure variable.
3.4.2.3 Conventional vs. unconventional monetary policy
On December 16, 2008, the federal funds rate - the conventional monetary policy
instrument of the Fed - reached the effective zero lower bound. Subsequently, the Fed
introduced unconventional monetary policy measures in the attempt to further lower
the long-term interest rates of the economy, thus boosting the stagnated economy. The
two main unconventional tools were “forward guidance”, communication by the FOMC
about the expected future path of the federal funds rate over the next several quarters,
and “large scale asset purchases” (LSAP), purchases of hundreds of billions of dollars
of longer-term U.S. Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed securities.
The Nakamura and Steinsson (2018)’ identification strategy pools the exogenous
response of financial market participants coming from both conventional and uncon-
ventional monetary policies. On the one hand, this is extremely useful because it allows
us to contruct a single variable able to capture monetary policy throughout the full
2001-2017 sample. On the other hand, this method does not allow us to distinguish
between different types of monetary measures.
In this section we investigate whether conventional and unconventional monetary
policies have comparable effects on participating household groups portfolio decisions.
We make use of the high frequency identification method of Swanson (2017), which
disentangles between three distinct dimensions of monetary policy shocks. As in Naka-
mura and Steinsson (2018), Swanson (2017) uses a broad range of interest rate futures
changes around FOMC announcements. The main difference is that, instead of extract-
ing one principal component, this method extracts the first three principal components
and rotates them to give the factors a structural interpretation. The first factor cap-
tures the surprise change in the federal funds rate target (“target shock”), the second
is the surprise change in forward guidance (“forward guidance shock”), and the third
is interpreted as surprise change in LSAPs (“LSAP shock”). For our purposes, we
use only the target shock, which captures the conventional part of monetary policy.
Figure 3.8 plots the target shock with our monetary policy news shock of Nakamura
and Steinsson (2018). We scale it such that it has a 100 basis points effect on the
1-year Treasury yield to make the estimates comparable to our baseline model.17 We
17To make the target shock comparable to the high frequancy monetary policy news shock described
in Section 3.3.1, we construct it as the first (out of three) principle component of the daily changes
around FOMC days of the same five interest rate futures, the federal funds futures (the current-
month contract rate and thecontract rates for each of the next three months) and Eurodollar futures
(at two to four quarters in the future). Then, following the procedure outlined in 3.3.2, we construct
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re-estimate Equation (3.6) in its baseline specification, i.e. comparing single female-
and male-headed households. Table 3.6 shows the results.
The effect of the target shocks on the active saving of stocks is identical to the effect
of the monetary policy news shocks (Table 3.4, columns 1), with the two coefficients
being identical. After a contractionary monetary policy shock that increases 1-year
Treasure by 100 basis points, households sell stocks by approximately $712. Moreover,
consistent with the baseline results, gender/marital status of the head do not play a
role in the way households react to conventional shocks. To conclude, we confirm that
households respond to conventional and unconventional monetary policies in a very
similar fashion.
3.5 A counterfactual analysis
Our empirical analysis shows that the only household group affected by monetary
policy are single female-headed houseolds that do not participate in the stock market.
After a contractionary monetary policy shock that increases the 1-year US Treasury
bond yields by 100 basis points, single women are 11% less likely to enter the stock
market. However, how large is this effect in terms of economic numbers? In this
section we conduct a static simulation exercise to visualize how the entry rate of single
female-headed households is affected by monetary policy shocks during our sample
period, 2001 - 2017. Afterwards, we calculate how much financial wealth single female-
headed households potentially missed out or gained through monetary policy induced
non-participation or entry in the stock market.
To construct the counterfactual of how many female-headed households would have
participated in the stock market would not there have been monetary policy, we pro-
ceed in the following way. First, we aggregate the daily monetary policy shocks into
biennial frequency and quantify the average effect of monetary policy on women’s entry
decisions. For this exercise, we do not use the household-specific aggregated shocks,
but sum the shocks from January 1st of wave t − 1 to December 31 of wave t (Table
3.13, Column 1). Then we use the stock market entry rate per wave of single female-
headed households provided by the PSID (Table 3.13, Column 2) to calculate how high
the entry rate would be if there were no monetary policy shocks (same table, Column
3). For example, the biennial monetary policy shock between 2001 and 2003 increases
the 1-year US Treasury yield by 11.5 basis point. From Table 3.2 we know that this
decreases single female-headed household to enter the stock market by
biennial househol-specific target shocks by summing the high frequancy target shocks within a two-
year window that depends on the household’s interview month to the PSID survey in each wave.
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Table 3.6: Monetary policy and stock active saving - target shock
Dummy Head = 1 if Single female-headed HH
VS
Dummy Head = 0 if Male-headed HH
MP target -3493.8
(2772.0)




MP ∗target × Head 0.015
(0.020)
Constant yes
Other inter. terms yes






Note: This table presents the results of the fixed effect model in
Equation (3.6) over the years 2001-2017. Only households partici-
pating in the stock market both in t − 1 and t are included. The
dependent variable is the stock active saving. The dummy Headi
is equal to 1 if the household head is single and female; it is equal
to 0 if the household head is male. The variable MP targeti,t is the
household-level biennial cumulated monetary policy shock series
constructed in Section 3.4.2.3. The variable MP ∗targeti,t is the in-
teraction between MPi,t and the household’s lagged stock holding,
Wi,t−1. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the house-
hold level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels.
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0.11 × 0.115 = 0.013.18 Thus, in 2003 single female-headed households are 1.3% less
likely to enter the stock market. Then we can use this information together with the
actual entry rate provided by the PSID data (that is 10.4% in 2003) to construct their
entry rate without monetary policy shock, 0.104× (1 + 0.013) = 0.105.
At first glance, Table 3.13 tells us that fist, monetary policy is mostly of contrac-
tionary nature in our sample, implying that the entry rate of women has been rather
negatively affected by monetary policy (with only the biennial aggregated shocks be-
tween 2007 and 2009 being negative, hence accomodative); second, if we compare the
entry rate with and without monerary policy, we would be inclined to think that their
difference is very marginal (Column 4). However, how many single female-headed
households are affected by monetary policy? How much capital gains do they gain or
miss by entering or staying out of the stock market? As mentioned in Section 3.1, in
2018 there are about 15 million single female-headed households. If we assume that this
figure is constant throughout our sample and that monetary policy has a symmetric
effect on households, we can calculate the how many single female-headed households
enter or do not enter the stock market due to monetary shocks (red line in Figure 3.5).
As a next step, we calculate the capital gains or losses that single female-headed
households experience due to monetary policy induced entry/non entry in the stock
market. For this exercise, we use stock market participants single women’s average
stock holding, which is $113215.46 (Table 3.1) and again we assume that this number is
constant throughout all waves. We proxy the average biennial stock market investment
return using S&P 500 index return (Table 3.13, Column 5). Thus, we multiply the
biennial return (e.g., -3.1% in 2003) for the average stock investment. Finally, we
multiply the obtained biennial capital gains with the number of single female-headed
households that are affected by monetary policy (Column 4). The blue bars in Figure
3.5 present the final numbers.
Figure 3.5 shows that between 2003 and 2017 single female-headed households missed
$256 million of capital gain every two years, for a total of $2046 million over the entire
period. These financial losses are equally distributed before and after the beginning
of the zero lower bound period (2009), with stronger monetary policy shock but lower
(and also negative) stock market returns in the first half of the sample and smaller
monetary policy shocks but higher returns in the post ZLB. As a next step, we perform
an additional and complementary counterfactual exercise. We use again the average
stock holding of single women stock market participants and we approximate capital
gains of women by using the yearly average S&P, but now we assume that single women
18The coefficient 0.11 in Table 3.2 is the marginal response to a monetary policy shock the increases the
1-year Treasury yeals by 100 basis points. Thus, we need to scale it down for the actual magnitude
of the shock, 11.5 basis point.
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make the monetary policy-driven participation decision on the first year they appear
in the PSID and cannot change it until the end of the sample (2017). Suppose a single
female-headed household enters the stock market in the year 2003 and stay until 2017.
The S&P 500 index in 2003 was 500 and in 2017 it was 2000. Thus, the capital gain
during this period is (2000− 500/500) = 3, or 300%. Thus, using again stock market
participants single women’s average stock holding, the capital gain during this period
is 339646.48$. We calculate these capital gains from the stock market for every period
until 2017. Afterwards, we multiply the capital gains with the number of single female-
headed households that are affected by monetary policy. Figure 3.9 in the Appendix
presents the numbers. According to the results, between 2003 and 2017 single women
missed almost $13 bl of capital gains.






































2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Gains/losses Single female-headed households
Note: The graphs depicts: the number of single female-headed house-
holds that enter or do not enter the stock market due to monetary
shocks (red line); the single female-headed households’ biennial capital
gains/losses due to the monetary policy-driven stock market participa-
tion or non participation decision (blue bars).
In summary, we show that although the effect of monetary policy on the stock market
entry rate may seem small, the missed out capital gains can be significantly large. Due
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to the fact that single female-headed families are the poorest household group in the
USA, live the longest and often have fewer working years than other household groups,
this can have severe effects on their financial wealth, negatively affecting their already
higher probability to be living in poverty in the retirement years.
3.6 Conclusion
This Chapter investigates potential heterogeneous effects of monetary policy on stock
market investment choices of single female-headed households compared to both single
and married male-headed households using US household survey data from 2001 to
2017. Our empirical analysis shows that, on the one hand, contractionary monetary
policy negatively affects single female-headed households’ stock market participation
status, decreasing their probability of stock market entry (while this is not the case
for male headed-households). On the other hand, monetary policy does not have an
heterogeneous impact across household groups with regards to their decision to exit the
stock market or to rebalance their equity investment. Finally, we conduct a simulation
study to quantify the missed out capital gains stemming from monetary policy-driven
stock market non-participation.
We conclude that gender and marital status significantly affect how households re-
spond to central banks’ actions. Single female-headed households are more sensitive
to monetary policy cycles than male headed-households, but only if they are not al-
ready participating in the stock market. This is true even controlling for a wide range
of demographic and financial characteristics that could explain such differences. In
particular, our results indicate that such controls are important but do not explain
away gender and marital effects. Because these controls are imperfect, however, and
because unobserved differences may affect investment behavior, we interpret the re-
maining gender and marital effect on stock market entry choices as descriptive, rather
than causal.
Since our results show that monetary policy only affects the entry decisions of single
women, it is crucial to make them resilient to monetary policy adjustments and to
educate them on saving and investing. In the US, investment decisions are particularly
important for the accumulation of wealth for retirement and this is true especially
for single female-headed households, as they are the most fragile family groups and
they are more likely to live longer in retirement, having fewer working years and lower
earnings.
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3.A Monetary policy shock identification
The identification method of Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) employs high frequency
data on interest rate futures to construct a monetary policy shock measure. It identifies
the exogenous and unanticipated component of Fed’s announcements (the “shock”) by
extracting it directly from financial market responses. The identification strategy relies
on measuring the change in the futures during a narrow time window around FOMC
meetings. The idea is that right before any meeting, all public available information of
the economy is already incorporated into the financial markets and reflected in their
prices/yields. Thus, if the time span around the FOMC announcement is tight enough,
any immediate change in the futures is dominated by the information about future
monetary policy contained in the announcement itself. Moreover, by using a broad
range of interest rate futures, the measure captures not only unanticipated changes in
the Fed funds rate, but also the effect of “forward guidance” and other unconventional
monetary policies.
Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) construct the monetary policy news shock as the first
principal component of the change in five interest rate futures. The first of these is
the change in market expectations of federal funds rates during a narrow time window
around FOMC meetings. In general, the payout of the federal funds futures is calcu-
lated as the average effective federal funds rate that prevails over the calendar month
specified in the contract. Therefore, immediately before an FOMC meeting at time
t−∆t, the current-month federal funds future contract can be written as the weighted
average of (i) the federal funds rate of the month r0 (before the FOMC meeting) and








where d1 denotes the day of the FOMC meeting, D1 is the number of days in the









Thus, the change in expectations before and after the FOMC meeting can be calcu-
lated as




19Note that Gürkaynak et al. (2005) introduce a risk premium term in the equation. For simplicity,
we exclude this term.
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The second future we use is the change in expectations regarding the federal funds








where d2 and D2 are the day of that FOMC meeting and the number of days in
the month containing that FOMC meeting, respectively.20 Again, using the same
calculations as above, we are able to calculate the change in expectations at the time
of the next scheduled FOMC meeting,
mp2t ≡ Et(r2)− Et−∆t(r2) =
[








The last set of interest rate futures we use are the change in the price of three Eu-
rodollar futures at the time of the FOMC meetings. Following Nakamura and Steinsson
(2018), we use the Eurodollar futures at horizons of two, three, and four quarters in
the future.
Since only daily data is available to us, we are not able to construct the monetary
policy news shock within a 30-minute window. This can affect the exogeneity of our
measure due to a wider time span around the FOMC meetings. Nevertheless, Pi-
azzesi and Swanson (2008) show that a daily window is sufficient to identify exogenous
components of monetary policy announcements. As a robustness check, we download
the publicly available monetary policy shock series of Nakamura and Steinsson (2018),
which stops in 2014 (our sample is until 2017) and apply them to our empirical analysis.
The results remain robust.
20The next scheduled FOMC meeting can occur between the next month up to three months after
the current meeting.
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3.B Figures
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Note: This figure shows the cross sectional distribution of PSID inter-
views over the year 2003-2017.
Source: PSID
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2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Nakamura and Steinnson (2018)'s monetary shock
Monetary policy news shock
Note: This figure shows two monetary policy shock series. The original
Nakamura and Steinsson (2018)’s monetary shock series (dashed orange
line) is constructed as the first principal component of the daily change in
five interest rate futures around Fed’s FOMC meetings and is estimated
using intradaily data and is available until end-2014. The monetary
policy news shocks (solid black line) is constructed as the first principal
component of the daily change in five interest rate futures around Fed’s
FOMC meetings using daily data. In both cases the included futures
are the federal funds futures (the current-month contract rate and the
contract rates for each of the next three months) and Eurodollar futures
(at two to four quarters in the future). Both shocks are scaled to have a
100 basis point impact on the 1-year US Treasury yield.
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2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Target shock Monetary policy news shock
Note: This figure shows two monetary policy shocks estimated at a daily
frequency over the 2001 − 2017 period. The target shocks (dashed blue
line) are constructed as the first principal component out of three of the
daily change in five interest rate futures around Fed’s FOMC meetings.
The monetary policy news shocks (solid black line) are constructed as the
first principal component of the daily change in five interest rate futures
around Fed’s FOMC meetings. In both cases the included futures are the
federal funds futures (the current-month contract rate and the contract
rates for each of the next three months) and Eurodollar futures (at two
to four quarters in the future). Both shocks are scaled to have a 100
basis point impact on the 1-year US Treasury yield.
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2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Cumulated gains/losses Single female-headed households
Note: The graphs depicts: the number of single female-headed households
that enter or do not enter the stock market due to monetary shocks (red line);
the single female-headed households’ capital gains/losses due to the monetary
policy-driven stock market participation or non participation decision cumu-
lated from the first wave they appear in the PSID (on the x-axis) to the end
of the sample, 2017 (blue bars).
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3.C Tables
Table 3.7: Summary statistics - unweighted sample
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
All households Single female-headed HHs Male-headed HHs
Panel A: Full sample
Stock market participation 0.23 0.42 0.12 0.33 0.25 0.43
Stock market exit 0.33 0.47 0.39 0.49 0.32 0.47
Stock market entry 0.09 0.29 0.06 0.23 0.10 0.30
Stock holding 41225.61 545474.93 9226.45 75603.48 46975.97 591304.09
Riskless asset holding 22894.65 78762.07 10111.35 27983.65 25163.57 84503.71
Stock active saving 240986.52 12062381.55 205432.69 10481270.23 247823.64 12335552.57
Riskless asset active saving 4980.50 79403.64 1052.36 26494.25 5673.18 85480.07
Liquid asset holding 77781.49 613284.96 28763.40 162369.97 86579.55 662079.63
Stocks/liquid assets 0.13 0.28 0.07 0.22 0.14 0.29
Net worth 300973.88 1180274.72 140516.41 1030338.20 329636.15 1203852.51
Income 88062.41 111588.71 44404.58 34914.10 95799.12 118539.65
Home ownership 0.82 0.39 0.62 0.49 0.85 0.36
Observations 17496 2628 14837
Panel B: Stock market participants
Stocks 225329.34 1347519.14 94468.94 247749.63 235573.54 1396764.47
Riskless assets 53373.19 146875.34 31682.75 53956.23 55076.49 151616.12
Stock active saving 3421.39 31033.94 -207.80 5844.05 3705.44 32168.53
Riskless asset active saving 12196.13 148708.05 4923.89 51471.68 12765.47 153712.16
Liquid assets 308648.77 1485082.53 150920.92 368328.37 321018.26 1537715.64
Stocks/liquid assets 0.59 0.30 0.59 0.31 0.59 0.29
Net worth 808553.83 2160744.22 792217.26 3523859.95 810332.24 2018914.54
Income 139634.08 193253.61 63216.63 70290.99 145537.43 198467.16
Home ownership 0.93 0.26 0.86 0.35 0.93 0.25
Observations 2389 162 2227
Note: The table shows the summary statistics of the relevant wealth and income variables included in the
analysis. Panel A presents figures for the full sample; Panel B for the sub-sample of stock market participants
(at least $1 invested in stock in both t− 1 and t). The sample period is 2001-2017.
Source: PSID and own calculations.
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Table 3.8: Summary statistics of the monetary policy news shocks, 2001-2017
High-frequency monetary Biennial household-specific
policy news shocks monetary policy news shocks
Mean 0.001 0.039
Median 0.007 0.080
Std. Dev. 0.034 0.177
Min -0.182 -0.433
Max 0.127 0.306
Note: Summary statistics of monetary shocks over the period 2001-2017.
The shocks are all scaled to have a 100 basis point impact on the 1-year
Treasury bond yields. The high frequency monetary policy news shocks
are constructed as the first principal component of the daily change in five
interest rate futures around Fed’s FOMC meetings. The included futures
are the federal funds futures (the current-month contract rate and the
contract rates for each of the next three months) and Eurodollar futures
(at two to four quarters in the future). The biennial household-specific
monetary news shocks are obtained by summing up the monetary policy
shock series at the daily frequency (Figure 3.1) within a two-year window
that depends on the household’s interview month to the PSID survey in
each wave.
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Table 3.9: Monetary policy and riskless asset active saving - alternative US Treasury
maturities to calculate riskless active saving
1-year US Treasury 2-year US Treasury 10-year US Treasury
Riskless Act. Sav Riskless Act. Sav. Riskless Act. Sav
(1) (2) (3)
MP -1034.0 -745.6 -1076.6
(46378.2) (46389.6) (46547.5)
MP × Head 1949.8 1384.3 -92.3
(41660.9) (41681.6) (41549.6)
MP ∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.089***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
MP ∗ × Head -0.700∗ -0.696 -0.686
(0.423) (0.424) (0.426)
Constant yes yes yes
Other inter. terms yes yes yes
Financial var., lag yes yes yes
Demographics, lag yes yes yes
Household FE yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes
Observations 2,389 2,389 2,389
R2 0.10 0.10 0.10
Note: This table the presents results of the fixed effect model in Equation (3.6) estimated
using the sub-sample of households participating in the stock market over the years 2001-
2017. In all columns the dependent variable is the riskless asset active saving, calculated
using the US Treasury maturity that appears in the first row (for a detailed explanation of
the methodology used to calculate the riskless asset active saving, please refer to Section
3.2.1.2). The dummy Headi is equal to 1 if the household head is single and female, it
is equal to 0 if the household head is male. The variable MPi,t is the household-level
biennial monetary policy shock series constructed in Section 3.3. The variable MP ∗i,t
is the interaction between MPi,t and the household’s lagged value of the liquid assets,
Wi,t−1. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the household level. ∗, ∗∗, and
∗∗∗ represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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Table 3.10: Monetary policy and stock active saving - robustness checks
Dummy Head = 1 if Single female-headed HH
VS
Dummy Head = 0 if Male-headed HH




MP × Head 4689.4 6775.6
(6355.6) (6027.1)
MP ∗ -0.002∗ -0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001)
MP ∗ × Head 0.065 0.058
(0.129) (0.036)
Constant yes yes
Other inter. terms yes yes
Financial var., lag yes yes
Demographics, lag yes yes
Household FE yes yes
Time FE yes yes
Observations 2,389 2,660
R2 0.01 0.01
Note: This table presents the results of the fixed effect model in Equa-
tion (3.6) estimated using the sub-sample of households participating in
the stock market over the years 2001-2017. The dependent variable is
the stock active saving. In Column (1) the monetary policy exposure
variable is the household’s lagged value of the liquid assets (instead of
the lagged value of the stock investment). Column 2 includes house-
holds that participate in the PSID survey for at least two consecutive
waves (insted of at least three consecutive waves). The dummy Headi
is equal to 1 if the household head is single and female, it is equal to 0
if the household head is male. The variable MPi,t is the household-level
biennial monetary policy shock series constructed in Section 3.3. The
variableMP ∗i,t is the interaction betweenMPi,t andWi,t−1, the monetary
policy exposure variable. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered
at the household level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent statistical significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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Table 3.11: Monetary policy and riskless active saving - only households that partici-
pate in the PSID survey for at least two consecutive waves
Dummy Head = 1 if Single female-headed HH
VS
Dummy Head = 0 if Male-headed HH




MP × Head -5018.0 19281.7
(52797.8) 39957.9
MP ∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗
(0.010) (0.012)
MP ∗ × Head 0.306 0.653
(0.518) (0.440)
Constant yes yes
Other inter. terms yes yes
Financial var., lag yes yes
Demographics, lag yes yes
Household FE yes yes
Time FE yes yes
Observations 2,389 2,660
R2 0.03 0.00
Note: This table presents the results of the fixed effect model in Equation
(3.6) estimated using the sub-sample of households participating in the stock
market over the years 2001-2017. The dependent variable is the riskless asset
active saving. In Column (1) the monetary policy exposure variable is the
household’s lagged value of the liquid assets (instead of the lagged value of
the stock investment). Column (2) includes household that participate in
the PSID survey for at least two consecutive waves (insted of at least three
consecutive waves). The dummy Headi is equal to 1 if the household head is
single and female, it is equal to 0 if the household head is male. The variable
MPi,t is the household-level biennial monetary policy shock series constructed
in Section 3.3. The variableMP ∗i,t is the interaction betweenMPi,t andWi,t−1,
the monetary policy exposure variable. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered at the household level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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Table 3.12: Monetary policy and stock active saving - households at the top and bottom
of their respective group’s liquid asset distribution
Dummy Head = 1 if Single female-headed HH
VS
Dummy Head = 0 if Male-headed HH
Top 50% of the Bottom 50% of the








MP ∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.050
(0.002) (0.087)
MP ∗ ×Headtop 0.010
(0.077)
MP ∗ ×Headbottom 0.298
(0.298)
Constant yes yes
Other inter. terms yes yes
Financial var., lag yes yes
Demographics, lag yes yes
Household FE yes yes
Time FE yes yes
Observations 1,194 1,195
R2 0.01 0.01
Note: This table presents the results of the fixed effect model in Equation (3.6)
over the years 2001-2017. Only households participating in the stock market both
in t − 1 and t are included. The dependent variables is stock active saving. In
Column (2) the dummy Headtop,i is equal to 1 if the household head is single,
female and in the top 50% of its household group liquid asset distribution; it is
equal to zero 0 if the household head is male and in the top 50% of its household
group liquid asset distribution. In Column (2) the dummy Headbottom,i is equal to 1
if the household head is single, female and in the bottom 50% of its household group
liquid asset distribution; it is equal to zero 0 if the household head is male and in the
bottom 50% of its household group liquid asset distribution. The variable MPi,t is
the household-level biennial cumulated monetary policy shock series constructed in
Section 3.3. The variableMP ∗i,t is the interaction betweenMPi,t and the household’s
lagged stock holding, Wi,t−1. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the
household level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels.
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Table 3.13: Entry rate with and without monetary policy shocks
Biennial MP Entry rate Entry rate ∆ entry S&P 500
shock with MP without MP rate biennial return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2003 0.115 0.104 0.105 -0.001 -0.031
2005 0.317 0.082 0.085 -0.003 0.123
2007 0.061 0.078 0.079 -0.001 0.176
2009 -0.127 0.065 0.064 0.001 -0.241
2011 0.107 0.039 0.039 -0.001 0.128
2013 0.124 0.057 0.058 -0.001 0.470
2015 0.088 0.032 0.032 -0.000 0.106
2017 0.064 0.057 0.057 -0.000 0.308
Note: This table provides information on the biennial cumulated mon-
etary policy shocks (Column 1, see Section 3.5 for construction); the
single female-headed household entry rate in the stock market taking
into account the effect of monetary policy (Column 2, provided by the
PSID); the single female-headed household entry rate in the stock mar-
ket excluding the effect of monetary policy (Column 3, authors’ own
calculations); the difference between entry rate with and without mone-
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